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jointly determine its sense, the conditions under which it is coherent to assert that
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this starting point the dissertation develops a theory of quantification as marking
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sentences. The dissertation concludes by applying the developed theory of meaning
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of contingentism are raised and addressed. The resulting logic is shown to meet all
the requirement that the dissertation lays out for a theory of meaning for quantifiers
and modal operators.
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Preface
This dissertation takes as its starting point the view that an account of the meaning
of sentences must ultimately be given in terms of when it is incoherent to assert
or deny those sentences. In this sense the work is an expansion on a bilateralist
theory of meaning proposed by Rumfitt [59] and later Restall [50]. It, however, goes
beyond these theories in many respects. One of the guiding lights of the dissertation
is that assertion and denial alone are not enough to generate a theory of meaning for
modal and quantifier expressions. These need to be supplemented with an account
of how language can reflect on the norms governing assertion and denial in the case
of modality and an account of assertion and denial-like uses of names in the case
of quantification. Ultimately, this dissertation takes its cue from Dummett’s The
Logical Basis of Metaphysics : it attempts to shed light on difficult metaphysical
questions by an examination of a theory of the meaning of the expressions used in
discussion of those metaphysical questions.
Chapter 1 lays out what things are taken for granted in this dissertation. In
particular, it is taken for granted that the use of an expression determines its meaning
in the way discussed above. It also holds the Fregean thesis that expressions in a
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language have both a sense and a reference. I argue from these assumptions to
various constraints on an adequate theory of the meaning of an expression. Of
particular importance for this work is that these constraints on a theory of meaning
can be formalized. This sets a criterion of adequacy over all the work done in this
dissertation. Any set of rules that does not meet the formal constraints on a theory
of meaning cannot underwrite a theory of meaning.
Chapters 2 and 3 apply the results of chapter 1 to the case of modal operators. It
is shown that standard accounts of modality merely in terms of assertion and denial
are not formally adequate. I propose an alternative. A set of assertions and denials
can be thought of as a description of how things are. Descriptions in a language are
not independent of one another. It is possible to reflect on which descriptions are
coherent and which are not. This forms the basis of the theory of modal expressions
on offer. This account of modality is formalized by the notion of a hypersequent.1
Chapter 2 shows that hypersequent calculi are formally adequate for a range of modal
logics.
Chapter 3 discusses modality in the particular case of the operator ‘it ought to be
the case that. . . ’. It is taken for granted that the appropriate logic for this operator is
the modal logic D. The hypersequent account of that logic is shown in that chapter to
be formally adequate. The chapter concludes by offering a preliminary interpretation
of that formal system as a theory of meaning. It is coherent to deny ‘It ought to
be the case that ϕ’ only if it is coherent to deny ‘ϕ’ in the relatively morally ideal
description of the world and given a relatively morally ideal description of the world
1In some chapters, e.g. chapter 7 hypersequents are referred to as ‘hyperpositions’.
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wherein it is coherent to deny ‘ϕ’ it is coherent to deny ‘It ought to be the case that
ϕ’.
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss a theory of meaning for quantifiers. Chapter 4 clarifies
arguments made by Sellars [63, 67] that not all quantification is ontologically sig-
nificant. In particular, one can assert sentences of the form ‘a is something’ (Dffa)
without incurring commitment to there being some thing which the entity denoted
by ‘a’ is. Sellars’s argument for this conclusion leads him to gesture towards a formal
account of quantification that he never fully fleshes out. Chapter 4 argues that the
account of quantification that is required by Sellars is one on which it is coherent to
assert ‘something is red’ iff it is there is an expansion of my language by a term ‘t’
such that it is coherent to assert ‘t is red’.
Chapter 5 gives a formal account of ontological commitment to show why someone
adopting the standard account of quantification in terms of a satisfaction relation
would be forced to hold that all quantification is ontologically significant. In other
words, on the standard account of quantification if one asserts the sentence ‘a is
something’ one is committed to there being some thing which the entity denoted
by ‘a’ is. It then shows formally that on the account of quantification introduced in
chapter 4 this result can be avoided. The chapter concludes by discussing the upshots
of this approach for ontology generally. In particular, the ontological commitments
one can incur in a language depend only tangentially on what forms of quantification
that language adopts. The primary locus of ontological commitment is located in
what one is committed to there being by commitment to atomic sentences.
Chapter 6 applies the lessons of the previous chapters on ontological commitment
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to the case of first-order quantification. It argues that, as in the modal case, the bare
notions of assertion and denial are insufficient to characterize all that is done with
quantification and names. In addition to those uses of sentences there are also uses
of names. Names can be accepted or rejected. These uses of names bear the same
relation to denotation and lack thereof as assertion and denial of sentences bear to
truth and falsity. In particular, it is shown that there is an adequate formal account
of the first-order quantifier under consideration.
The dissertation concludes by combing all the work of the previous chapters and
applying it to the debate between necessitism and contingentism. Williamson [74]
argues that the proper account of second-order logic that is paired with the account
of first-order quantification discussed in chapter 6 is one on which various impor-
tant principles of second-order modal logic would fail to hold. This chapter shows
that even if the analogous account of second-order quantification is adopted those
principles do not fail. It also argues against Prior [43] who held that maintaining
the principle that a thing exists if and only if there is something true of it requires
denying the modal rule of necessitation and the interdefinability of necessity and pos-
sibility. The logic that results from these arguments is a Predicative Higher-order
Intensional Logic (PHIL). PHIL is a logic for alethic modality that is developed from
the accounts of modality developed in chapters 2 and 3 and quantification developed
in chapters 4 to 6. The dissertation concludes with a proof that PHIL is an adequate
formal account of a theory of meaning for higher-order modal logic.
The main upshot of the dissertation is that there is a viable inferentialist account
of modality and quantification. Furthermore, the theory of meaning presented is not
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only adequate by its own lights, but can be shown to be extensionally equivalent
to most higher-order logics that are applied in linguistics. This suggests that an
inferentialist philosophical account of meaning can be made consistent with current
work in linguistics. While this conclusion is far from established, the work done in
this dissertation shows that it is a possibility. More generally the dissertation offers
an inferentialist account of meaning that does not differ from standard referentialist
accounts in terms of the inferences that are validated. The two theories, as far as
the inferential data is concerned, agree.
Finally, the dissertation suggests a novel approach to issues in ontology and meta-
physics. These fields have been dominated by Quine’s [47] claim that “to be assumed
as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.” If this
dissertation is correct then that account of ontological commitment is not the only
coherent one available. The final chapter shows that the account of meaning devel-
oped in this dissertation can be used to motivate a plausible logic for contingentism.
A logic whose expressive powers are that of a higher-order modal logic, but whose
ontological commitments can be taken to be only objects (as opposed to properties,
attributes, etc.) which exist in the actual world (as opposed to every possible world).
The implication of this is that investigations into language are not necessarily meta-
physically neutral. A study of language can exonerate views that may be implausible
because other theories of meaning are taken as given.
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Chapter 1
Theories of Meaning
Abstract. This chapter begins by singling out the objects of study of this disser-
tation as human languages: those languages that a human being could come to use
in the practice of describing. It sets out what the constraints on offering a theory
of meaning for such a language is and discusses those constraints in the context of
classical propositional logic.
Keywords. Inferentialism, Sense and Reference, Theory of Meaning, Uniqueness,
Cut-Admissibility
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1.1 The Object of Study
This work takes language to be a broad category. The objects of study are the pure
symbolic systems used for offering descriptions of things.1
These systems are called pure because one and the same symbolic system can
be embodied in different media. One could write the system of natural numbers in
base ten notation or base twelve notation without any loss of content. One could
speak English in a variety of ways or opt for a vow of silence and only write English.
As Sellars pointed out, there are many ways to play the same game of chess, one
could play with wooden pieces on a standard board or on the counties of Texas with
cars. These are embodiments of the same game. This dissertation is not concerned
with the particular embodiments that a language might take but with the symbolic
structures themselves.
The objects of study are also not necessarily languages that are what linguists call
‘natural languages’, or languages that a person could learn as their first language. In
principle mathematicians can, as Frege hoped, converse with one another in formal
languages. There are sentences of a formal language, for instance the Go¨del sentence,
that it is unlikely a person could learn when learning a natural language in the
linguists sense but that mathematicians nonetheless call true. These sentences belong
to languages that have some role in describing things, but it is far from clear that
they are languages that a human being could learn as their first language.
The objects of study for this investigation are those languages that human beings
1The word ‘things’ is used here merely as a way of generalizing over the object of description.
There is no presumption here that a thing described must be of a certain ontological category or
have a metaphysical status.
2
could use to describe things. They need not be languages that a person could learn
first but they are languages that humans can employ in giving a description of how
things are.
This requirement itself imposes some restrictions on the objects of study. Humans
could not use a language that is not recursively definable. Without a finite way of
characterizing the good inferences of a language there is no way a human could come
to be competent in that language.
Language, in the sense described above, is the vehicle by which humans describe
the world. A theory of meaning for a language or set of languages offers a clearer view
of the relationship between language and the world. The goal of this dissertation is
to offer a theory of meaning for expressions that have something like the sense of
“something”, “everything”, “It might have been the case that”, “It is necessarily the
case that”, and related expressions in English.
1.2 Sense and Reference
A theory of meaning for a language like English would explain the difference between
the sentence2 “It is snowing but it is not cold” and “It is snowing and it is not cold”.
In so doing it would say what contribution ‘but’ makes to the meaning of sentences
in which it occurs and how that is different from the contribution which ‘and’ makes.
While the meaning of the above two sentences is different there is an important aspect
of their meaning that they share. In any situation where it would not be wrong to
2Here and throughout I use ‘sentence’ as synonymous with ‘declarative sentence’. A complete
theory of meaning would have to account for the meanings of imperative, interrogative, and other
uses of language. Those are set to the side in this work.
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respond to an assertion of one with “That is correct” it would not be wrong to
respond in the same way to the other.3 Similarly if it would not be wrong to respond
to one with “That’s wrong” it would not be wrong to respond to the other in the
same way. The situations in which one would not be wrong in asserting or denying
either sentence are exactly the same. The aspect of meaning that determines this
feature of these sentences is called their sense.
The sense of a sentence is the part of the meaning of a sentence that is most
closely related to the descriptive content of that sentence. The sense of a sentence
determines what ways the world would have to be if that sentence were true or false.
A second part of the meaning of a sentence – where ‘meaning’ is taken as a broad
category – is the truth value of that sentence. Call this aspect of a sentence its
reference. The reference of a sentence is that aspect of its meaning that a person
might still be ignorant of even if they knew perfectly well how to use that sentence.
Call any feature of the meaning of a sentence that is not its sense but relates to its
proper use its tone. The sense and reference of “It is snowing but it is not cold”
and “It is snowing and it is not cold” are thus the same. These two sentences differ
only in tone. A person can know both the sense and the tone of the sentence “It
is raining in Washington D.C. on August 1, 2016” without knowing the reference of
that sentence.
The main assumption of this work is that the sense of a sentence along with the
contribution of the world determines the reference of that sentence. The sense of a
sentence determines the way things would have to be in order for that sentence to
3It is important that the sense of a sentence is not thereby to be identified with the situations
in which it would not be inappropriate to call a sentence true or false.
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be true or false. An account of what the senses of a class of sentences are thus lays
bare what it would take for those sentences to be true or false. This assumption
explains how a theory of meaning can be philosophically enlightening. Physicists,
mathematicians, ethicists, etc. offer descriptions of the way things are. A physi-
cist offers a description of physical reality, a mathematician offers a descriptions of
mathematical reality, an ethicist offers a description of ethical reality, etc.
The specific focus of this work is to offer an account of the sense of quantifiers
and modal expressions. A quantifier is an expression that is used to generalize
over some syntactic category. Some paradigm cases of quantifiers are the English
words ‘something’, ‘everything’, and ‘nothing’. These expressions can be used to
generalize over the syntactic category of singular terms. For instance, “Something
is a dog”, “Nothing is a dog”, and “Everything is a dog” are all sentences that
have a quantifier in a place where a name could be, e.g. “Clifford is a dog”. It is
this feature of quantifiers that accounts for Polyphemus’s misfortune when he was
blinded by Odysseus. Odysseus tells Polyphemus that his name is ‘No one’, so when
Polyphemus exclaims ‘No one has blinded me’ he does not communicate that he has
been blinded. There are many quantifiers in English, e.g. ‘exactly three’, ‘a few’, and
‘most’. It has long been philosophical orthodoxy that the only genuine quantifiers
of a language – where ‘language’ has the meaning discussed in section 1.1 – are ones
that generalize over the syntactic category of singular terms. One of the results of
this work is that there is nothing in principle wrong with generalizing over syntactic
categories other than singular terms.
Modal operators, unlike ‘and’ and ‘or’ are not truth-functional. In general, the
5
truth value of a sentence whose main operator is a modal expression does not depend
on the truth values of its component sentences. For example, the expression ‘Phoebe
believes that’ is the main operator of the sentence “Phoebe believes that it is raining”.
That sentence may be true if the sentence “It is raining” is true and even if it is not.
Other modal expressions include, ‘it ought to be the case that’, ‘it was the case that’,
and ‘it is possible that’.
For expressions which are not sentences their senses are the contribution that they
make to sentences in which they occur. ‘And’ and ‘but’ have same sense because,
as discussed above, substituting one for the other in a sentence will not change
the sense of that sentence. It is this feature of language that explains how it is
possible that language users can understand the senses of novel sentences. Many
of the sentences in the above paragraphs have never been spoken or written before.
Despite this fact they are intelligible to someone who understands the senses of the
words they feature. If the contribution that an expressions makes to sentences in
which it occurs is systematic, it is possible to offer an explanation of this important
feature of language users. They need only grasp a finite number of senses as well
as the rules for how to combine those senses to be able to grasp the sense of novel
expressions. This aspect of the theory of meaning is called compositionality. Any
account of the sense of expressions must be compositional. An account of meaning
that is not compositional must provide an alternative explanation of how language
users could come to understand novel sentences.
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1.3 Assertion, Denial, and Positions
An assumption of this dissertation is that the meaning of an expression is determined
by its use. The paradigm way in which language describes the world is through
assertion and denial. It is these uses of sentences that determines their sense. The
conditions under which it is not wrong to assert or deny a sentence are determined by
the sense of that sentence. A position is a group of assertions and denials. Positions
themselves can be thought of as descriptions. A person making assertions and denials
on a particular subject is offering a position on that subject.
In a narrow sense, there may be only one position which is not wrong, the position
that asserts all of the truths and denies all of the falsehoods. More broadly though,
some positions can be shown to be wrong on the basis of the senses of the sentences
that they assert or deny alone. For instance, the position that asserts and denies the
same sentence is wrong. If a person asserts and denies the same sentence either the
asserted sentence does not have the same sense as the denied sentence or that person
has made a rational mistake. Another way of putting this point is that assertion
and denial are exclusive speech acts. If a position is wrong in this way, it is called
incoherent. A position that is not wrong in this way is called coherent. Positions
other than the one that asserts and denies the same sentence are incoherent, e.g.
the position that asserts ‘It is raining and it is snowing’ and denies ‘It is snowing’.
The incoherence of those positions, however, is recursively specified by the rules that
fix the sense of expressions occurring in them and the incoherence of asserting and
denying the same thing.
A controversial question in the philosophy of language is whether denial can be
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explained in terms of assertion or not (see e.g. Dummett [13], or Rumfitt [59]).
Dummett [13] offers a theory of meaning that takes assertion to be the primitive
notion. He then claims that to deny a sentence is to assert its negation. Such
a theory is called unilateralist. Part of the framework for the theory of meaning
offered here is that there are two primitive notions required to determine the sense
of a sentence. A view of this sort is called bilateralist. Following Rumfitt [59] and
Restall [50] the two primitive uses of a sentence that determine its sense are the rules
governing its assertion and denial. Position contain room for assertion and room for
denial neither of which can be explained in terms of the other.
The challenge for the unilateralist is to explain denial in terms of other speech
acts. Traditionally, unilateralists attempt to explain the denial of a sentence ‘S’ in
terms of an assertion of the negation of ‘S’. But in order for someone asserting ‘not-
S’ to be denying ‘S’, the connective ‘not’ must have a feature that explains why an
assertion of ‘not-S’ entails that ‘S’ ought to be denied.
Negation in unilateralist theories therefore plays a special role. In general to deny
a sentence ‘S’ is to assert the negation of ‘S’. The challenge then is to substantiate
this claim. One way to show why this is the case is to hold that the logical form
of ‘not-S’ is ‘if S then K’, where ‘K’ is a special sentences. ‘K’ is special because
it is supposed to come with ought-to-be-deniedness built in. It would be unhelpful
for a unilateralist to take this feature of ‘K’ to be primitive. That either pushes the
question back – a unilateralist must explain why ‘K’ ought to be denied in terms of
assertion – or violates the unilateralist principle that only one speech act is taken as
primitive – that ‘K’ ought to be denied is not explained in terms of assertion.
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Philosophers such as [13] opt for the former option. They attempt to explain
why ‘K’ ought to be denied in terms of assertion. The strategy is to say that ‘K’
ought to be denied because an assertion of ‘K’ commits one to the truth of every
sentence of the language. But this cannot explain why K ought to be denied unless
the conjunction of every sentence also ought to be denied. Perhaps the response on
the part of the unilateralist should be that the conjunction of every sentence ought
to be rejected because it cannot be true. But this is only a feature of a language once
it already has negation or a conditional – there is nothing wrong with asserting the
conjunction of all atomic sentences. Thus, there must be something about negation
or the conditional that explains why ‘K’ ought to be denied. It is unclear what
features of these connectives can offer an explanation of denial in terms of assertion.
If ‘S and not-S’ ought to be denied and ‘not-S’ is explained as ‘if S then K’ then
we are back where we began: that sentence ought to be denied because it entails ‘K’
and ‘K’ ought to be denied.
1.4 The Senses of the Sentential Connectives
A sentential connective is an expression that produces a sentence when combined
with other sentences. Common examples in English are ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘it is not the
case that’. A sentence is just the sort of thing that can be asserted or denied. A
person cannot assert a table, a chair, or a number. Similarly a person cannot assert
a name or predicate.4 A person can assert ‘It is raining’. Since ‘It is raining’ is a
4While a person cannot assert a name, it is argued in chapter 6 that there is an analogous use of
names to that of assertion for sentences. These uses of names are called ‘acceptance’ and ‘rejection’.
Accepting a name is bears the same relation to the fact that that name denotes as assertion of a
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sentence and ‘it is not the case that’ is a one-place sentential connective ‘It is not
the case that it is raining’ is a sentence. Certain sentential connectives play a crucial
role in offering a theory of meaning for modal and quantificational expressions. In
particular the correlates to the English expressions ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘it is not the case that’,
and ‘if ... then ...’ lay the foundation for investigation launched in this work. These
are called the extensional sentential connectives. This section discusses the theory
of the meaning for these connectives.
Formal tools are helpful in making clear and precise any theory. A theory of
meaning is no exception to this rule. The notion of a sentence, a position, and other
notions discussed above can be formalized.
The language under considerationL consists of an infinite set of atomic sentences
p1, q1, r1, p2, q2, . . .. The translation of atomic sentences into English is arbitrary.
Some translations (perhaps all) of atomic sentences into English make it the case
that it is incoherent to assert Γ and deny ∆ where Γ and ∆ are sets of atomic
sentences. For the purposes of this work this feature of some specific translation is
ignored. The senses of atomic sentences are assumed as given and are assumed not
to rule any assertion or denial of other atomic sentences out. The set of sentential
connectives that will be considered are ‘ ’, ‘^’, ‘_’, and ‘Ñ’ (translated roughly as
‘it is not the case that’, ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘if . . . then ’). The sentences of L are
generated according to the recursive clause
• For any atomic sentence p, p is an element of L .
sentence does to the fact that that sentence is true. Similarly, to reject a name is to take it that
there is nothing that that name denotes. Acceptance and rejection of names are however different
speech acts than assertion and denial of sentences.
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• For any sentences ϕ and ψ,  ϕ, pϕ ^ ψq, pϕ _ ψq, and pϕ Ñ ψq are elements
of L .
• Nothing else is an element of L .
If Γ and Σ are sets of sentences then Γ ñ Σ is the position that one would take up
by asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ. If a position is incoherent this is indicated
by prefixing it with a turnstile, $. For instance $ Γ ñ Σ indicates that the position
Γ ñ Σ is incoherent.
1.4.1 Structural Rules
Some facts about which positions are incoherent follow immediately from the features
of assertion and denial. It is noted above that assertion and denial are exclusive
speech acts. It is incoherent to assert and deny the same sentence. If a person
asserts and denies the same sentence then either they are not using those sentences
univocally or they are making a rational mistake. Put formally, any position of the
form ϕñ ϕ is incoherent, i.e. $ ϕñ ϕ.
A calculus offers a systematic way of relating positions to one another. In partic-
ular incoherent positions are linked with other incoherent positions in statements of
the form “If Γ1 ñ Σ1, . . . , Γn ñ Σn are incoherent then ∆ ñ Λ is incoherent”. To
keep notation short and clear this conditional statement is replaced by a horizontal
bar with the positions of the antecedent above the bar and the conclusion below the
bar, e.g.
Γ1 ñ Σ1 . . . Γn ñ Σn
∆ ñ Λ
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The fact that assertion and denial are rationally exclusive acts is written in this
new notation as
Γ, ϕñ ϕ,Σ
which says that no matter what is incoherent Γ, ϕñ ϕ,Σ is.
A deduction of a position Γ ñ Σ relative to a calculus C is a tree whose leaves
all have the form ∆, ϕ ñ ϕ,Λ, each of whose nodes results from the nodes above
it in accordance with a rule of C, and whose root is Γ ñ Σ. Since all instances of
∆, ϕ ñ ϕ,Λ are incoherent and the rules of a calculus preserve incoherence if there
is a deduction of Γ ñ Σ in a calculus C then Γ ñ Σ is incoherent according to C.
For each calculus that is considered the converse that if there is no deduction of a
position then that position is coherent is also assumed. In the present context this
amounts to the assumption that the only incoherent sets of assertions and denials
that are not given by rules of a calculus are positions of the form ∆, ϕñ ϕ,Λ.
A rule is R is derivable in a calculus C iff deductions of the premises of R can be
transformed into a deduction of the conclusion of R by applications of the rules of C.
A rule R is admissible for a calculus C iff whenever the premises of R are deducible
then so is its conclusion. All derivable rules are admissible but the converse does not
necessarily hold.
That Γ, ϕ ñ ϕ,Σ is incoherent is given by the rule of Id in fig. 1.1. Other
structural rules of the calculus can be justified on the basis that they are features
of the practice of assertion and denial. For instance, if it is incoherent to assert all
of Γ and deny all of Σ then it is incoherent assert all of Γ, deny all of Σ, and assert
(deny) ϕ. This corresponds to the rules of TL(R) of fig. 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Propositional Logic
Structural Rules
Id ϕñ ϕ
Γ ñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ϕñ Σ
Cut
Γ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
TR
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Operational Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ
L^
Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ Σ
Γ, ϕñ Σ Γ, ψ ñ Σ
L_
Γ, ϕ_ ψ ñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ψ ñ Σ
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ ñ ψ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ
Γ ñ ϕ, ψ,Σ
R_
Γ ñ ϕ_ ψ,Σ
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
RÑ
Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
The validity of Cut
Γ, ϕñ Σ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Cut
Γ ñ Σ
entails that any coherent position can be expanded to a maximally coherent position.
Cut read from top to bottom indicates that if Γ ñ Σ is coherent then for any sentence
ϕ either Γ, ϕñ Σ is coherent or Γ ñ ϕ,Σ is coherent. A maximal coherent position
is a coherent position that either asserts or denies every sentence of the language.
The validity of Cut guarantees that for any coherent position there is a maximally
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coherent position that asserts and denies at least all the same things as the original
position. Maximal coherent positions play a crucial role in chapter 5.
One of the fundamental assumptions of this work is that the sense of a sentence
determines its reference. The contribution that an expression – for now the only ones
under consideration are the sentential connectives – makes to the sense of sentences
in which it occurs is given by its operational rules. The sense of atomic sentences
are throughout taken as given. A theory of the senses of atomic sentences is left for
future work.5
If one knew the sense of a sentence one might still not know the reference of that
sentence. What the reference of a sentence is, its truth value, is a product of the
sense of that sentence and the way things are. The sense of a sentence determines its
reference in the following way. The sense of a sentence determines the set of coherent
positions given an assertion or denial of that sentence. If one knew how the world
was with respect to those positions or some subset of those positions then one could
determine the truth value of a sentence. If one knew the sense of a sentence and the
way the world was then one would know the reference of that sentence.
The senses of sentences in a position determine complete stories of the world,
i.e. maximal coherent positions, that are extensions of that position. This is made
clear during the construction of a completeness proof such as theorem 1.6.2 where the
operational rules governing sentences are used to expand a position. Complete stories
of the world therefore are tightly linked with the notions of sense and reference. If a
person knew all of the facts (independently of how they are expressed in a language)
5As is apparent in chapter 5 a theory of the senses of atomic sentences is required for a full
account of how the ontological commitments of a position are to be determined.
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and knew the senses of every sentence in a language then they would be able to
determine the reference of each of those sentences. The senses of sentences determine
which complete positions are complete stories of the world, that is, they determine
which positions that assert or deny every sentence of the language are coherent.
In actual practice, the sense of a sentence determines a set of complete stories of
the world. One position ∆ ñ Λ is an extension of another Γ ñ Σ iff Γ Ď ∆ and
Σ Ď Λ. Let Γ ñ Σ be a coherent position that asserts   p, i.e.   p P Γ. It follows
from L and R that any complete story of the world that is an extension of Γ ñ Σ
will assert the sentence p. If a person knew enough of the story of the world that
they knew that all of Γ were correctly assertible and all of Σ were correctly deniable
then they would be able to determine that the complete story of the world asserted
p given their knowledge of what  contributes to the sense of a sentence.
As mentioned above the cut rule guarantees that every coherent position can be
extended to a complete story of the world. If the cut rule were invalid then there
would be a sentence ϕ and position Γ ñ Σ such that Γ, ϕ ñ Σ and Γ ñ ϕ,Σ are
both incoherent even though Γ ñ Σ is coherent. In this case the coherent position
Γ ñ Σ cannot be extended to a complete story of the world. Since Γ ñ Σ is coherent
the world might be such that all of Γ is true and all of Σ is false. In such a scenario
there could be no complete story of the world. It would be incoherent, given that one
accepted all of Γ and rejected all of Σ, to assert ϕ or to deny ϕ. Put referentially ϕ
could neither be true nor false, it would have no referent. This violates the principle
that, for sentences at least, their sense determines their reference.6
6It is important to note that ‘reference’ here does not mean the same as ‘stands for’ or ‘bears a
significant relation to’. The term ‘reference’ in this context is only relational in its surface grammar.
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The sense of each of the connectives is given by the rules governing their assertion
and denial conditions. The R rule says that if it is incoherent to assert ϕ then it is
incoherent to deny  ϕ. Contrapositively, R says that if it is coherent to deny  ϕ
then it is coherent to assert ϕ.
Similarly the sense of the conditional is given by LÑ and RÑ. Read from bottom
to top, LÑ says that if ϕÑ ψ is coherent to assert while asserting all of Γ and denying
all of Σ then either it is coherent to assert ψ while asserting all of Γ and denying all
of Σ or it is coherent to deny ϕ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ. The
RÑ rule says that if it is coherent to deny ϕÑ ψ then it is coherent to assert ϕ and
deny ψ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ.
There is debate amongst philosophers as to whether or not the conditional whose
sense is given in the preceding paragraph should be translated as ‘if . . . then . . . ’.
This work takes no side in this debate. This should not be taken to suggest that
the formal analysis of language has no bearing on natural language. Conditionals
in natural language are as various as modal vocabulary. Whether or not there is
a sense of ‘if ϕ then ψ’ in English that is adequately translated as ϕ Ñ ψ is an
open question. If the structural rules of fig. 1.1 mirror the practices of assertion and
denial then there is no reason to suppose that a sense could not be given to such a
connective.
The targets of the theory of meaning of this work are quantifiers and modal
The claim that ‘S refers to the True’ is more perspicuously written as ‘S is true’. Similarly for names,
which do bear an important ‘standing for’ relation to object. The claim that ‘S refers to o’ is more
perspicuously written as ‘S is a name of o’. Names that stand for nothing do not therefore have
no reference in the sense being used here. Throughout I will use the term ‘denote’ for the relation
that names have to objects for which they stand.
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expressions. A theory of the senses of these expressions is given compositionally. A
full exposition of the theory of meaning here proposed would require an account of
the senses of atomic sentences. While something is said about this in chapter 4 and
chapter 5 much of the work is left to the side. The theory of meaning presented
takes for granted a theory of the senses of atomic sentences. It assumes nothing
about them except that they are determined by the rules governing their assertion
and denial.
1.5 Constraints on a Theory of Sense
Prior [44] makes it clear that not every set of rules can determine the meaning of an
expression. Consider the two-place connective whose ‘sense’ is determined by L
and R .
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ
L
Γ, ϕ ψ ñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ, ψ,Σ
R
Γ ñ ϕ ψ,Σ
If is introduced into the framework given by fig. 1.1 then all positions are
incoherent. The following deduction establishes this for an arbitrary position Γ ñ Σ.
pñ p
TL p, q ñ p
L p q ñ p
q ñ q
TR q ñ p, q
R q ñ p q
cut q ñ p
L q, pñ
L q  pñ
q ñ q
TL q, pñ q
L q pñ q
pñ p
TR pñ q, p
R pñ q p
cut pñ q
R ñ q, p
R ñ q  p
Cut ñTL/TR
Γ ñ Σ
Since there is no language in which every position is incoherent L and R cannot
determine the sense of any connective. This work does not attempt to state necessary
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and sufficient conditions for what sets of rules determine a sense. The assumptions
made so far about sense, however, entail two important features of rules on their
being meaning conferring.
The sense of a sentence is determined by the rules governing the assertion and
denial of that sentence. This entails the uniqueness constraint on what sets of rules
can by themselves determine a single sense. Let S be a set of rules proposed as
determining the meaning of the n-place connective å. Sræ { ås is the result of
replacing every occurrence of å in the rules of S by æ. Let æ be an expression whose
meaning is said to be determined by Sræ { ås. The rules S are said to uniquely
characterize the sense of å iff the following two conditions obtain in the calculus
expanded by S and Sræ { ås
U1 $ Γ, å ψ1, . . . , ψn ñ Σ iff $ Γ, ä ψ1, . . . , ψn ñ Σ
U2 $ Γ ñå ψ1, . . . , ψn,Σ iff $ Γ ñæ ψ1, . . . , ψn,Σ.
If one of U1 or U2 were to fail then the sense of ç could not be said to be determined
by the rules governing its assertion and denial. Suppose for instance that U1 failed
and that there were a position Γ ñ Σ such that $ Γ, å ψ1, . . . , ψn ñ Σ and & Γ, æ
ψ1, . . . , ψn ñ Σ. In such a case there is a complete story of the world that asserts
all of Γ and å ψ1, . . . , ψn and denies all of Σ but there is no corresponding story that
asserts æ ψ1, . . . , ψn. Since these two sentences might differ in their reference, for
instance in the case that it is correct to assert Γ and correct to deny Σ, they cannot
coincide in sense. Since, abstracting away from the particular symbols ‘å’ and ‘æ’, S
and Sræ { ås are the sets of rules, this set of rules cannot determine a single sense. If
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uniqueness fails for a set of rules S then that set of rules does not determine a single
sense for the expressions that they govern. It follows that uniqueness is a necessary
condition for a set of rules to determine the sense of an expression.
Uniqueness is not a sufficient condition for a set of rules to determine a single
meaning. L and R uniquely determine the ‘sense’ of . Let be introduced with the
rules tL ,R ur { s. The following two deductions establish along with applications
of cut establish U1 and U2 for and .
Id ϕñ ϕ
TL
ϕ, ψ ñ ϕ
L
ϕ ψ ñ ϕ
TR
ϕ ψ ñ ϕ, ψ
R
ϕ ψ ñ ϕ ψ
TL/TR
Γ, ϕ ψ ñ ϕ ψ,Σ
Id ϕñ ϕ
TL
ϕ, ψ ñ ϕ
L
ϕ ψ ñ ϕ
TR
ϕ ψ ñ ϕ, ψ
R
ϕ ψ ñ ϕ ψ
TL/TR
Γ, ϕ ψ ñ ϕ ψ,Σ
Another important feature of a calculus is that the rule of cut be admissible. This
feature is not necessarily indispensable for a set of rules to determine a sense for a
sentence but it entails some interesting properties for the senses of the expressions
being studied.
The admissibility of cut is a property of a calculus not a set of rules, and so it is
difficult to say what it would take for a set of rules to be cut-admissible except when
that set of rules is considered as a calculus in its own right. If cut is admissible then
the rules of the calculus alone guarantee that if a position is coherent then there is
a coherent maximal extension of that position.
The expressions that are being investigated are those for which operational rules
are being offered. The cut admissibility of the calculi in this work entails that each
of the expressions being studied conservatively extends the rest of the language. If
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the position Γ ñ Σ is incoherent and does not contain the expression ε then there
is a deduction of Γ ñ Σ that does not make use of any of the rules governing ε.
Contrapositively if Γ ñ Σ is incoherent then there is a deduction of Γ ñ Σ that
makes use only of the rules governing vocabulary appearing in ΓYΣ. This provides
evidence that the sense of an expression ε is determined completely by the rules
governing its use.
The structural rules of a language do not contribute to the individual senses of
a sentence. If a structural rule contributes anything to the sense of a sentence it
contributes the same thing to the sense of every sentence. Structural rules govern
the way any sentence can behave in a position. Structural rules cannot then help to
explain what is the shared between the two sentences ‘It is snowing and it is not cold’
and ‘It is snowing but its not cold’. Structural rules could also not help to explain
what the difference between ‘It is raining or it is snowing’ and ‘It is raining and it
is snowing’. Since sense was posited to explain those features of sentences it would
be superfluous to hold that the structural rules of a language make a contribution
to the senses of sentences of that language.
If cut is admissible then the calculus in question is also consistent. Consider the
calculus of fig. 1.1. If cut is admissible then for any deduction δ of Γ ñ Σ there is
a deduction δ1 of Γ ñ Σ that does not use the rule of cut. Consider the calculus
of fig. 1.1 without the rule of cut. Suppose that the position ñ were derivable
from Γ ñ Σ. It would either have to be an axiom or follow from some rule. Axioms
contain sentences and rules only add sentences to a calculus. Therefore, ñ is
not derivable. To say that a calculus is consistent is to say that & ñ ϕ ^  ϕ. In
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this setting $ ñ ϕ^ ϕ iff $ ñ as is proved by the following two deductions.
ñ
TR ñ ϕ^ ϕ
ñ ϕ^ ϕ
Id ϕñ ϕ
L ϕ, ϕñ
L^ ϕ^ ϕñ
cut ñ
Since there is no cut-free deduction of ñ , there is no cut-free deduction of
ñ ϕ^ ϕ. If cut is admissible and there is no cut-free deduction of ñ ϕ^ ϕ then
there is no deduction of ñ ϕ ^  ϕ with the cut rule. Thus, if cut is admissible
then the calculus in question is consistent.
Definition 1 (Sub-formula). The sub-formulas of a formula ϕ, written subpϕq, are
given by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
• If ϕ is atomic then subpϕq “ tϕu.
• If ϕ is  ψ then subpϕq “ subpψq Y tϕu.
• If ϕ is ψ d θ then subpϕq “ subpψq Y subpθq Y tϕu, for d P t^,_,Ñu.
If Γ is a set of formulas then subpΓq “ Ťtsubpγq : γ P Γu.
A calculus has the sub-formula property when for any deduction δ of Γ ñ Σ
there is a deduction δ1 of Γ ñ Σ such that if γ appears in any position in δ1 then
γ P subpΓYΣq. Let δ1 be a cut-free deduction of Γ ñ Σ. Since every rule of fig. 1.1,
save cut, generates formulas out of their sub-formulas or is an instance of Id, any
formula appearing in δ1 must be a sub-formula of ΓYΣ. If a calculus is cut-admissible
and δ entails Γ ñ Σ then there is a cut-free deduction of Γ ñ Σ with the above
property.
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In order to show that the calculus of fig. 1.1 is cut-admissible some lemmas are
proved first.
Lemma 1.1. All connectives can be defined in terms of ^ and  .
Proof. This is shown by showing that if ϕ is of the form ψ d θ for d P tÑ,_u then
there is a sentence γ such that
1. $ Γ, γ ñ ϕ,Σ
2. $ Γ, ϕñ γ,Σ
for any ΓY Σ.
Case 1 (d isÑ). In this case γ is the sentence  pψ^ θq. (1) and (2) are established
by the following deductions.
Id
ψ ñ ψ
TL
ϕ, ψ ñ ψ
Id ϕñ ϕ
TR
ϕñ ϕ, ψ
LÑ
ϕ, ϕÑ ψ ñ ψ
L 
ϕ, ψ, ϕÑ ψ ñ
L^
ϕ^ ψ, ϕÑ ψ ñ
R 
ϕÑ ψ ñ  pϕ^ ψq
TL/TR
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ  pϕ^ ψq,Σ
Id ϕñ ϕ
TR
ϕñ ψ, ϕ
Id
ψ ñ ψ
TL
ψ, ϕñ ψ
R 
ϕñ ψ, ψ
R^
ϕñ ψ, ϕ^ ψ
L  pϕ^ ψq, ϕñ ψ
RÑ  pϕ^ ψq ñ ϕÑ ψ
TL/TR
Γ, pϕ^ ψq ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
Case 2 (d is _). In this case γ is  p ϕ ^  ψq. The following two deductions
establish this case.
Id ϕñ ϕ
TR
ϕñ ϕ, ψ
Id
ψ ñ ψ
TR
ψ ñ ϕ, ψ
L_
ϕ_ ψ ñ ϕ, ψ
L  ϕ, ϕ_ ψ ñ ψ
L  ϕ, ψ, ϕ_ ψ ñ
L^  ϕ^ ψ, ϕ_ ψ ñ
R 
ϕ_ ψ ñ  p ϕ^ ψq
TL/TR
Γ, ϕ_ ψ ñ  p ϕ^ ψq,Σ
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Id ϕñ ϕ
TR
ϕñ ϕ, ψ
R ñ ϕ, ψ, ϕ
Id
ψ ñ ψ
TR
ψ ñ ϕ, ψ
R ñ ϕ, ψ, ψ
R^ ñ ϕ, ψ, ϕ^ ψ
L  p ϕ^ ψq ñ ϕ, ψ
R_  p ϕ^ ψq ñ ϕ_ ψ
TL/TR
Γ, p ϕ^ ψq ñ ϕ_ ψ,Σ
The proof of lemma 1.1 did not rely on cut. Therefore, if cut is admissible for
the calculus that contains only rules governing  and ^, it is admissible for the full
calculus of fig. 1.1.
1.6 Models
The calculus of fig. 1.1 corresponds to a set of models. Models are used here and
elsewhere as a tool. They have merely instrumental and no explanatory value. As
is discussed in chapter 2 they can in principle be dispensed with for philosophical
purposes.
The notion of a model is expanded throughout this work just as the notion of a
position is expanded to capture different aspects of the practice of offering a descrip-
tion of the way things are. A model in this case is a function v : L ÝÑ tT, F u such
that
• If ϕ is atomic then vpϕq P tT, F u
• If ϕ is  ψ then vpϕq “ T iff vpψq “ F .
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• If ϕ is ψ ^ θ then vpϕq “ T iff vpψq “ vpθq “ T .
A model is a counter-example to a position Γ ñ Σ iff for all γ P Γ vpγq “ T and for
all σ P Σ vpσq “ F . If there are no counter-examples to Γ ñ Σ this is written as
Γ |ù Σ.
Theorem 1.6.1 (Soundness). If $ Γ ñ Σ then Γ |ù Σ.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length deductions in fig. 1.1. Let δ be a
deduction whose last inference is I. Since the smallest deductions are instances of Id
that is the base case. There are no counter-examples to ϕ ñ ϕ because all models
are functions. The inductive hypothesis (IH) is that if δ1 is a deduction smaller than
δ then there are no counter-examples to the end sequent of δ1. There are seven other
cases to consider.
Case 1 (I is TL). In this case δ has the form
δ
...
Γ ñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Suppose that there is a model v that is a counter-example to Γ, ϕ ñ Σ. For all
γ P Γ Y tϕu vpγq “ T . It follows that for all γ P Γ vpγq “ T . Since vpσq “ F for
all σ P Σ v is a counter-example to Γ ñ Σ. This contradicts IH which entails that
there is no counter-example to Γ ñ Σ.
Case 2 (I is TR). This case is similar to the case where I is TL.
Case 3 (I is cut). For this case it is necessary to establish that for any v and ϕ
vpϕq “ T or vpϕq “ F . This is proved by induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ
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is atomic this is built into the definition of a model. Suppose that ϕ is  ψ. By the
inner inductive hypothesis (IIH) vpψq “ T or vpψq “ F . In the first case vpϕq “ T
and in the second vpϕq “ F . Suppose that ϕ is ψ ^ θ. By IIH either vpψq “ T
or vpψq “ F and either vpθq “ T or vpθq “ F . This generates four sub-cases to
consider.
c1 vpψq “ T and vpθq “ T .
c2 vpψq “ T and vpθq “ F .
c3 vpψq “ F and vpθq “ T .
c4 vpψq “ F and vpθq “ F .
In c2 – c4 it is not the case that vpψq “ vpθq “ T . It follows that vpϕq “ F and so
vpϕq “ F or vpϕq “ T . In c1 vpψq “ vpθq “ T . So vpϕq “ T and thus that vpϕq “ T
or vpϕq “ F .
In this case δ has the form
δ1
...
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
δ2
...
Γ, ϕñ Σ
cut
Γ ñ Σ
Applying IH to δ1 and δ2 yields that there are no counter-examples to Γ ñ ϕ,Σ and
there are no counter-examples to Γ, ϕ ñ Σ. Suppose for reductio that there is a
counter-example v to Γ ñ Σ . By the above proof either vpϕq “ T or vpϕq “ F . In
the first case v is a counter-example to Γ, ϕñ Σ which is impossible. In the second
case v is a counter-example to Γ ñ ϕ,Σ.
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Case 4 (I is L ). In this case δ has the form
δ
...
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
By IH there is no counter-example to Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. For reductio let v be a counter-
example to Γ, ϕ ñ Σ. In particular, vp ϕq “ T and so vpϕq “ F . It follows that
v is a counter-example to Γ ñ ϕ,Σ.
Case 5 (I is R ). This case is similar to the case where I is L .
Case 6 (I is L^). In this case δ has the form
δ
...
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ
L^
Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ Σ
By IH there is no counter-example to Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ. Suppose for reductio that there is
a counter-example v to Γ, ϕ^ψ ñ Σ. In particular vpϕ^ψq “ T so vpϕq “ vpψq “ T .
v is also a counter-example to Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ.
Case 7 (I is R^). In this case δ has the form
δ1
...
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
δ2
...
Γ ñ ψ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ
By IH there are no counter-examples to Γ ñ ϕ,Σ and Γ ñ ψ,Σ. Suppose for
reductio that v is a counter-example to Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ. In particular, vpϕ^ ψq “ F .
Either vpϕq “ F or vpψq “ F . In the first case v is a counter-example to Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
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which is impossible. In the second case v is a counter-example to Γ ñ ψ,Σ which is
also impossible.
Theorem 1.6.2 requires the definition of several structures about which some
important lemmas are proved. The first such is a tree τ constructed from a position
Γ ñ Σ written τpΓ ñ Σq. At the root of the tree is Γ ñ Σ. The tree leaves of
the tree at any stage are positions. A leaf Γ ñ Σ is open iff Γ X Σ “ H. A leaf is
called ‘closed’ if it is not open. A branch is open when it contains no closed leaves.
Let ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . be a list of the sentences of L . At each stage of construction i do the
following for each open leaf Γ ñ Σ in the construction:
1. If ϕi is atomic then do nothing.
2. If ϕi is  ψ then
• if ϕi P Γ then expand the branch of the tree under consideration by
Γ ñ ψ,Σ
Γ ñ Σ
• If ϕi P Σ then expand the branch of the tree under consideration by
Γ, ψ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
3. If ϕi is ψ ^ θ then
• If ϕi P Γ then expand the branch of the tree under consideration by
Γ, ψ, θ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
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• If ϕi P Σ then expand the branch of the tree under consideration by
Γ ñ ψ,Σ Γ ñ θ,Σ
Γ ñ Σ
4. Repeat steps (1-3) for ϕj where j ă i.
Let β “ Γ ñ Σ,Γ1 ñ Σ1, . . . be an open branch in τpΓ ñ Σq. fpβq is the
position
YiΓi ñ YiΣi
If β is an open branch where ∆j ñ Λj occurs before ∆k ñ Λk then ∆j Ď ∆k and
Λj Ď Λk. The set ą pΓ ñ Σq is the set of all fpβq for open branches β in τpΓ ñ Σq.
If a position Γ ñ Σ is such that &cf Γ ñ Σ then ą pΓ ñ Σq ‰ H where $cf Γ ñ Σ
indicates that Γ ñ Σ is provable in the calculus of fig. 1.1 without the rule of cut.
If
ą pΓ ñ Σq “ H then there are no branches in τpΓ ñ Σq that are open but in that
case τpΓ ñ Σq is a cut-free deduction of Γ ñ Σ.
Lemma 1.2. For any position ∆ ñ Λ P ą pΓ ñ Σq if  ϕ P ∆ then ϕ P Λ and if
 ϕ P Λ then ϕ P ∆.
Proof. Let β be a branch such that fpβq “ ∆ ñ Λ. Let ϕj be  ϕ. At stage j (or
later, without loss of generality let it be j) there is a position ∆1 ñ Λ1 at which ϕj
is considered. Let ∆2 ñ Λ2 be the position in β considered at stage j ` 1. At that
stage if  ϕ P ∆1 then ϕ P Λ2 and if  ϕ P Λ1 then ϕ P ∆1 by case 2 of the construction
of τpΓ ñ Σq. Since ∆2 Ď ∆ and Λ2 Ď Λ those facts hold for ∆ ñ Λ too.
Lemma 1.3. For any position ∆ ñ Λ P ą pΓ ñ Σq if ϕ ^ ψ P ∆ then ϕ P ∆ and
ψ P ∆ and if ϕ^ ψ P Λ then either ϕ P Λ or ψ P Λ.
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Proof. Let β be a branch such that fpβq “ ∆ ñ Λ. Let ϕj be  ϕ. At stage j (or
later, without loss of generality let it be j) there is a position ∆1 ñ Λ1 at which ϕj
is considered. Let ∆2 ñ Λ2 be the position in β considered at stage j ` 1. At that
stage if ϕj P ∆1 then ϕ P ∆2 and ψ P ∆2 by case 3 of the construction of τpΓ ñ Σq.
Similarly, if ϕj P Λ1 then at stage j by clause 3 the τpΓ ñ Σq branches. β either
passes through the left branch or the right branch. In the first case ϕ P Λ2. In the
second case ψ P Λ2.
Theorem 1.6.2 (Completeness). If Γ |ù Σ then $cf Γ ñ Σ.
Proof. Suppose that & Γ ñ Σ. Let ∆ ñ Λ P ą pΓ ñ Σq. ∆ ñ Λ is guaranteed to
exist because otherwise Γ ñ Σ would have a deduction. Let v be the model that
assigns all the atomic sentences in Γ T and all other atomic sentences F .
Claim 1. For all ϕ P ∆ vpϕq “ T and for all ϕ P Λ vpϕq “ F .
Proof of Claim 1. This is proved by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base
case is trivial. The inductive hypothesis (IH) is that for all formula ψ of complexity
less than ϕ if ψ P ∆ then vpψq “ T and if ψ P Λ then vpψq “ F . There are four
cases to consider
Case 1 (ϕ is  ψ and ϕ P ∆). By lemma 1.2 ψ P Λ. By IH, vpψq “ F . It follows that
vpϕq “ T .
Case 2 (ϕ is  ψ and ϕ P Λ). This case is similar to the first one.
Case 3 (ϕ is ψ ^ θ and ϕ P ∆). By lemma 1.3 ψ P ∆ and θ P ∆. By IH vpψq “ T
and vpθq “ T . So vpϕq “ T .
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Case 4 (ϕ is ψ^ θ and ϕ P Λ). By lemma 1.3 either ψ P Λ or θ P Λ. In the first case
by IH vpψq “ F so vpϕq “ F . In the second case vpθq “ F so vpϕq “ F .
It follows from claim 1 that v is a counter-example to ∆ ñ Λ. Since Γ Ď ∆ and
Σ Ď Λ v is also a counter-example to Γ ñ Σ.
Theorem 1.6.3 (Cut Admissibility). If $ Γ ñ Σ then $cf Γ ñ Σ.
Proof. Suppose that $ Γ ñ Σ. By theorem 1.6.1 Γ |ù Σ. By theorem 1.6.2 $cf Γ ñ
Σ.
1.7 Cut Elimination
Let R be the rule that proceeds from premises S1, . . . , Sn to Sc. R is said to be
admissible for a calculus when if S1, . . . , Sn are derivable then so is Sc. In particular
theorem 1.6.3 shows that the rule of cut is admissible for the logic of fig. 1.1. A rule
R is eliminable when it is admissible and there is an algorithm for transforming a
deduction using rule R to one that makes no use of the rule R. Most of the proofs
of this work are proofs that cut is admissible for a particular calculus. But because
one calculus is proved to be cut eliminable it is worthwhile to see the shape of a cut
elimination proof in the simple case of fig. 1.1.
The shape of a cut-elimination proof used here proceeds by showing that the
rules for the logical connectives are invertible. Using that feature of the calculus it is
shown that a deduction ending in a cut over a complex formula can be transformed
into a deduction with cuts only over formulas that are less complex. Finally it is
shown that cuts over atomic sentences can be eliminated.
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Lemma 1.4. If $cf Γ, ϕñ Σ then $cf Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of deductions. Let δ be deduction
of Γ, ϕñ Σ. If δ is an instance of Id, then either  ϕ P Σ or there is a ψ P ΓX Σ.
In the former case Γ, ϕñ Σ can be rewritten as Γ, ϕñ  ϕ,Σ. The following is
a deduction of the desired sequent
Id
Γ, ϕñ ϕ,Σ
R 
Γ ñ ϕ, ϕ,Σ
In the second case Γ ñ ϕ,Σ is also an instance of Id. For the inductive cases the
inductive hypothesis is that if there is a deduction δ1 of ∆, ϕ ñ Λ such that the
length of δ1 is less than the length of δ then there is a deduction δ2 of ∆ ñ ϕ,Λ. Let
I be the last inference of δ. This leaves six cases to consider.
Case 1 (I is TL). If  ϕ is the formula introduced by TL, then the appropriate
instance of TR gives the result. If not, δ has the form
δ
...
Γ1, ϕñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
By IH there is a deduction δ1 of Γ1 ñ ϕ,Σ. An application of TL to this deduction
gives the result.
Case 2 (I is TR). This is similar to case where I is TL.
Case 3 (I is L ). If  ϕ is the formula introduced by I then the deduction ending
in I maybe with an application IH gives the result. If not then an application of IH
and L gives the result.
Case 4 (I is R or L^). These cases are similar to the above.
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Case 5 (I is R^). In this case δ has the form
δ1
...
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
δ2
...
Γ, ϕñ θ,Σ
R^
Γ, ϕñ ψ ^ θ,Σ
Applications of IH to δ1 and δ2 and an application of R^ yields the following deduc-
tion
δ11
...
Γ ñ ϕ, ψ,Σ
δ12
...
Γ ñ ϕ, θ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ, ψ ^ θ,Σ
Lemma 1.5. If $cf Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ then $cf Γ, ϕñ Σ
Proof. The proof of this case is similar to lemma 1.4.
Lemma 1.6. If $cf Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ Σ then $cf Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ
Proof. This again is proved by induction on the length of deductions. Let δ be a
deduction of Γ, ϕ ^ ψ ñ Σ and I be the last inference of δ. If I is Id then either
ϕ ^ ψ P Σ or Γ X Σ ‰ H. The latter case is as above. The following deduction
establishes the result for the former case
Id
Γ, ϕñ ϕ,Σ
TL
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ ϕ,Σ
Id
Γ, ψ ñ ψ,Σ
TL
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ ψ,Σ
R^
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ
There are six inductive cases to consider.
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Case 1 (I is an instance of TL). In this case either ϕ ^ ψ is the formula being
introduced or not. If it is, then two applications of TL suffice. If it is not then an
application IH + TL suffices.
Case 2 (I is an instance of TR). This is similar to the second case above.
Case 3 (I is an instance of L or R ). In this case an application of IH and I gives
the result.
Case 4 (I is an instance of L^). If ϕ^ ψ is not the main connective then the result
follows from IH and I. If it is then the deduction immediately above I gives the
result maybe with an application of IH.
Case 5 (I is R^). This case if given by an application of IH and I
Lemma 1.7. If $cf Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ then $cf Γ ñ ϕ,Σ and $cf Γ ñ ψ,Σ.
Proof. This is again proved by induction on the length of deductions. If the deduction
is an instance of Id and ϕ^ψ is not the main connective then the desired sequent is
also an instance of Id. The following two deductions suffice for the case where the δ
is an instance of Id and ϕ^ ψ is the main sentence.
Id
Γ, ϕñ ϕ,Σ
TL
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ ϕ,Σ
L^
Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ ϕ,Σ
Id
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
TL
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ ψ,Σ
L^
Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ ψ,Σ
2 There are six other cases to consider. All of them except possibly the case of
R^ follow as above. That case is the only one that is explicitly considered. If ϕ^ψ
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is the sentence introduced by I in that case then the result follows from the two
deductions immediately preceding I. If not then the following deduction is given
δ1
...
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ, γ,Σ
δ2
...
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ, θ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ, γ ^ θ,Σ
Applying IH to δ1 gives deductions δ
1
1 of Γ ñ ϕ, γ,Σ and δ21 of Γ ñ ψ, γ,Σ.
Applying IH to δ2 gives deductions δ
1
2 of Γ ñ ϕ, θ,Σ and δ22 of Γ ñ ψ, θ,Σ. The
following deductions are sufficient for this case
δ11
...
Γ ñ ϕ, γ,Σ
δ12
...
Γ ñ ϕ, θ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ, γ ^ θ,Σ
δ21
...
Γ ñ ψ, γ,Σ
δ22
...
Γ ñ ψ, θ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ψ, γ ^ θ,Σ
Theorem 1.7.1. Cut is eliminable from the calculus given by fig. 1.1.
Proof. It is proved that if δ of Γ ñ Σ is a deduction whose last inference is cut and
whose only instance of cut is that one, then there is a deduction δ1 of Γ Ñ Σ that
is cut-free. Call that the Main Claim. Given the Main Claim, and a deduction that
features multiple cuts each cut can be eliminated by replacing the deduction whose
last inference is cut by the deduction given by Main Claim. Proof of Main Claim.
This is proved by induction on the complexity of the formula featured in the cut
rule. Let that formula be ϕ. In which case the deduction δ in question has the form
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δ1
...
Γ ñ ψ,Σ
δ2
...
Γ, ψ ñ Σ
R^
Γ ñ Σ
There are three cases to consider.
Case 1 (ϕ is atomic). This case requires a sub-induction over the combined length
of δ1 and δ2. For the base case it is supposed that one is an instance of Id. Without
loss of generality suppose that is it Γ ñ ψ,Σ. In this case Γ ñ ψ,Σ can be rewritten
as Γ, ψ ñ ψ,Σ. In this case δ2 is the required deduction. The only sub-inductive
case where ψ could be the main formula is an instance of TL or TR. But then the
result is the deduction immediately preceding that instance of TL or TR. In all the
other cases the result follows from an application of S-IH and I.
The inductive hypothesis is that if δ1 is a deduction of ∆ ñ Λ that features cuts
only over formulas of complexity less than ϕ then there is a cut-free deduction of
∆ ñ Λ
Case 2 (ϕ is  ψ). In this case δ has the form
δ1
Γ ñ  ψ,Σ
δ2
Γ, ψ ñ Σ
cut
Γ ñ Σ
An application of lemma 1.5 to δ1 gives a deduction of Γ, ψ ñ Σ. An application
of lemma 1.5 to δ2 yields a deduction of Γ ñ ψ,Σ. Cutting over those deductions
yields a deduction of Γ ñ Σ with cuts only over formulas of complexity less than ϕ.
The result is given by an application of IH.
Case 3 (ϕ is ψ ^ θ). In this case δ has the form
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δ1
Γ ñ ψ ^ θ,Σ
δ2
Γ, ψ ^ θ ñ Σ
cut
Γ ñ Σ
Applying lemma 1.7 and lemma 1.6 to δ1 and δ2 respectively yields deductions
δ11, δ21 , and δ12 of Γ ñ ψ,Σ, Γ ñ θ,Σ, and Γ, ψ, θ ñ Σ. The following deduction δ1
cuts only over formulas of complexity less than ϕ
δ11
Γ ñ ψΣ
TL
Γ, θ ñ ψ,Σ
δ12
Γ, ψ, θ ñ Σ
cut
Γ, θ ñ Σ
δ21
Γ ñ θ,Σ
cut
Γ ñ Σ
Since δ1 contains cuts only over formulas less complex than ϕ there is a cut-free
deduction of Γ ñ Σ.
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Chapter 2
A Hypersequent Approach to
Modal Logic
Abstract. This chapter develops a novel approach to model logic using hyper-
sequent calculi. Calculi are presented for the modal logics K, D, T , S4, B, and
S5. The rules governing the behavior of the modal expression ˝ do not change from
calculus to calculus. Different modal logics are captured by manipulating the ex-
ternal structural rules of the hypersequent calculus. The rules governing the modal
expression ˝ are explicit, separated, symmetrical, and non-circular. It is shown that
each calculus uniquely characterizes the modal expression ˝. Two of the hyperse-
quent calculi are known to be cut admissible. The chapter concludes by rehearsing
a proof of cut admissibility for the hypersequent calculus for S5 found in Restall [53].
Keywords. Modal Logic, Hypersequent Calculus, Uniqueness, Cut Admissibility
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a framework for exploring modal logics in a proof-theoretic
setting. The motivation for this work is a broad concern with the plausibility of
sequent calculi to underwrite a proof-theoretic approach to modality. Because de-
ductive calculi for modal logic in the standard setting fail to have desirable structural
properties there have been many attempts at altering the structure of deductions or
the objects in a deduction (for a survey see Wansing [73] or Poggiolesi [39]). Some
take what are normally considered to be model-theoretic notions, e.g. relations be-
tween wordls, as primitive objects in the deductive calculi (see, e.g. Negri [34]).
Others have expanded the structure of the sequent (see Mints [33], Dosˇen [12], and
Avron [1]). These latter, however, have until recently only captured a small range of
the modal logics that are considered by philosophical logicians. More recently several
philosophers have attempted to capture different modal logics using hypersequents
(see for instance Lahav [23]1). This chapter develops a new framework that makes
use of lists of sequents, or hypersequents.
Section 2.2 presents sequent accounts of modal logic that can be found in Wansing
[73] or Poggiolesi [39]. This section also discusses some constraints that philosophers
have suggested on what sorts of rules can count as meaning determining. In sec-
tion 2.3, the hypersequent calculi for the modal logics are presented. That section
develops sound model theories for the various logics and shows in what sense they
capture the familiar modal calculi. Section 2.4 proves some important results about
1The approach of this chapter is markedly different from the calculi developed in Lahav [23].
The focus in both cases was to develop cut-free hypersequent calculi, whereas the main goal of this
chapter is to develop hypersequent calculi that uniquely characterize modal expresssions.
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the calculi introduced in the previous section.
Let tp1, p2, . . .u be an denumerably infinite set of atomic sentences. Fix a formal
language L by
ϕ :“ p| ϕ|pϕÑ ψq| ˝ ϕ
If Γ and Σ are sets of sentences then Γ ñ Σ is a sequent. If S1, . . . , Sn are
sequents then the list pS1q; pS2q; . . . ; pSnq is a hypersequent.2
2.2 Modal Logic
2.2.1 Model Theory
A Kripke frame F “ xWF , RF y is an ordered pair of a non-empty set of worlds,
WF , and a relation, RF , that holds between elements of WF . Call the set of all
such frames K. A Kripke model MF “ xF , IMF y is an ordered pair of a Kripke
frame, F , and an interpretation function, IMF . IMF is a function from worlds and
sentences into t1, 0u. Let w P WF and ϕ P L . IMF pw,ϕq is defined inductively by
the following clauses.
• If ϕ is atomic then IMF pw,ϕq P t1, 0u.
• If ϕ is  ψ then IMF pw,ϕq “ 1 iff IMF pw,ψq “ 0.
2Sequents are separated off by parentheses and semicolons to improve readability. In general,
lower-case Greek letters are used as schematic letters for sentences of L , upper case Greek letter
are used as schema for sets of sentences, S with decorations are used as schema for sequents, and
upper case Latin letters are used as schema for hypersequents.
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• If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ then IMF pw,ϕq “ 1 iff IMF pw,ψq “ 0 or IMF pw, θq “ 1.
• If ϕ is ˝ψ then IMF pw,ϕq “ 1 iff for all v P WF such that wRFv, IMF pv, ψq “ 1.
If Γ is a set of sentences, IMpw,Γq “ 1p0q is shorthand for the claim that for all
γ P Γ, IMF pw, γq “ 1p0q.
Definition 2 (Counter-Model). A model MF is a counter-model to a sequent Γ ñ Σ
at a world w iff IMF pw,Γq “ 1 and IMF pw,Σq “ 0.
A sequent Γ ñ Σ is valid for a class of frames S iff there is no model MF with
frame F P S such that MF is a counter-example to Γ ñ Σ. If Γ ñ Σ is valid with
respect to S this is indicated by |ùS Γ ñ Σ.
The modal logics considered in this chapter are K, D, T , S4, B, and S5.
The modal logic K is the set of valid sequents for the whole class of frames, K.
The modal logic D is the set of valid sequents for the class of serial frames, i.e.
D :“ tF : @x P WF , Dy P WF pxRFyqu. The modal logic T is the set of valid
sequents for the class of reflexive frames, i.e. T :“ tF : @y P WF pyRFyqu. The
modal logic S4 is the set of valid sequents for the class of reflexive and transi-
tive frames, i.e. TR :“ T X tF : @xyz P WF , pxRFy & yRFz Ą xRFzqu. The
modal logic B is the set of valid sequents for the class of symmetric frames, i.e.
B “ tF : @xy P WF pxRFy Ą yRFxqu. Finally, the modal logic S5 is given by the
class of universal frames, i.e. L :“ tF : @xy P WMpxRFyqu. This is summed up in
the table below.
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Class of Frames Restriction on R
K
D serial
T reflexive
TR reflexive & transitive
B symmetrical
L universal
2.2.2 Sequents
A sequent calculus is a set of rules and axioms by which deductions may be generated.
A deduction δ of a sequent Γ ñ Σ relative to a calculus C is a tree whose leaves are
axioms of C, is such that each node in the tree is generated from its predecessors by
means of a rule of C, and whose root is Γ ñ Σ. If δ is a deduction of Γ ñ Σ relative
to calculus C this is indicated by δ $c Γ ñ Σ. More generally $c Γ ñ Σ indicates
that there is a deduction of Γ ñ Σ relative to C.
The sequent calculus for Classical Propositional Logic, cpl, is given in fig. 2.1.
This calculus serves as the basis for all the modal sequent calculi considered in this
chapter.
The modal logics described in section 2.2.1 are captured by adding various com-
binations of the rules from fig. 2.2 to cpl .3
Definition 3 (Adequacy). A class of frames S is adequate for a sequent calculus C
iff for any sequent Γ ñ Σ, |ùS Γ ñ Σ iff $C Γ ñ Σ.
3There are many different ways of generating sequent calculi for the modal logics described in
section 2.2.1. Many of these sequent calculi can be found in Wansing [73] and Poggiolesi [39].
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Figure 2.1: Classical Propositional logic
Structural Rules
Id ϕñ ϕ
Γ ñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ϕñ Σ
Cut
Γ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
TR
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Logical Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ψ,Σ Γ, ϕñ Σ
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
RÑ
Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
Each of class of frames discussed in section 2.2.1 above is adequate with respect
to a calculus definable from figs. 2.1 and 2.2. Each calculus adopts all of the rules
of fig. 2.1 and some subset of the rules of fig. 2.2. The calculi that are adequate for
each class of frames are given in the table below. The table also contains citations
where the proofs of adequacy can be found.
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Figure 2.2: Modal Sequent Rules
Γ ñ ϕ
k ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
t
Γ, ˝ϕñ Σ
˝Γ ñ ϕ
4 ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
Γ ñ
d ˝Γ ñ
Γ ñ ϕ, ˝Σ
b ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σ
˝Γ ñ ϕ, ˝Σ
5 ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ, ˝Σ
˝∆ :“ t˝δ : δ P ∆u
Class of Frames Set of Rules Deducibibility Relation Reference
K k $k Sambin and Valentini [61]
D k ` d $d Valentini [71]
T k ` t $t Ohnishi and Matsumoto [35]
TR k ` t` 4 $s4 Ohnishi and Matsumoto [35]
B k ` b $b Takano [70]
L k ` t` 4` 5 $s5 Ohnishi and Matsumoto [35]
One of the philosophical motivations for exploring modal logics is to see to what
extent the meaning of modal expressions can be explained by the inferences in which
they feature. It has been proposed, by e.g. Belnap [4], Dummett [13], or Poggiolesi
[39], that in order for a set of rules to determine the meaning of an expression the set
must meet several constraints. Some of the features that philosophers have discussed
are the following
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1. Explicit: A rule R is explicit when only one occurrence of the expression in
question occurs essentially in the conclusion. A set of rules that has this feature
is not in danger of defining more than one status of a sentence at once. For
instance, if the left of a sequent corresponds to truth and the right to falsity, the
rule k offers an explanation of the truth of ˝ϕ inextricably from an explanation
of its falsity.
2. Separated: A rule R is separated when the only expression that features
essentially in that rule is the expression whose meaning is being explained. If
a rule features two expressions essentially then it runs the risk of offering an
explanation of those two expressions at once as opposed offering an explanation
of just one of them.
3. Symmetrical: A set of rules S is symmetrical when for each rule R P S R either
introduces a connective on the left or on the right and there is at least one rule
for each. If the left and right side of a sequent correspond to some status a
sentence may have, then symmetrical rules guarantee that for any status there
is a way of determining whether a particular sentence has that status. Thus
the status of a sentence would not, in principle, be underdetermined by the
rules of S.
4. Non-Circularity: A rule R is non-circular if there is no essential occurrence
of the connective being defined in the premises of R. A circular rule leaves
open the possibility that there is no way to understand how to use a particular
expression without already having some antecedent grasp of that expression.
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As is noted by Dummett [13] ([13, pg.257]), in some cases this may not be
problematic. But it is a good feature of a rule if it avoids the possibility of
circularity altogether.
5. Uniqueness: Let S be a set of rules, and Srε1{εs be the result of replacing
ε1 for ε everywhere in S. S is said to uniquely chracterize an expression ε it
introduces iff both
(a) $ Γ, ϕñ Σ iff $ Γ, ϕrε1{εs ñ Σ
(b) $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ iff $ Γ ñ ϕrε1{εs,Σ.
Proponents of proof-theoretic semantics generally hold some version of the
claim that meaning is use. This could be stated in a weak form as the claim
that the rules governing the behavior of an expression determine the meaning of
the expression. In the case above, the purported rules that govern the meaning
of ε are S. Suppose that uniqueness fails but that S is said to determine the
meaning of ε. If uniqueness fails then there is a sequent, e.g. Γ, ϕñ Σ, that is
provable though Γ, ϕrε1{εs ñ Σ is not. The only difference between Γ, ϕ ñ Σ
and Γ, ϕrε1{εs ñ Σ is that ε1 replaces ε in the second. ε and ε1 cannot therefore
have the same meaning. Since ε and ε1 have the same use (S and Srε1{εs
respectively) S does not determine the meaning of ε.
6. Cut Admissibility: Let C be a calculus and Ccf be the calculus that is exactly
like C except that it lacks the Cut rule. A logic is cut admissible when $C Γ ñ
Σ iff $Ccf Γ ñ Σ. Cut admissibility is a desirable property for a calculus. In
general, it shows that & ñ , and so serves as proof of consistency. In most
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settings it also establishes that only rules governing the expressions occurring
in a sequent are used to determine whether or not there is a deduction of that
sequent.4
7. Sub-formula Property: A calculus has the sub-formula property iff whenever
$ Γ ñ Σ there is a deduction δ of Γ ñ Σ such that if ∆ ñ Λ occurs in δ
then any sentence ϕ P ∆Y Λ is a sub-formula of a sentence in ΓY Σ. In most
settings a calculus that is cut admissible has the sub-formula property.
None of the logics characterized above have explicit rules governing ˝. Every
logic described above requires the k rule to govern the behavior of ˝, but this rule
is not explicit. The rules 4, b, and 5 are also circular. Let C be a modal calculus
characterized above with rules R governing ˝. If d is introduced to the calculus
using the rules Rrd{˝s the sequent ˝p ñ dp is not deducible even though the
sequent ˝pñ ˝p is. Thus, all of these logics fail to uniquely characterize the modal
expression ˝. It was shown by Ohnishi and Matsumoto [35] that the calculus for S5
is not cut admissible.
2.3 Hypersequent Modal Logics
This section presents the various hypersequent calculi for modal logics. The logics
are presented in order from weakest to strongest beginning with System K. The bulk
of the model theoretic work is done in section 2.3.1. Proceeding from modal logic to
4Cut is said to be admissible when it is known that for any deducible sequent there is a cut-free
deduction of that sequent. Cut is said to be eliminable when an algorithm is known for transforming
deductions with cut to deductions without cut.
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modal logic requires only small changes in the overall approach. Hypersequent system
K is given in fig. 2.3. The various structural rules for extending the hypersequent
calculi are discussed in sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.6
A hypersequent calculus contains both structural and logical rules. However,
the structural rules of a hypersequent calculus are further divided into internal and
external structural rules. The internal structural rules of a hypersequent calculus
allow for the manipulation of sentences within a sequent in a hypersequent. The
external structural rules of a hypersequent calculus allow for the manipulation of
sequents within a hypersequent. One of the novelties of this approach to modal
proof-theory is that the logical rules governing the modal operator ˝ are constant
between the various modal systems. The different modal logics are characterized by
adding or removing external structural rules from a hypersequent calculus.
Let F be a Kripke frame. A branch of worlds in F is a list w1, . . . , wn such that
for each 1 ď i ď n, wiRFwi´1.
Definition 4 (Counter-Example). A model MF is a counter-example to a hyperse-
quent pS1q, . . . , pSnq iff there is a branch w1, . . . , wn such that MF is a counter-model
to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n.
If there is a deduction of a hypersequent G according to the rules of fig. 2.3 this
is indicated by $hk G.
2.3.1 System K
The calculus of fig. 2.3 captures K in the sense that $k Γ ñ Σ iff $hk pΓ ñ Σq. This
is proved in theorem 2.3.1.
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Figure 2.3: Hypersequent System K
Structural Rules
Id ppñ pq
G; pΓ ñ Σq;H
TL
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
G
W
G; p ñ q
G; pΓ ñ Σq;H
TR
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
Cut
G; pΓ ñ Σq;H
Operational Rules
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H
L 
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H G; pΓ, ψ ñ Σq;H
LÑ
G; pΓ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
L˝
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
R 
G; pΓ ñ  ϕ,Σq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ ψ,Σq;H
RÑ
G; pΓ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σq;H
p ñ ϕq; pΓ ñ Σq;H
R˝ pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq;H
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The rule Id of fig. 2.3 holds only over atomic sentences. The rule can be proved
to hold for all sentences of the language.
Definition 5 (Rank). The rank of a sentence ϕ is defined inductively by
• If ϕ is atomic then rkpϕq “ 0.
• If ϕ is  ψ or ˝ψ then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` 1.
• If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` rkpθq ` 1.
Lemma 2.1. $hk pϕñ ϕq
Proof. This is proved by induction on the rank of ϕ. The base case is given by Id.
For the other three cases, the inductive hypothesis (IH) is that the lemma holds for
formulas of lower rank. The following three deductions then establish the lemma.
IH
pϕñ ϕq
L pϕ, ϕñq
R p ϕñ  ϕq
IH
pϕñ ϕq
IH
pψ ñ ψq
LÑ pϕ, ϕÑ ψ ñ ψq
RÑ pϕÑ ψ ñ ϕÑ ψq
IH
pϕñ ϕq
W pϕñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ p ñ ϕq; p˝ϕñ q
R˝ p˝ϕñ ˝ϕq
The other hypersequent calculi result from the addition of rules to the calculus
of fig. 2.3. It follows that lemma 2.1 holds for all those systems as well. Lemma 2.1
will often be invoked simply as Id in what follows.
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In order to prove lemma 2.2 a measure on the length of deductions is required.
This is given by definition 6.
Definition 6 (Length of a Deduction). The length of a deduction δ, lpδq is defined
inductively:
• If δ is an instance of Id, then lpδq “ 1.
• If δ has δ1, . . . , δn as premises then lpδq “ př1ďiďn lpδ1qq ` 1.
Lemma 2.2. If $hk G then there is no model MF such that F P K and MF is a
counter-example to G.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of deductions. Let δ be a deduction
of G and I be the last inference of δ. The smallest deduction is an instance of
Id. Suppose that there were a model MF such that there is a world w P WMF
such that IMF pw, pq “ 1 and IMF pw, pq “ 0. This is impossible, so there are no
counter-examples to Id.
Case 1 (I is W). Let MF be a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pSnq; pSn`1q. There is
a branch of worlds w1, . . . , wn, wn`1 in F such that wiRFwi´1 and MF is counter-
model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n ` 1. But then there is a branch wn, . . . , w1 in F
such that wiRFwi´1 and MF is a counter-model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n.
Case 2 (I is TL). LetMF be a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj, ϕñ Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
So there is a branch of worlds w1, . . . , wn in F such that wiRFwi´1 and MF is a
counter-model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n. In particular, MF is a counter-model
to Γj, ϕ ñ Σj at wj. It follows that IMF pwj,Γj Y tϕuq “ 1. So IMF pwj,Γjq “ 1
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and MF is a counter-model to Γj ñ Σj at wj. So MF is a counter-example to
pS1q; . . . ; pΓj ñ Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
Case 3 (I is TR). This case is similar to the above.
Case 4 (I is Cut). Let MF be a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj ñ Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
So there is a branch of worlds w1, . . . , wn in F such that wiRFwi´1 and MF is a
counter-model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n. In particular, MF is a counter-model to
Γj ñ Σj at wj. Either IMpwj, ϕq “ 1 or IMpwj, ϕq “ 0. In the former case, MF is a
counter-model to Γj, ϕñ Σj at wj. SoMF is a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj, ϕñ
Σjq; . . . ; pSnq. In the latter case, MF is a counter-model to Γj ñ ϕ,Σj at wj, and
thus MF is a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj ñ ϕ,Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
Case 5 (I is L ). LetMF be a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj, ϕñ Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
So there is a branch of worlds w1, . . . , wn in F such that wiRFwi´1 and MF is
a counter-model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n. In particular, MF is a counter-
model to pΓj, ϕ ñ Σjq at wj. Since IMF pwj, ϕq “ 1, IMF pwj, ϕq “ 0. So
MF is a counter-model to pΓj ñ ϕ,Σjq at wj and MF is a counter-example to
pS1q; . . . ; pΓj ñ ϕ,Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
Case 6 (I is R ). This is similar to the above case.
Case 7 (I is RÑ or LÑ). These cases, as with the case of L , follow from
manipulation of what IMF assigns to a formula of the form ϕÑ ψ at a world wj.
Case 8 (I is L˝). LetMF be a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj´1 ñ Σj´1q; pΓj, ˝ϕñ
Σjq; . . . ; pSnq. There is a branch of worlds, w1, . . . , wn in F such that wiRwi´1 and
MF is a counter-model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n. Since MF is a counter-model to
Γj, ˝ϕñ Σj at wj, IMF pwj, ˝ϕq “ 1. For any world, v, such that wjRv, IMpv, ϕq “ 1.
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Since wjRwj´1, IMpwj´1, ϕq “ 1. MF is a counter-model to Γj´1, ϕñ Σj´1 at wj´1
and so MF is a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pΓj´1, ϕñ Σj´1q; pΓj ñ Σjq; . . . ; pSnq.
Case 9 (I is R˝). Let MF be a counter-example to pΓ1 ñ ˝ϕ,Σ1q; . . . ; pSnq. There
is a branch, w1, . . . , wn in F such that wiRFwi´1 and MF is a counter-model to pSiq
at wi. It follows that MF is a counter-model to pΓ1 ñ ˝ϕ,Σ1q at w1. In particular,
IMpw1, ˝ϕq “ 0, so there is a world w0 such that w1RFw0 and IMF pw0, ϕq “ 0. But
then MF is a counter-model to p ñ ϕq at w0. F contains a branch w0, . . . , wn such
that wiRFwi´1 and MF is a counter-model to Si at wi for 1 ď i ď n. It follows that
MF is a counter-example to p ñ ϕq; pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pSnq.
Theorem 2.3.1. $k Γ ñ Σ iff $hk pΓ ñ Σq.
Proof. For the left to right direction let δ $k Γ ñ Σ. It is proved by induction on
the length of δ that $hk Γ ñ Σ. All instances of Id are the same for both systems.
If the last inference of δ is TL then δ has the form
δ
...
Γ ñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
By the IH there is a deduction, δ1 of pΓ ñ Σq. An application of TL to δ1 yields
a deduction of pΓ, ϕ ñ Σq. TR, Cut, L , R , RÑ, and LÑ all follow in a similar
way. Let the last inference of δ be k. In this case δ has the form
δ
...
Γ ñ ϕ
k ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
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By IH there is a deduction δ1 of pΓ ñ ϕq according to the rules of fig. 2.3. Let
the cardinality of Γ be n. In this case the following deduction establishes the result
δ1
...
pΓ ñ ϕq
W pΓ ñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ˆ n p ñ ϕq; p˝Γ ñ q
R˝ p˝Γ ñ ˝ϕq
For the left to right direction suppose that &k Γ ñ Σ by the fact that sequent
system k is adequate for K there is a model MF with a world w such that MF is
a counter-model to Γ ñ Σ at w. There is a branch w in F such that MF is a
counter-model to Γ ñ Σ at w. So MF is a counter-example to pΓ ñ Σq.
The remainder of the hypersequent calculi for modal logics are generated merely
by manipulation of structural rules. The rules L˝ and R˝ are the only rules explicitly
governing modality in any of the hypersequent systems presented.
2.3.2 System D
The calculus that results from adding
p ñ q;G
Drop
G
to the calculus of fig. 2.3 captures the modal logic System D. If there is a deduction
of G in this calculus this is indicated by $hd G. This calculus is sound for the class
of serial models given by frames in D. This is result is proved in lemma 2.3.
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Lemma 2.3. If $hd G then there is no model MF such that F P D and MF is a
counter-example to G.
Proof. The proof that all of the rules of fig. 2.3 preserve validity is similar to the
proof of lemma 2.2. This leaves only the proof that Drop preserves validity over
the class of models with serial frames. Let δ be a deduction ending with inference
Drop. Let MF be a counter-example to pS1q; . . . ; pSnq. There is a branch of worlds
w1, . . . , wn in F such that wiRwi´1 and MF is a counter-model to Si at wi. Since
F is serial, there is a world w0 such that w1Rw0 and MF is a counter-model to
p ñ q at w0. So MF is a counter-example to p ñ q; pS1q; . . . ; pSnq.
Theorem 2.3.2. $d Γ ñ Σ iff $hd pΓ ñ Σq.
Proof. For the left to right direction let $d Γ ñ Σ. It is proved by induction on the
length of deductions that $hd pΓ ñ Σq. Every proof that does not involve the rule
d has been considered above. Let d be the last inference of a deduction δ. δ has the
form
δ
...
Γ ñ
d ˝Γ
Let the cardinality of Γ be n. By IH there is a deduction δ1 ending in the
hypersequent pΓ ñ q. The following deduction establishes the left to right direction
of the lemma.
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δ1
...
pΓ ñ q
W pΓ ñ q; p ñ q
L˝ˆ n p ñ q; p˝Γ ñ q
Drop p˝Γ ñ q
For the right to left direction suppose that &d Γ ñ Σ. Since the sequent calculus
for system D is adequate with respect to D there is a counter-example MF to Γ ñ Σ
at a world w built on a frame F P D. So w is a branch in MF such that MF
is a counter-model to Γ ñ Σ at w. It follows that MF is a counter-example to
pΓ ñ Σq.
2.3.3 System T
The calculus obtained by adding the rule
G; pSiq; pSiq;H
EC
G; pSiq;H
to the calculus of fig. 2.3 captures the modal logic System T. If a hypersequent
G is derivable according to those rules this is indicated by $ht G. This rule is sound
for the class of models with reflexive frames, i.e. T.
Lemma 2.4. If $ht G then there is no model MF such that F P T and MF is a
counter-example to G.
Proof. As above, the proof that the rules of fig. 2.3 are sound for the set of models
with frames in T is similar to the proof of lemma 2.2. This only leaves it to be shown
that the rule EC preserves validity over models with reflexive frames. Let MF be a
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counter-model to pS1q; . . . ; pSiq; . . . ; pSnq. There is branch of worlds w1, . . . , wn in F
such that wjRFwj´1 and MF is a counter-model to Sj at wj for 1 ď j ď n. Since
F is reflexive wiRFwi. So there is a branch, w1, . . . , wi, wi, . . . , wn in F such that
MF is a counter-model to Sj at wj. It follows that MF is a counter-exmaple to
pS1q; . . . ; pSiq; pSiq; . . . ; pSnq.
Theorem 2.3.3. $t Γ ñ Σ iff $ht pΓ ñ Σq.
Proof. For the left to right direction let $t Γ ñ Σ. It is proved by induction on the
length of deductions that $ht pΓ ñ Σq. All the cases except for an application of t
have been considered above. Let δ be the deduction in question. If the last inference
of δ is t then δ has the form
δ
...
Γ, ϕñ Σ
t
Γ, ˝ϕñ Σ
By IH there is a deduction δ1 of pΓ, ϕ ñ Σq. The following deduction completes
this half of the theorem.
δ1
...
pΓ, ϕñ Σq
W pΓ, ϕñ Σq; p ñ q
L˝ pΓ ñ Σq; p˝ϕñ q
TL+TR pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq
EC pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq
For the right to left direction let &t Γ ñ Σ. Since the sequent calculus for system
T is adequate with respect to T there is a model MF with a reflexive frame F and
world w P WF such that IMF pw,Γq “ 1 and IMF pw,Σq “ 0. w is a branch in F
such that MF is a counter-example to Γ ñ Σ at w. By lemma 2.4, &ht pΓ ñ Σq.
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2.3.4 System S4
The calculus obtained by adding the rules
G;H
EW
G; p ñ q;H
and EC to the calculus of fig. 2.3 captures the modal logic System S4. If a
hypersequent G is derivable according to those rules this is indicated by $hs4 G.
Both rules are sound with respect to the class of models with reflexive and transitive
frames, i.e. TR.
Lemma 2.5. If $hs4 G then there is no model MF such that F P TR and MF is a
counter-example to G.
Proof. All the cases with the exception of EW have been considered above. This
leaves only the task of showing that EW preserves soundness. Let MF be a counter-
example to pS1q; . . . ; pSiq; p ñ q; pSi`2q; . . . pSnq. So there is a branch w1, . . . , wn
inF such that for each wi, MF is a counter-model to Si at wi. Since RF is transitive
w1, . . . , wi, wi`2, . . . , wn also forms a branch in F . It follows that MF is a counter-
example to pS1q; . . . ; pSiq; pSi`2q; . . . ; pSnq.
Lemma 2.6. $hs4 p˝ϕñ ˝ ˝ ϕq
Proof. This lemma is proved by the following deduction.
Id pϕñ ϕq
EW pϕñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ p ñ ϕq; p˝ϕñ q
EW p ñ ϕq; p ñ q; p˝ϕñ q
R˝ p ñ ˝ϕq; p˝ϕñ q
R˝ p˝ϕñ ˝ ˝ ϕq
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Theorem 2.3.4. $s4 Γ ñ Σ iff $hs4 pΓ ñ Σq.
Proof. For the left to right direction let δ $s4 Γ ñ Σ. It is proved by induction on
the length of δ that $hs4 Γ ñ Σ. As above, the only case that has not been covered
is the case where the last inference of δ is an application of EW. Let δ have the form
δ
...
˝Γ ñ ϕ
EW ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
By IH there is a deduction δ1 of p˝Γ ñ ϕq. Call the following deduction δˆ and
let the cardinality of ˝Γ be n.
δ1
...
p˝Γ ñ ϕq
EW p˝Γ ñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ˆ n p ñ ϕq; p˝ ˝ Γ ñ q
R˝ p˝ ˝ Γ ñ ˝ϕq
TLˆn p˝Γ, ˝ ˝ Γ ñ ˝ϕq
By lemma 2.6, TL and TR, there is a deduction of p˝˝Γzt˝˝γiu, ˝γi ñ ˝˝γi, ˝ϕq for
each γi P Γ. Applying Cut to δˆ for each such γi generates a deduction of p˝Γ ñ ˝˝ϕq.
For the right to left direction let &s4 Γ ñ Σ. TR is adequate for the sequent
calculus formulation of S4, so there is a model MF with a world w P WF such that
MF is a counter-model to Γ ñ Σ at w. Since w is also a branch in F , MF is a
counter-example to the hypersequent pΓ ñ Σq. By lemma 2.5, &hs4 pΓ ñ Σq.
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2.3.5 System B
The calculus generated by adding the rule
pS1q; pS2q; . . . ; pSn´1q; pSnq
SYM pSnq; pSn´1q; . . . ; pS2q; pS1q
to fig. 2.3 captures the modal logic B. If there is a deduction of a hypersequent
G according to those rules this is indicated by $hb G. This calculus is sound for the
class of models with symmetric frames.
Lemma 2.7. The rule
pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq
˝E1 pΓ ñ Σq; p ñ ϕq
is derivable.
Proof. The following deduction establishes this lemma.
pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq
W pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p ñ q
TR pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p ñ ϕq
Id pϕñ ϕq
W pϕñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ p ñ ϕq; p˝ϕñ q
SYM p˝ϕñ q; p ñ ϕq
TL/TR pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; p ñ ϕq
Cut pΓ ñ Σq; p ñ ϕq
Lemma 2.8. The rule
pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p∆ ñ Λq
˝E2 pΓ ñ Σq; p∆ ñ ϕ,Λq
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is derivable.
Proof. The following deduction establishes this lemma.
pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p∆ ñ Λq
TR pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p∆ ñ ϕ,Λq
Id pϕñ ϕq
W pϕñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ p ñ ϕq; p˝ϕñ q
SYM p˝ϕñ q; p ñ ϕq
TL/TR pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ ϕ,Λq
Cut pΓ ñ Σq; p∆ ñ ϕ,Λq
Lemma 2.9. If $hb G then there is no model MF such that F P B and MF is a
counter-example to G.
Proof. Let δ $hb G. The lemma is proved by induction over the length of δ. As
above most of the cases to be considered are similar to cases already rehearsed in
lemma 2.2. This leaves only the case where the last inference of δ is an instance of
SYM. Let δ have the form
δ
...
pS1q; pS2q; . . . ; pSn´1q; pSnq
SYM pSnq; pSn´1q; . . . ; pS2q; pS1q
Let MF be a counter-example to pSnq; pSn´1q; . . . ; pS2q; pS1q. There is a branch
wn, wn´1, . . . , w2, w1 in WF such that wi`1RFwi and MF is a counter-model to Si
at wi for each 1 ď i ď n. Since F is symmetrical, for each wi and wi`1, wi`1Rwi.
w1, w2, . . . , wn´1, wn is such that MF is a counter-model to Si at wi. It follows that
MF is a counter-example to pS1q; pS2q; . . . ; pSn´1q; pSnq.
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Theorem 2.3.5. $b Γ ñ Σ iff $hb pΓ ñ Σq.
Proof. For the left to right direction let δ $b Γ ñ Σ. It is proved by induction on
the length of δ that $hb pΓ ñ Σq. The only case that has not been addressed above
is the case where the last inference of δ is an instance of b. In this case δ has the
following form.
δ
...
Γ ñ ϕ, ˝Σ
b ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σ
By IH there is a deduction δˆ of pΓ ñ ϕ, ˝Σq. Let the cardinality of Σ be n and the
cardinality of Γ be m. The following deduction establishes the left to right direction.
δˆ
...
pΓ ñ ϕ, ˝Σq
˝E1 pΓ ñ ϕ, ˝Σ{tσ1uq; p ñ σ1q˝E2 ˆ n pΓ ñ ϕq; p ñ Σq
L˝ˆm p ñ ϕq; p˝Γ ñ Σq
R˝ p˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq
For the right to left direction let &b Γ ñ Σ. Because the class of models with
frames in B is adequate for the calculus that results from fig. 2.1 along with k and
b, there is a model MF with a world w P WF such that MF is a counter-model to
Γ ñ Σ at w. It follows that MF is a counter-example to pΓ ñ Σq. By lemma 2.9,
&hb pΓ ñ Σq.
2.3.6 System S5
The calculus that results from adding the rule
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G; pS1q; pS2q;H
EE
G; pS2q; pS1q;H
to the calculus for hypersequent S4 generates a calculus that captures the modal
logic S5. Hypersequents for logics weaker than S5 are lists of sequents. Because of the
structural rules that have been added hypersequents at this point behave as though
they are sets of sequents. By EC the number of repeated sequents does not make a
difference to what hypersequents are deducible and by EE the order of the sequents
occurring in a hypersequent does not make a difference to what hypersequents are
deducible. If a hypersequent G is deducible according to the rules of this calculus
this is indicated by $hs5 G. Systems equivalent to this one have appeared in Restall
[51, 53, 54].
Lemma 2.10. The rule
G; pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq
GE1
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p ñ ϕq
is derivable.
Proof. Let the cardinality of G be n, the cardinality of the set of sentences appearing
in G be m, and the cardinality of ΓYΣ be j. This lemma is proved by the following
deduction.
G; pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq
EW
G; pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p ñ q
TR
G; pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p ñ ϕq
Id pϕñ ϕq
EW pϕñ ϕq; p ñ q
L˝ p ñ ϕq; p˝ϕñ q
EE p˝ϕñ q; p ñ ϕq
EWˆn p ñ q; . . . ; p˝ϕñ q; p ñ ˝ϕq
TL/TRˆm` j
G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; p ñ ϕq
Cut
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p ñ ϕq
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Lemma 2.11. The rule
G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
L˝1
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
is derivable.
Proof. This lemma is proved by the following deduction.
G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
TR
G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
Id pϕñ ϕq
EW pϕñ ϕq; p ñ q; . . . ; p ñ q
TL/TR pϕñ ϕq; p∆ ñ Λq; pΓ ñ Σq;G;H
L˝ p ñ ϕq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq; pΓ ñ Σq;G;H
EE p ñ ϕq; pΓ ñ Σq;G; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
R˝ pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq;G; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
EE
G; pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
Cut
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
Lemma 2.12. If $hs5 G then there is no model MF such that F P L and MF is a
counter-example to G.
Proof. Let δ $ G. This lemma is proved by induction on the length of δ. As
above all but the case of EE has already been considered. For the last case let
&hs5 pS1q; . . . ; pSiq; pSi`1q; . . . ; pSnq. There is a counter-example MF with world,
w1, . . . , wn P WF such that wjRwj´1 and MF is a counter-model to Sj at wj.
Since for any worlds wj and wk wjRFwk, wiRFwi`1. So MF is a counter-model
to pS1q; . . . ; pSi`1q; pSiq; . . . ; pSnq.
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Theorem 2.3.6. $s5 Γ ñ Σ iff $hs5 Γ ñ Σ.
Proof. For the left to right direction let δ $s5 Γ ñ Σ. It is shown by induction on
the length of δ that $hs5 pΓ ñ Σq. The only case that has not been treated above
is the case where the last inference of δ is an instance of 5. In that case δ has the
following form.
δ
...
˝Γ ñ ϕ, ˝Σ
5 ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ, ˝Σ
By IH there is a deduction δˆ such that δˆ $hs5 p˝Γ ñ ϕ, ˝Σq. Let Σ be tσ1, . . . , σnu
and the cardinality of Γ be m. The following deduction establishes the left to right
direction of this lemma.
δˆ
...
p˝Γ ñ ϕ, ˝Σq
GE1 ˆ n p˝Γ ñ ϕq; p ñ σ1q; . . . ; p ñ σnq
EW p˝Γ ñ ϕq; p ñ q; p ñ σ1q; . . . ; p ñ σnq
L˝1 p ñ ϕq; p˝Γ ñ q; p ñ σ1q; . . . ; p ñ σnq
R˝ p˝Γ ñ ˝ϕq; p ñ σ1q; . . . ; p ñ σnq
EE p ñ σ1q; p˝Γ ñ ˝ϕq; p ñ σ2q; . . . ; p ñ σnq
R˝ p˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ, ˝σ1q; p ñ σ2q; . . . ; p ñ σnq
EE + R˝ˆ n´ 1 p˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ, ˝Σq
For the left to right direction let &s5 Γ ñ Σ. Because the class of models with
frames in L are adequate for the sequent calculus S5 there is a model MF with a
world w P WF such that MF is a counter-model to Γ ñ Σ at w. It follows that MF
is a counter-example to pΓ ñ Σq. By lemma 2.12 &hs5 pΓ ñ Σq.
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2.4 Technical Results
This section explores some features of the systems described above.
2.4.1 Interdefinability of ˝ and ♦
The use of ˝ as the primitive modal connective makes no difference to the results
above. ♦ could be introduced using the rules L♦ and R♦.
pϕñ q; pΓ ñ Σq;G
L♦ pΓ,♦ϕñ Σq;G
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
R♦
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆ ñ ♦ϕ,Λq;H
If ♦ϕ is defined as  ˝ ϕ, ♦ϕ obeys L♦ and R♦. This is proved by the following
two deductions.
pϕñ q; pΓ ñ Σq;G
R ñ  ϕq; pΓ ñ Σq;G
R˝ pΓ ñ ˝ ϕ,Σq;G
L pΓ, ˝ ϕñ Σq;G
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
L 
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
L˝
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆, ˝ ϕñ Λq;H
R 
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆ ñ  ˝ ϕ,Λq;H
Conversely, taking ♦ as primitive ˝ϕ is adequately definable as  ♦ ϕ. Let K♦
be the calculus that results from the calculus of fig. 2.3 by replacing L˝ and R˝ by
L♦ and R♦. The following two deductions establish that ˝ϕ is definable by  ♦ ϕ
in the calculus K♦. Since this result holds in K♦ it holds in any extension of this
logic by the addition of external structural rules.
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
R 
G; pΓ ñ  ϕ,Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
R♦
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆ ñ ♦ ϕ,Λq;H
L 
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆, ♦ ϕ,ñ Λq;H
p ñ ϕq; pΓ ñ Σq;H
L p ϕñ q; pΓ ñ Σq;H
L♦ pΓ,♦ ϕñ Σq;H
R pΓ ñ  ♦ ϕ,Σq;H
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2.4.2 Uniqueness
As mentioned in section 2.2 if a calculus is to be used to underwrite an inferentialist
theory of meaning it is desirable that that calculus uniquely determines the expres-
sions it introduces. The sequent calculi discussed in section 2.2 do not uniquely
determine the expression ˝. On the other hand, each of the hypersequent calculi do
uniquely determine the expression ˝.5
Let Kd be the calculus that results from adding the following rules to the rules
of fig. 2.3.
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
Ld
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆,dϕñ Λq;H
p ñ ϕq; pΓ ñ Σq;H
Rd pΓ ñ dϕ,Σq;H
Lemma 2.13. $Kd G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq;H iff $Kd G; pΓ,dϕñ Σq;H.
Proof. For the left to right direction let δ $Kd Γ, ˝ϕñ Σ. It is proved by induction
on the length of δ that $Kd Γ,dϕ ñ Σ. Let I be the last inference of δ. If I is Id
then neither d nor ˝ can occur in the conclusion hypersequent of δ. There are ten
other cases to consider. Only several of these cases are considered explicitly.
Case 1 (I is TL). Without loss of generality let ˝ϕ P Γ. In this case δ has the form
δ
...
G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq;H
TL
G; pΓ, ˝ϕ, ψ ñ Σq;H
By IH there is a deduction δˆ of G; pΓ,dϕ ñ Σq;H. An application of TL to δˆ
yields a deduction of G; pΓ,dϕ, ψ ñ Σq;H. If ˝ϕ is the main formula in TL then the
5They also uniquely characterize the extensional connectives.
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deduction with dϕ is the main formula of TL yields a deduction of G; pΓ,dϕ, ψ ñ
Σq;H.
Case 2 (I is LÑ). Without loss of generality let ˝ϕ occur in Γ. In this case δ is a
deduction with the following form.
δ1
...
G; pΓ, ˝ϕñ ψ,Σq;H
δ2
...
G; pΓ, ˝ϕ, θ ñ Σq;H
Cut
G; pΓ, ˝ϕ, ψ Ñ θ ñ Σq;H
By IH there are deductions δˆ1 and δˆ2 of G; pΓ,dϕñ ψ,Σq;H and G; pΓ,dϕ, θ ñ
Σq;H respectively. An application of LÑ to these deductions yields a deduction of
G; pΓ,dϕ, ψ Ñ θ ñ Σq;H.
Case 3 (I is L˝). If ˝ϕ is not the main formula of I the result follows in a way similar
to the above cases. If, on the other hand, ˝ϕ is the main formula of I then δ has the
form
δ
...
G; p∆, ϕñ Λq; pΓ ñ Σq;H
L˝
G; p∆ ñ Λq; pΓ, ˝ϕñ Σq;H
In this case, replacing I with an instance of Ld yields a deduction of G; p∆ ñ
Λq; pΓ,dϕñ Σq;H.
The right to left direction of this lemma is analogous to the above proof.
Lemma 2.14. $Kd pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq iff $Kd pΓ ñ dϕ,Σq.
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Proof. The proof of this is analogous to the proof of lemma 2.13. For the left to right
direction let δ be a deduction of G; pΓ ñ Σq;H whose last inference is I. In the case
that I is R˝ and ˝ϕ is the formula introduced by R˝ δ has the form
δ
...
p ñ ϕq; pΓ ñ Σq;H
R˝ pΓ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq;H
Replacing the occurrence of R˝ by Rd as the last inference of δ establishes the
result.
The right to left direction is analogous.
The proof that the other hypersequent calculi uniquely characterize ˝ requires
showing that the induction over deductions done in lemmas 2.13 and 2.14 holds when
external structural rules are added to the calculi. These proofs follow the general
pattern of applying the inductive hypothesis to generate a deduction to which the
appropriate inference for the case can be applied. These proofs are left out in the
interest of space.
2.4.3 Cut Elimination
Two of the hypersequent calculi presented in section 2.3 are known to be cut admis-
sible. I prove that the calculus given in section 2.3.2 is cut eliminable in chapter 3.
It is proved below that the calculus given in section 2.3.6 is cut admissible. Restall
[51] shows that an equivalent system is cut eliminable and also there proves the
soundness and completeness results for that system. In “A Cut-Free Sequent System
for Two-Dimensional Modal Logic and Why it Matters” ([55]), he proves the same
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results for a calculus of which the hypersequent calculus for S5 is a part. The proof
is rehearsed here for the sake of completeness. It is an open question whether or not
the other hypersequent calculi are cut eliminable.
Lemma 2.15. The following rule
pΓ1, ϕñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn, ϕñ Σnq
L˝U pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ˝ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
is derivable in the cut free fragment of the hypersequent calculus for S5.
Proof. This lemma is established by the following deduction.
pΓ1, ϕñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn, ϕñ Σnq
EE pΓ1, ϕñ Σ1q; pΓi, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn, ϕñ Σq
L˝ pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; pΓi, ˝ϕ, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn, ϕñ Σq
EE + L˝ pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ˝ϕ, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
EW + TL+ TR pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ˝ϕ, ϕñ Σiq; pΓi ñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
L˝ pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ˝ϕñ Σiq; pΓi, ˝ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
EC pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ˝ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
Let G be a hypersequent. A tree with G at the root built according to the
following procedure is called pipGq. pipGq is constructed in stages. A leaf G1 of
the tree being constructed is closed iff there is a sequent Γ ñ Σ P G1 such that
ΓX Σ ‰ H. A leaf is open iff it is not closed. At each stage consider each open leaf
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓn Ñ Σnq and sequent Γi ñ Σi occurring in pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓn ñ
Σnq. For each sentence ϕ P Γi Y Σi do the following.
1. If ϕ is pi do nothing.
2. If ϕ is  ψ then
69
(a) if ϕ P Γi then expand that branch by
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ϕñ ψ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
(b) if ϕ P Σi then expand that branch by
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ψ ñ ϕ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi ñ ϕ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
3. if ϕ is ψ Ñ θ then
(a) if ϕ P Γi then expand that branch by
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ϕñ ψ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ϕ, θ ñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
(b) if ϕ P Σi then expand that branch by
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi, ψ ñ θ, ϕ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . pΓi ñ ϕ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
4. if ϕ is ˝ψ then
(a) if ϕ P Γi then expand that branch by
pΓ1, ψ ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ψ, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn, ψ ñ Σnq
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi, ϕñ Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
(b) if ϕ P Σi and there is no Γj ñ Σj such that ψ P Σj then expand that
branch by
p ñ ψq; pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi ñ ϕ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓi ñ ϕ,Σiq; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq
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Since each of the steps in building pipGq is a derivable rule if every branch of pipGq
closes, pipGq $cfhs5 G. It follows that if &cfhs5 G then there is an open, possibly infinite,
branch of pipGq.
Let β be a branch in pipG1q of the form G1, G2, . . .. Consider two hypersequents
Gi and Gi`1 such that Γ ñ Σ P Gi and ∆ ñ Λ P Gi`1. ∆ ñ Λ is the successor
of Γ ñ Σ if either Γ ñ Σ is ∆ ñ Λ or Γ ñ Σ is ∆, ϕ ñ Λ and ϕ is the result
of the step taken at stage i. The relation of successor is a function. If ∆ ñ Λ is
the successor of Γ ñ Σ this is indicated by #pΓ ñ Σq “ ∆ ñ Λ. Let Γ ñ Σ be a
sequent featuring in Gi. ChpΓ ñ Σq is a set defined inductively by
• Γ ñ Σ P ChpΓ ñ Σq,
• #pΓ ñ Σq P ChpΓ ñ Σq,
• and if ∆ ñ Λ P ChpΓ ñ Σq then #p∆ ñ Λq P ChpΓ ñ Σq,
• Nothing else is in ChpΓ ñ Σq.
Given a set ChpΓ1 ñ Σ1q “ tΓ1 ñ Σ1,Γ2 ñ Σ2, . . .u the sequent SChpΓ1 ñ Σ1q is
defined as
SChpΓi ñ Σiq :“
ď
i
Γi ñ
ď
i
Σi
Let β be an open branch in the tree pipGq. The hypersequent Mpβq is the set6
Mpβq :“ tSChpΓ ñ Σq : DGpG P β&Γ ñ Σ P Gqu
6As mentioned above given the rules EC and EE hypersequents can be treated as sets when
considering the hypersequent calculus for S5.
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Lemma 2.16. Let G be such that &cfhs5 G and β be an open branch in pipGq. Let
Γ ñ Σ P Mpβq. Mpβq has the following properties:
1. If  ϕ P Γ then ϕ P Σ.
2. If  ϕ P Σ then ϕ P Γ.
3. If ϕÑ ψ P Γ then either ψ P Γ or ϕ P Σ.
4. If ϕÑ ψ P Σ then ϕ P Γ and ψ P Σ.
5. If ˝ϕ P Γ then for any ∆ ñ Λ P Mpβq, ϕ P ∆.
6. If ˝ϕ P Σ then there is a ∆ ñ Λ P Mpβq such that ϕ P Λ.
Proof. The proofs of (1) – (4) follow straightforwardly from the construction of pipGq.
To prove (5) let Γ ñ Σ P Mpβq and ˝ϕ P Γ. Suppose that there is a ∆ ñ Λ P Mpβq
such that ϕ R ∆. Let SChpΓˆ ñ Σˆq “ Γ ñ Σ and Schp∆ˆ ñ Λˆq “ ∆ ñ Λ. There is a
stage with hypersequent Gj such that Γˆ
1 ñ Σˆ1 P ChpΓˆ ñ Σˆq, ˝ϕ P Γˆ1, Γˆ1 ñ Σˆ1 occurs
in Gj, ∆ˆ
1 ñ Λˆ1 P Chp∆ˆ ñ Λˆq, ∆ˆ1 ñ Λˆ1 occurs in Gj, and ˝ϕ is under consideration.
However at the following stage Gj`1 ϕ is added to the left of every sequent in Gj
by (4a) in the construction of pipGq. Let ∆ˆ2 ñ Λˆ2 “ #p∆ˆ1 ñ Λˆ1q. It follows that
ϕ P ∆ˆ2 and so ϕ P ∆ contradicting the assumption.
To prove (6) let ˝ϕ P Σ. Let SChpΓˆ ñ Σˆq “ Γ ñ Σ. There is a sequent
Γˆ1 ñ Σˆ1 P ChpΓˆ ñ Σˆq occurring in a hypersequent Gi P β such that ˝ϕ P Σˆ1
with the sentence ˝ϕ under consideration. At that stage either there is a sequent
∆ ñ Λ P Gi such that ϕ P Λ or not. If there is, then ϕ P SChp∆ ñ Λq. If not then
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by (4b) in the construction of pipGq Gi`1 is Gi; p ñ ϕq. Let SChp ñ ϕq “ Π ñ Θ.
It follows that SChp ñ ϕq P Mpβq and ϕ P Θ.
Lemma 2.17. If &cfhs5 G then there is a model MF that is a counter-example to G.
Proof. Let &cfhs5 G. As noted above there is a open branch β in pipGq. Let Mpβq “
pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq; . . .. LetF be a frame such that for each Γi ñ Σi PMpβq
there is a world wi P WF and no other worlds in WF . Let RF be universal. It follows
F P L. Let MF be the ordered pair xIMF ,F y. IMF pwi, pq “ 1 iff p P Γi. It is proved
by induction on the rank of ϕ that for any ϕ if ϕ P Γj then IMF pwj, ϕq “ 1 and if
ϕ P Σj then IMF pwj, ϕq “ 0. The atomic case is given above. This leaves the three
other inductive cases.
Case 1 (ϕ is  ψ). Let ϕ P Γj. By lemma 2.16 (1), ψ P Σj. By IH IMF pwj, ψq “ 0,
so IMF pwj, ψq “ 1. The case where ϕ P Σj is similar.
Case 2 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). This case is similar the above case.
Case 3 (ϕ is ˝ψ). Let ϕ P Γj. It follows from lemma 2.16 (5) that for every ∆ ñ
Λ P Mpβq, ψ P ∆. Let Γi ñ Σi P Mpβq. So ψ P Γi. By IH, IMF pwi, ψq “ 1. Since
Γi ñ Σi is arbitrary it holds for all such wi that IMF pwi, ψq “ 1. So IMF pwj, ˝ψq “ 1.
Let ϕ P Σj. It follows from lemma 2.16 (6) that there is a Γi ñ Σi PMpβq such
that ψ P Σi. By IH IMF pwi, ψq “ 0. So IMF pwj, ˝ψq “ 0.
It follows that there is a branch of worlds w1, . . . , wn, . . . P WF such that MF is
a counter-model to Γi ñ Σi at wi. So MF is a counter-example to Mpβq.
For each sequent ∆ ñ Λ occurring in G there is a sequent Γi ñ Σi PMpβq such
that ∆ Ď Γi and Λ Ď Σi. Since MF is a counter-example to Mpβq MF is also a
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counter-example to G.
Theorem 2.4.1. If $hs5 G then $cfhs5 G.
Proof. Let $hs5 G. By lemma 2.12 there is no counter-example to G. By lemma 2.17,
if there is no counter-example to G then $cfhs5 G. So $cfhs5 G.
2.5 Discussion
The hypersequent calculi presented in section 2.3 have several desirable properties.
The rules governing modal expressions do not change from system to system. They
also have all of the important properties discussed in section 2.2.
1. The rules have only one occurrence of ˝ in the conclusion.
2. Only ˝ appears essentially in the conclusion of L˝ and R˝.
3. Every rule governing ˝ either introduces ˝ on the left of a sequent or on the
right and there is a rule to do each.
4. No rule features ˝ essentially in its premises.
Thus the rules of the hypersequent calculi are explicit, separated, symmetrical, and
non-circular. In addition to this the results of section 7.3.2 show that they uniquely
characterize the expression ˝. Finally it is known that the hypersequent calculi for
the modal logics D and S5 are cut admissible. The calculus for the modal logic D is
in addition to this cut eliminable. It follows that both hypersequent calculi have the
sub-formula property.
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Restall [51] concludes “Proofnets for S5: Sequents and Circuits for Modal Logic”
by saying
The aim, of course, is an account of proof in which the rules for the
modal operators are untouched, and the structural rules (in this case,
the behaviour of nearness and the relations of ancestor/descendant) play
the role of determining which modal logic is found.
This chapter offers such an account of proof. The logics developed in section 2.3
vary only in their external structural rules. All of the logics have the advantage
over the standard sequent account of modal logic presented in section 2.2 of uniquely
characterizing the expression ˝. This suggests that this hypersequent approach to
modal logic is well worth continued exploration. It is a valuable tool for exploring
the proof theoretic properties of modal logics and may be of value to philosophers in
developing an inferentialist theory of meaning for modal expressions.
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Chapter 3
Hypersequent System D
Abstract. If inferentialism is to be a viable theory of meaning, then it must be
able to offer an account of the meaning of modal expressions. This chapter lays the
groundwork for such an account by proposing constraints on a theory of meaning. In
particular it is required that the Rule of Cut be admissible and that each expression
of the language whose meaning is being given be characterized uniquely. Many proof-
theoretic accounts of modality fail to meet this second constraint. The achievement
of this chapter is to offer a hypersequent calculus that does meet those constraints
for System D. System D is selected as an example to show that the theory of meaning
proposed is viable and can be extended to modal notions with inferential patterns
weaker than S5. Cut elimination (Theorem 3.6.1) and the unique characterization of
‘it is obligatory that...’ are proved (Theorem 3.7.1) for the proposed hypersequent
calculus.
Keywords. Modal Logic, Inferentialism, System D, Hypersequents
3.1 Inferentialism and Meaning
The main aim of this chapter is to introduce a viable example, and so a starting point,
for an inferentialist account of modality. If inferentialism is to be a viable theory of
meaning it must offer a plausible account of modality. The first requirement of such
a theory is that it be adequate given the other commitments of inferentialism. The
second is that it be able to offer a variety of modal systems to mirror the variety of
modalities that appear to be a part of meaningful discourse. This chapter lays the
groundwork for addressing these concerns. It is the first of the above concerns that
motivates use of the hypersequent calculus. The bulk of the chapter introduces this
formalism and shows that it meets the formal constraints required by an inferentialist
account of meaning. The second of the above concerns prompts an exploration of
Lemmon and Scott’s [30] System D. Much of the literature on inferentialist accounts
of modality has centered on the modal operators ‘It is necessary that . . . ’ and ‘it is
possible that . . . ’ (see Brandom [10], Dosˇen [12], Avron [2], and Restall [55]). This
chapter illustrates that an inferentialist account of modality can capture a wider
range of modal operators.
Before exploring the specific inferentialist theory that will be offered, some general
points are worth noting. Inferentialism is at least the claim that the use of an
expression determines its meaning. The salient use here is generally given by a set
of rules. This is a minimal account of the commitments of inferentialism. Most
inferentialists will subscribe to some stronger claim about the relation between the
meaning of an expression and its use. What follows from this characterization of
inferentialism thus has wide applicability.
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Since a set of rules is said to determine the meaning of an expression it must
be that there is only one consistent understanding of that expression. Suppose that
two expressions were introduced using the same set of rules, and let there be a place
where the two expressions, so introduced, were not intersubstitutable. In this case
there would be an ambiguity as to what meaning the rules conferred, they could not
confer the same meaning to both expressions. Thus, the set of rules did not uniquely
determine a meaning. For any set of rules to confer a meaning on an expression,
it must be provable that a second expressions governed by the same rules would
be everywhere intersubstitutable with the first. This was first proposed by Belnap
[4] in response to Prior [44]. More recently, this constraint has been put forward in
Humberstone [21] as the Uniqueness Criterion. According to it, a meaning conferring
set of rules must determine a single meaning for an expression. This is of particular
concern in here because standard sequent presentations of modal logic fail to meet
this constraint.
Similarly, a meaning conferring set of must be complete in the sense that they
rely on no other rules to confer the meaning of an expression. It must be that when
an expression can be shown to have some status in a proof system, e.g. proved,
incoherent to assert, refutable, etc. there must be a deduction in the proof system
that establishes that status using only meaning conferring (and structural) rules for
that expression.1 If this were to fail, then the original set of rules could not be said
to be properly meaning conferring. They would not be sufficient to fix the meaning
1For simplicity let operational rules only add formulas to a sequent, i.e. if any formula appears
in a premise sequent then either it appears as in the conclusion sequent or it is a sub-sentence of
some sentence of the conclusion sequent.
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of that expression in every context.2 It seems plausible that “It is obligatory that
. . . ”, negation, and the conditional have their meanings determined by the set of
rules governing each expression respectively and no others, e.g. the meaning that
negation contributes to sentences in which it occurs is governed solely by L and
R of Figure 3.2. In this circumstance this constraint amounts to the requirement
that deductions be normalizable in the sense of Prawitz [42] or Dummett [13] or in
the case of sequents and hypersequents that the calculus is cut admissible.
It should be noted that if the rule of cut is not valid, as suggested by Ripley [?],
then this constraint is trivially met. If it is valid, then showing that it is admissible
shows that when a sentence featuring that expression is established, then there is
a deduction that establishes that sentence featuring a rule explicitly mentioning
that expression. This constraint has stronger force in other inferentialist theories
of meaning. For instance, Brandom’s [9] account of logical vocabulary as expressive
requires that cut be admissible. If there were a deduction involving logical vocabulary
that established a sentence not establishable without the use of logical vocabulary,
the logical vocabulary would have made a substantial contribution to the meaning of
other sentences. In such a case, the logical vocabulary could not be purely expressive
in Brandom’s [9] sense.
The uniqueness constraint and cut admissibility are discussed in detail below.
Most of this chapter is devoted to showing that the calculus of Figure 3.2 meets these
two requirements of a theory of meaning. The former is established by Theorem 3.7.1,
the latter by Theorem 3.6.1.
2It should be noted that this does not entail a molecularism about meaning. It is compatible
with the above that rules governing the conditional are meaning conferring for negation.
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Fix a set of atomic sentences, p1, p2, . . .. The set of sentences of the language
under consideration is specified by
ϕ :“ | ϕ|pϕÑ ψq| ˝ ψ
The specific theory of meaning that this chapter pursues is bilateralist in the
sense of Rumfitt [59]. There are two independent uses of sentences, they can either
be asserted or denied. Following Restall [50, 53, 55], a position is a pair of sets of
sentences, one set of which represents assertions the other of which represents denials.
If Γ and Σ are sets of sentences, then Γ ñ Σ is the position one would take up if one
asserted all of Γ and denied all of Σ. Positions can be coherent or incoherent. For
instance it is incoherent to assert and deny the same sentence.3 It is incoherent to
assert “The sky is blue” while also denying that sentence.
Positions provide an adequate theory of meaning for classical propositional logic.
The meaning of a sentence, ‘P and Q’, whose main operator is a conjunction is given
by the following set of rules:
• If it is coherent to assert ‘P and Q’ in a position then it is coherent to assert
‘P’ in that position and it is coherent to assert ‘Q’ in that position.
• If it is coherent to deny ‘P and Q’ in a position then it is either coherent to
deny ‘P’ in that position and it is coherent to deny ‘Q’ in that position.
These rules are given a formal treatment in by the following three rules of the sequent
calculus. Let Γ and Σ be sets of sentences.
3This may not hold for all circumstances, for instances indexicals present a possible counter-
example, but these cases are left out of consideration for present purposes.
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Γ, P ñ Σ
Land
Γ, PandQñ Σ
Γ, Qñ Σ
Land
Γ, PandQñ Σ
Γ ñ P,Σ Γ ñ Q,Σ
Rand
Γ ñ PandQ,Σ
Let $ Γ ñ Σ indicate that there is a deduction of the sequent Γ ñ Σ. Let ‘und’
be an expression that is introduced into the language by the meaning conferring
rules:
Γ, P ñ Σ
Lund
Γ, PundQñ Σ
Γ, Qñ Σ
Lund
Γ, PundQñ Σ
Γ ñ P,Σ Γ ñ Q,Σ
Rund
Γ ñ PundQ,Σ
The rules governing ‘und’ are the same as those governing ‘and’. The uniqueness
constraint can be formally stated as the requirement that the following two facts
hold.
• $ Γ, PandQñ Σ iff $ Γ, PundQñ Σ.
• $ Γ ñ PandQñ Σ iff $ Γ ñ PundQ,Σ.
3.2 Sequent System D
The above discussion of positions suggests that the most natural approach to offering
a theory of meaning for a modal logic is to simply add modal operators to a sequent
system that has already been proposed. The standard account of System D is given
in Figure 3.1. Similar presentations can be found in Wansing [73], Poggiolesi [39]
and Valentini [71].
The calculus of Figure 3.1 is unable to underwrite a theory of meaning for the
modal operator ˝. It fails to the uniqueness constraint. Let the language be expanded
by d, and System D` be the calculus of Figure 3.1 expanded by the rules:
81
Figure 3.1: Sequent System D
Structural Rules
Axiom ϕñ ϕ
Γ ñ Σ
WL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
WL
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Operational Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ψ ñ Σ
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ
k ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
RÑ
Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
Γ ñ
d ˝Γ ñ
˝Γ “ t˝ϕ : ϕ P Γu
Γ ñ ϕ
k` dΓ ñ dϕ
Γ ñ
d` dΓ ñ
In system D` $ ˝ϕ ñ ˝ϕ, but & dϕ ñ ˝ϕ. While cut is admissible for this
system (see Valentini [71]) it fails the uniqueness constraint. The rules k and d thus
do not uniquely determine the meaning of the operator ˝. This failure of uniqueness
is not particular to the sequent account of system D. It fails for K, T , B, S4, and
S5 as they are characterized in Wansing [73].
This suggests that sequents are not the appropriate formal tools to offer an in-
ferentialist treatment of modality.
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3.3 Hypersequent System D
A hypersequent is a finite sequence of sequents. So if for each 1 ď i ď n, Γi ñ
Σi is a sequent, then pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq is a hypersequent. Upper-case
Roman Letters towards the beginning of the alphabet, e.g. G, H, J . . . are used as
hypersequent variables. When convenient parentheses around sequents are dropped.
When considering a sentence, ϕ appearing in a hypersequent, it is convenient to
discuss the specific sequent in which ϕ appears. As a shorthand, ‘ϕ P ΓYΣ’ is used
to indicate that ϕ P ΓYΣ. ‘ϕ P ∆ ñ Λ P H’ is used to indicate that ϕ P ∆YΛ and
∆ ñ Λ P H.
Hypersequents were first introduced by Pottinger [40] to give a proof system for
modal logic. They have since been used by Avron [1], Lahav [23], and Lellmann [29]
for that same purpose. The approach offered by this chapter differs considerably
from these approaches in two important ways. The first is that this approach makes
crucial use of the external structural rules of the calculus. The hypersequents of
this chapter are lists, not sets or multisets. This approach allows for many different
systems of modal logic to be obtained simply by manipulation of structural rules of
the calculus. The second difference is that the rules governing the modal operators
are specified so that they satisfy the uniqueness constraint discussed above.
The goal of this chapter is to introduce a viable example, and so a starting point,
for an inferentialist account of modality. Sequents have been rejected as a plausible
structure to account for all the features of a theory of meaning that are required. In
order for hypersequents to be satisfactory structure, then in addition to meeting the
formal constraints discussed in Section 3.1 there must be a semantic interpretation
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of hypersequents. For different systems of modal logic, the semantic interpretation
is different. A hypersequent consisting of just one sequent is given the same reading
as above. If that hypersequent, Γ ñ Σ, is deducible, then it is incoherent to assert
all of Γ and deny all of Σ. Let pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq be a hypersequent.
Corresponding to it is a hyper-position. Restall [55] gives an account of how to
understand both the expressions. On that account, to be in a hyper-position is to be
addressing the relationship of other positions to one’s own position. This strategy
is followed: modality is considered to ultimately be a way of considering positions
other than the one that one has actually taken up. For deontic modality, in the case
where n “ 2, if pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; pΓ2 ñ Σ2q is deducible then it is incoherent to take up
the position Γ2 ñ Σ2 while holding Γ1 ñ Σ1 to be morally ideal relative to Γ2 ñ Σ2.
For example, the hypersequent, pñ ϕq; p˝ϕ ñq, is deducible in the hypersequent
calculus given by Figure 3.2. This corresponds to the incoherence of taking up a
position asserting that it ought to be that ϕ, but denying ϕ in a position morally
ideal relative to the one taken up. Simplified, it is incoherent to assert that ϕ ought
to be the case, but deny ϕ is morally ideal.
For the case where n ą 2, the relation ‘. . . is morally ideal relative to . . . ’ is
iterated. To say a hyperposition, pΓ1 ñ Σ1q; . . . ; pΓn ñ Σnq, is incoherent is to say
that it is incoherent to take up Γn ñ Σn and hold that for each 1 ď i, i ` 1 ď n,
Γi ñ Σi is morally ideal relative to Γi`1 ñ Σi`1. This is a only a sketch of the
semantic interpretation. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the formal apparatus
and show that it meets the constraints suggested in Section 3.1.
Figure 3.2 gives a hypersequent calculus for system D. $h G indicates that G
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is deducible in this system. Theorem 3.8.2 and Theorem 3.8.1 establish that this
system is equivalent to sequent system D in that it proves a hypersequent of the form
Γ ñ Σ iff that sequent is provable according to the rules of Figure 3.1. Theorem 3.6.1
establishes that the Cut rule is eliminable, and Theorem 3.7.1 establishes that the
uniqueness constraint is met. It is worth noting that there may be other hypersequent
calculi that have these features. The advantage of this approach is that other modal
logics, for instance K, can be obtained by manipulating external structural rules.
System K is given by the calculus that retains all the rules of Figure 3.2 except for
Drop. It can be shown that cut is eliminable for that calculus by a proof similar to
the one given here.
Section 3.4 offers theorems that are useful for acquaintance with the system.
The theorems are useful in Section 3.7. Section 3.5 offers lemmas that allow a
deduction featuring a sentence ϕ, to be transformed into a deduction featuring a
sentence or sentences of rank less than ϕ. These lemmas are instrumental in the
proof of Theorem 3.6.1. Section 3.6 proves that Cut is eliminable. This is proved
by introducing a Cut*-rule of which all instances of the Cut rule are instances. It
is proved that Cut* is eliminable by showing that it can be eliminated from proofs
having only one occurrence of Cut*. This is shown by an induction over the rank of
the formula that is main in the Cut* rule. The lemmas of Section 3.5 are instrumental
in the base case and two inductive cases. For the inductive case where the main
formula of the Cut* rule is a formula of the form ˝ϕ, a sub-induction over a newly
defined measure, disarray (see Definition 19) is required. It is shown that Cuts*
can be pushed up deductions while preserving disarray and that when there is no
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disarray the rank of the Cut* formula can be reduced.
Section 3.8 shows that the calculus of Figure 3.2 deduces all and only the singleton
hypersequents that are deducible in Figure 3.1. Section 3.7 establishes that the rules
of Figure 3.2 uniquely characterize the modal operator.
3.4 Preliminaries
Theorem 3.4.1 shows that the rule Ax holds of all sentences, not only atomics. Many
of the proofs in the subsequent sections require this result. Theorem 3.4.1 also plays
a key role in the proof of Theorem 3.7.1.
Definition 7 (Rank of a sentence). The rank of ϕ, rkpϕq is defined inductively as
follows:
• If ϕ is atomic, then rkpϕq “ 0.
• If ϕ is ˝ψ or  ψ, then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` 1.
• If ϕ is γ Ñ δ, then rkpϕq “ rkpγq ` rkpδq ` 1.
Theorem 3.4.1. $h ϕñ ϕ, for any ϕ.
Proof. This proof proceeds by induction on the rank of sentences. The base case if
given by Ax. There are then three inductive cases: Case 1 (Negation).
IH
ϕñ ϕ
L  ϕ, ϕñ
R  ϕñ  ϕ
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Case 2 (Conditional).
IH
ϕñ ϕ
IH
ψ ñ ψ
LÑ
ϕ, ϕÑ ψ ñ ψ
RÑ
ϕÑ ψ ñ ϕÑ ψ
Case 3 (Necessity).
pϕñ ϕq
W pϕñ ϕq; pñq
L˝ pñ ϕq; p˝ϕñq
R˝ p˝ϕñ ˝ϕq
Corollary 1. $h Γ, ϕñ ϕ,Σ
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.4.1, TL, and TR.
3.5 Important Lemmas
3.5.1 Reduction Lemmas
This subsection offers the standard reduction lemmas of a cut-elimination proof.
These lemmas show that given a deduction of a hypersequent featuring a sentence,
 ϕ or ϕÑ ψ, it is possible to get deductions featuring their subsentences.
The rules in Figure 3.2 are schemata. In what follows it is sometimes important
to draw attention to different aspects of each of these schemata. Definition 8 and
Definition 9 make referring to these aspects of schema easy. They are also crucial for
definition the measure Definition 10 that is used in the base case of Lemma 3.13.
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Definition 8 (Main sentence). ϕ is the main sentence of TL, TR, L , R , LÑ,
RÑ, L , or R , if ϕ appears in the conclusion of one of those but not the premise(s).
In the case of Cut, the main sentence is the sentence not appearing in the conclusion
hypersequent. In the case of Ax, the main sentence is the only sentence present.
Definition 9 (Main Sequent). The main sequent of a rule schema, I, is either the
sequent containing the main sentence of I, or is given by the following list:
• Drop has no main sequent.
• The main sequent of W is pñq.
• For L˝ and R˝, the right-main sequent is the one containing the main sentence.
The left-main sequent is either the one immediately preceding the right-main
sentence or none at all.
Definition 10 (Depth). Let δ be a deduction. The depth of a sentence, ϕ, in that
deduction is defined relative to an occurrence of a sequent in a hypersequent in that
deduction. If ϕ does not appear in the sequent in question in that deduction, then
its depth is undefined.
• The depth of the main sentence of an instance of Ax is 1, dpp, δ, pñ pq “ 1.
• Let the last inference of δ be I, and the deduction(s) preceding I to be δ1pδ2q.
Let ∆ ñ Λ be the sequent in δ1 or δ2, such that Γ ñ Σ results from it after an
application of I, e.g. if I is TL, and Γ ñ Σ is main in I, with main sentence,
ψ, then ∆ ñ Λ is Γ{tψu ñ Σ, if Γ ñ Σ is not main, then ∆ ñ Λ is Γ ñ Σ.
• If I is Drop, and ϕ P Γ ñ Σ, then dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1
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• If I is W, and ϕ P Γ ñ Σ, then dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is TL, ϕ is main in I, the main sequent of I is Γ, ϕ ñ Σ, and ϕ R Γ, then
dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕñ Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is TR, ϕ is main in I, the main sequent of I is Γ ñ ϕ,Σ, and ϕ R Σ, then
dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is Cut, dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` dpϕ, δ2,∆ ñ Λq ` 1, where
ϕ P ΓY Σ.
• If I is L , ϕ is main in I, the main sequent of I is Γ, ϕñ Σ, and ϕ R Γ, then
dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕñ Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is R , ϕ is main in I, the main sequent of I is Γ ñ ϕ,Σ, and ϕ R Σ, then
dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is LÑ, ϕ is main in I, the main sequent of I is Γ, ϕ ñ Σ, and ϕ R Γ,
then dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕ ñ Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕ ñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ
Λq ` dpϕ, δ2,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is RÑ, ϕ is main in I, the main sequent of I is Γ ñ Σ, and ϕ R Σ, then
dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is L˝, ϕ is main in I, the right main sequent of I is Γ ñ Σ, and ϕ R Γ, then
dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕñ Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ, ϕñ Σq “ dpϕ, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ` 1.
• If I is R˝, ϕ is main in I, the right main sequent of I is Γ ñ Σ, and ϕ R Σ,
then dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ 1. Otherwise, dpϕ, δ,Γ ñ ϕ,Σq “ dpϕ, δ,∆ ñ Λq ` 1
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Let δ be a deduction, its length, lpδq, is defined as usual.
Lemma 3.1. If δ $h G; Γ, ϕ ñ Σ;H, then there is a δ1, such that δ1 $h G; Γ ñ
ϕ,Σ;H where lpδ1q ď lpδq and for any atomic p P ∆ ñ Λ P G; Γ, ϕ ñ Σ;H,
dpp, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ď dpp, δ,∆ ñ Λq.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of deductions. The smallest
deductions are the instances of Ax, which do meet the antecedent of the lemma. It
follows that the lemma holds for the base case. Let δ be given, and its last inference
be I.
Case 1 (I is Cut). If Γ, ϕ ñ Σ is not the main sequent in I, then the result
follows from two applications IH followed by I. If, on the other hand Γ, ϕ ñ Σ is
the main sequent in I, then the following deduction is given:
...
G; Γ, ψ, ϕñ Σ;H
...
G; Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ;H
Cut
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ;H
In this case IH allows the following deduction, δ1, to be constructed:
IH
G; Γ, ψ ñ ϕ,Σ;H
IH
G; Γ ñ ϕ, ψ,Σ;H
Cut
G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H
For each branch of δ, δ1 and δ2, lpδ1q, lpδ2q ă lpδq. By IH the each branches of
δ1, δ11, δ12 are such that lpδ11q ď lpδ1q, and lpδ12q ď lpδ2q. So lpδ1q ď lpδq. Similarly, the
depth of p in δ in ∆ ñ Λ is preserved by IH.
Case 2 (I is Drop or W) In either of these cases an application of IH followed
by I suffices. Since IH preserves the length of deductions, an application of I to
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a deduction whose length is at most one less than δ will be at most as long as δ.
Similarly for the depth of any atomic in δ.
Case 3 (I is TL or TR). If  ϕ is not the main sentence, this follows from an
application of IH to the deduction preceding I. The length of the resulting deduction
is less than or equal to the length of the deduction to which it was applied. Applying I
to that deduction gives δ1, where lpδ1q ď lpδq. If it is, δ1 is the deduction immediately
preceding I, whose length is less than δ. The depth of p in δ in ∆ ñ Λ is preserved
by IH.
Case 4 (I is L ). As above, if  ϕ is not the main sentence, this case follows
from IH and I. If it is the main sentence, then δ1 is the deduction preceding I, or an
application of IH. The depth of p in δ in ∆ ñ Λ is preserved by IH.
Case 5 (I is R , LÑ, or RÑ). These cases also follow form IH and I.
Case 6 (I is L˝). There are three sub-cases here: Case 6.1 (Γ, ϕ ñ Σ is not
main in I). This sub-case follows from IH and I.
Case 6.2 (Γ, ϕ ñ Σ is left-main in I). In this case, the following deduction is
given:
...
G; Γ, ψ, ϕñ Σ; ∆ ñ Λ;H
L˝
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ; ∆, ˝ψ ñ Λ;H
IH allows for the construction of the following deduction:
IH
G; Γ, ψ ñ ϕ,Σ; ∆ ñ Λ;H
L˝
G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ; ∆, ˝ψ ñ Λ;H
Let δ1 be the deduction preceding I. In this case applying IH gives δ
1
1, such that
lpδ11q ď lpδ1q. So applying L˝ gives a deduction of length less than or equal to δ.
91
Case 6.3 (Γ, ϕñ Σ is right-main in I). This is similar to the above case.
Case 7 (I is R˝). This case has two sub-cases: Case 7.1 (Γ, ϕ ñ Σ is not main
in I). In this case the δ has the following form:
IH
ñ ψ; ∆ ñ Λ;G; Γ, ϕñ Σ;H
R˝
∆ ñ ˝ψ,Λ;G; Γ, ϕñ Σ;H
IH allows the following deduction to be constructed:
IH
ñ ψ; ∆ ñ Λ;G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H
R˝
∆ ñ ˝ψ,Λ;G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H
Applying IH preserves the length of the deduction immediately preceding I. Ap-
plying R˝ to this gives δ1 with lpδ1q ď lpδq.
Case 7.2 (Γ, ϕñ Σ is right-main in I). In this case δ has the following form:
...
ñ ψ; Γ, ϕñ Σ;H
R˝
Γ, ϕ, ˝ψ ñ Σ;H
IH can be used to construct the following deduction:
IH
ñ ψ; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H
R˝
Γ ñ ˝ψ, ϕ,Σ;H
Applying IH preserves the length of the deduction immediately preceding I. Applying
R˝ to this gives δ1 with lpδ1q ď lpδq.
Lemma 3.2. If δ $h G; Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ;H, then there is a δ1 such that δ1 $h Γ, ϕ ñ
Σ;H, where lpδ1q ď lpδq and for any atomic p P ∆ ñ Λ P G; Γ, ϕ ñ Σ;H,
dpp, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ď dpp, δ,∆ ñ Λq.
Proof. The proof of this is similar to Lemma 3.1.
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Lemma 3.3. If δ $h G; Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ;H, then there is a δ1 such that δ1 $h G; Γ ñ
ϕ,Σ;H and δ2 $h G; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H, where lpδ1q, lpδ2q ď lpδq and for any atomic p P
∆ ñ Λ P G; Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ;H, dpp, δ1,∆ ñ Λq, dpp, δ2,∆ ñ Λq ď dpp, δ,∆ ñ Λq.
Proof. The base case for this is given by the fact that the antecedent of the lemma
is vacuous in that case. Let I be the last inference of δ.
Case 1 (I is Cut). There are two sub-cases:
Case 1.1 (Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ is not main). In this case, δ has the following form:
...
∆, γ ñ Λ;G; Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ;H
...
∆ ñ γ,Λ;G; Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ;H
Cut
∆ ñ Λ;G; Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ;H
In this case IH gives deductions of the following four hypersequents:
δ11 ∆, γ ñ Λ;G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H, with lpδ11q ă lpδq
δ12 ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H, with lpδ12q ă lpδq
δ13 ∆, γ ñ Λ;G; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H, with lpδ13q ă lpδq
δ14 ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H, with lpδ14q ă lpδq
Applying Cut to (δ11) and (δ12) gives a deduction, δ1 of ∆ ñ Λ;G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H,
with lpδ1q ď lpδq. Applying Cut to (δ3) and(δ4) gives a deduction, δ2, of ∆ ñ
Λ; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H, where lpδ2q ď lpδq.
Case 1.2 (Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ is main). This is similar to the above sub-case.
Case 2 (I is W or Drop). In both of these cases IH and an application of I gives
the result.
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Case 3 (I is TL or TR). If ϕÑ ψ is not the main sentence, these follow from an
application of IH followed by I. If ϕ Ñ ψ is the main sentence in TL, then TL can
be used to weaken in the desired sentence.
Case 4 (I is L , R , or RÑ). In these cases the result follows from IH followed
by I.
Case 5 (I is LÑ). In this case if ϕ Ñ ψ is not the main sentence, the result
follows from IH and an application of I. If ϕÑ ψ is the main sentence the result is
either the deductions immediately preceding I, or follows from them by IH.
Case 6 (I is L˝ or R˝). This is similar to the cases in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.4. If δ $h G; Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ;H then there is a δ1 such that δ1 $h G; Γ, ϕñ
ψ,Σ;H, where lpδ1q ď lpδq and for any atomic p P ∆ ñ Λ P G; Γ ñ ϕ Ñ ψ,Σ;H,
dpp, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ď dpp, δ,∆ ñ Λq.
Proof. This proof is similar to the above.
Lemma 3.5. If δ $h G; ∆ ñ Λ; Γ, ˝ϕ ñ Σ;H, then there is a δ1 such that δ1 $h
G; ∆, ϕ ñ Λ; Γ ñ Σ;H, where lpδ1q ď lpδq and for any atomic p P ∆ ñ Λ P
G; Γ, ˝ϕñ Σ;H, dpp, δ1,∆ ñ Λq ď dpp, δ,∆ ñ Λq.
Proof. This proceeds by induction on the length of deductions. Again the base case
does not meet the antecedent of the lemma. Let I be the last inference of δ
Case 1 (I is Cut.) If Γ, ˝ϕñ Σ is neither right nor left-main in I, then the result
follows from two applications of IH and I. If it is right-main in I, then δ has the
following form:
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...
G; ∆ ñ Λ; Γ, ˝ϕ, ψ ñ Σ;H
...
G; ∆ ñ Λ; Γ, ˝ϕñ ψ,Σ;H
Cut
G; ∆ ñ Λ; Γ, ˝ϕñ ψ,Σ;H
IH makes the following deduction constructible:
IH
G; ∆, ϕñ Λ; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H
IH
G; ∆, ϕñ Λ; Γ ñ ψ,Σ;H
G; ∆, ϕñ Λ; Γ ñ ψ,Σ;H
As above, the application of IH preserves the length of the sub-deductions of δ, and
so the constructed deduction is of length at most δ.
Case 2 (I is W or Drop). In either case, the result follows from IH and I.
Case 3 (I is TL or TR). If ˝ϕ is not the main sentence then δ1 is the result of IH
and I. If ˝ϕ is the main sentence then weakening in ϕ to ∆ ñ Λ as opposed to ˝ϕ
to Γ ñ Σ gives the result.
Case 4 (I is L , R , LÑ, or RÑ). All of these cases follow from IH and I.
Case 5 (I is L˝). If ˝ϕ is not main, then this follows from IH and I. If ˝ϕ is
main, then either δ1 is the deduction preceding I, or is given by IH.
Case 6 (I is R˝). In this case the result follows from IH and I.
3.5.2 Modal Lemmas
This subsection gives the conditions under which something like the above lemmas
can be applied to sentences of the form ˝ϕ.
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Definition 11 (Modal Rank). The modal rank of ϕ, mrpϕq is defined inductively
as follows:4
• If ϕ is atomic then mrpϕq “ 0.
• If ϕ is  ψ, and mrpψq “ 0 then mrpϕq “ 0.
• If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ where mrpψq “ 0,mrpθq “ 0, then mrpϕq “ 0.
• If ϕ is ˝ψ, then mrpϕq “ 1
• If ϕ is  ψ and mrpψq “ n ě 1, then mrpϕq “ n` 1.
• If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ, where mrpψq “ j and mrpθq “ k, and j ` k ě 1, then
mrpϕq “ j ` k ` 1
If Γ ñ Σ is a sequent, then the modal rank of that sequent is the ordered pair of
the maximum of the modal ranks of sentences in ΓYΣ, and the number of sentences
of that modal rank, mrpΓ ñ Σq “ xmaxtmrpϕq : ϕ P Γ Y Σu, |tψ : mrpψq “
maxtmrpϕq : ϕ P Γ Y Σuu|y, where |S| is the cardinality of the set S.5 The modal
ranks of sequents are ordered lexicographically. The modal rank of a hypersequent
G, mrpGq, is the ordered pair of the maximum of the modal ranks of sequents in G,
and the number of sequents of that modal rank in G, mrpGq “ xmaxtmrpΓ ñ Σq :
Γ ñ Σ P Gu, |t∆ ñ Λ : mrp∆ ñ Λq “ maxtmrpΓ ñ Σq : Γ ñ Σ P Guu|y. These too
are ordered lexicographically.
4This measure is similar to one defined by Lellmann [29]. It is a measure of how deeply a sentence
whose main expression is ˝ is nested in a sentence.
5The function max returns the maximum number in a set based on whatever ordering is given.
If the given set is empty it returns the lowest value of in the ordering in question.
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Remark 1. If mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x1, ny, then Γ ñ Σ can be partitioned into a set where
˝ does not occur, and a set where the main operator of each sentence is ˝. This
warrants rewriting this sequent as ∆ ˝ ∆1 ñ Λ ˝ Λ1 where for any ϕ P ∆ Y Λ,
mrpϕq “ 0.
Lemma 3.6. If δ $h G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H and řϕP∆YΛmrpϕq “ 0, then
δ1 $h G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆1 ñ Λ1;H, where lpδq ď lpδ1q and for any atomic p P Π ñ Θ P
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H, dpp, δ1,Π ñ Θq ď dpp, δ,Π ñ Θq.
Proof. Ax does not meet the antecedent of the lemma. Let I be the last inference of
δ
Case 1 (I is Cut). If Γ ñ Σ is not the main sequent in the cut, the result follows
from IH and I or merely IH. For the sake of clarity the case where Γ ñ Σ is the
main sequent in the cut is rehearsed. In this case δ has the following form:
...
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H
...
G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H
Cut
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H
The following deduction is can be constructed:
IH
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ; ∆1 ñ Λ1;H
IH
G; Γ ñ ϕ,Σ; ∆1 ñ Λ1;H
Cut
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆1 ñ Λ1;H
Case 2 (I is Drop or W). In this case IH and I give the result.
Case 3 (I is TL or TR). This case is also given by IH followed by I.
Case 4 (I is L , R , LÑ, or RÑ). Again, these cases are given by IH followed
by I.
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Case 5 (I is L˝). Case 5.1 (∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1 is right-main in I). In this case δ is
...
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H
L˝
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1, ˝ϕñ ΛΛ1;H
The following deduction can be constructed using IH
IH
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ; ∆1 ñ Λ1;H
L˝
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆1, ˝ϕñ Λ1;H
Case 5.2 (∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1 is left-main in I). In this case δ has the following form:
...
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1, ϕñ ΛΛ1; Π ñ Θ;H
L˝
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1; Π, ˝ϕñ Θ;H
In this case the following deduction is given:
IH
G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆1, ϕñ Λ1; Π ñ Θ;H
L˝
G; Γ ñ Σ;ñ; Π, ˝ϕñ Θ;H
Case 5.3 (Either Γ ñ Σ is right-main in I or neither Γ ñ Σ nor ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1 is
main in I). In this case the result is given by an application of IH followed by I.
Case 6 (I is R˝). This case is given by an application of IH followed by I.
Lemma 3.7. If δ $h G; Γ ñ Σ,∆ ñ ˝ϕ,Λ;H, then δ1 $h G; Γ ñ Σ,∆ ñ Λ;H,
where lpδ1q ď lpδq and p P Π ñ Θ P G; Γ ñ Σ; ∆∆1 ñ ΛΛ1;H, dpp, δ1,Π ñ Θq ď
dpp, δ,Π ñ Θq.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of δ. The base case is trivial.
For the inductive cases let I be the last inference of δ.
Case 1 ([I is Drop or W]). In either of these cases the result follows from IH and
I.
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Case 2 ([I is TL or TR]). If I is TL the result follows from IH and I. If I is TR,
then either it follows from IH and I, or in the case that ˝ϕ is the main sentence of
I, δ1 is the δ without I.
Case 3 ([I is Cut]). This case follows from two applications of IH followed by I.
Case 4 ([I is L , R , LÑ, or RÑ]). In any of these cases the result follows from
IH and I.
Case 5 ([I is L˝]). This follows from IH and I.
Case 6 ([I is R˝]). If Γ ñ Σ is not right-main in I, then the result follows from
IH and I since ˝ϕ cannot be the main formula in I. The only possibly worrying case
is if it is. In this case δ is
...
ñ ψ; Γ ñ Σ{t˝ψu; ∆ ñ ˝ϕ,Λ;H
R˝
Γ ñ Σ; ∆ ñ ˝ϕ,Λ;H
IH allows the following deduction to be constructed.
IH
ñ ψ; Γ ñ Σ{t˝ψu; ∆ ñ Λ;H
R˝
Γ ñ Σ; ∆ ñ Λ;H
Lemma 3.8. If mrpΓ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;Hq “ xx1, ny, 1y and δ $h Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H,
then either there is a δ1 such that δ1 $h Γ ñ Σ;H or there is a δ2 such that δ2 $h
˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H.
Proof. The base case is given by the fact that Ax is not of the right form to meet
the antecedent of the lemma. Let I be the last inference of δ. For the inductive
cases, it is important to note that because mrpΓ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;Hq “ xx1, ny, 1y,
99
for any ∆ ñ Λ P Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H, if p∆ ñ Λq ‰ pΓ ˝ Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1q then
mrp∆ ñ Λq “ x0,my, for some m.
Case 1 (I is TL or TR). These follow from IH, and possibly an application of TL
or TR.
Case 2 (I is Cut).
Case 2.1 (The Main Sequent is the left-most). In this case the given δ is
...
Γ ˝ Γ1, ϕñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ ϕ,Σ ˝ Σ1;H
Cut
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
In this case an sub-induction on the modal rank of ϕ is required. There are
several sub-cases that need to be considered.
Case 2.1.1 (mrpϕq “ 0). By IH either $h Γ, ϕ ñ Σ;H or $h ˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H. In
the second case, the result is given by IH alone. In the first case, it is necessary to
consider what is given by IH when applied to the deduction of Γ ˝Γ1 ñ ϕ,Σ ˝Σ1;H.
If, on the one hand $h ˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H, then IH gives the result. If, on the other,
$h Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H. The following deduction gives the result:
IH
Γ, ϕñ Σ;H
IH
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ;H
Cut
Γ ñ Σ;H
Case 2.1.2 (mrpϕq “ 1). This case is analogous to the above case where mrpϕq “
0
Case 2.1.3 (mrpϕq “ n). In this case, it will be shown that cuts can be pushed
back up δ. This allows the outer inductive hypothesis to be applied at a stage where
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the main sequents of the cut have a modal rank of at most x1,my, for some m. There
are two sub-sub-cases to consider here.
2.1.3.1 (ϕ is  γ). δ then has the form:
IH
Γ, γ ñ Σ;H
IH
Γ ñ  γ,Σ;H
Cut
Γ ñ Σ;H
Applying Lemma 3.1 to the deduction of Γ, γ ñ Σ;H and Lemma 3.2 to the
deduction of Γ ñ  γ,Σ;H and cutting gives the result.
2.1.3.2 (ϕ is γ Ñ δ). Again in this case applying Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 and
cutting will give the result.
Case 2.2 (The main sequent is other than the left-most). A similar induction over
the modal rank of the cut sentence is required. In this case δ is
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆, ϕñ Λ;H
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆ ñ ϕ,Λ;H
Cut
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆ ñ Λ;H
Case 2.2.1 (mrpϕq “ 0). In this case an application of Lemma 3.6 to one of the
deductions followed by TL and TR will give the result.
Case 2.2.2 (mrpϕq “ 1). In this case, an application of Lemma 3.7 to one of the
branches of δ will give the result.
Case 2.2.3 (mrpϕq “ n). There are two sub-cases to be considered.
Case 2.2.3.1 (ϕ is  ψ). In this case, δ is
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...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆, ψ ñ Λ;H
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆ ñ  ψ,Λ;H
Cut
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆ ñ Λ;H
An application of Lemma 3.1 to the right branch of δ, and application of Lemma 3.2
to the left branch, and a cut give the result.
Case 2.2.3.2 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). In this case δ is
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆, ψ Ñ θ ñ Λ;H
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆ ñ ψ Ñ θ,Λ;H
Cut
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G1; ∆ ñ Λ;H
An application of Lemma 3.3, an application of Lemma 3.4, and two cuts give
the result.
Case 3 (I is L , R , or RÑ). These cases are all given by an application of IH,
and possibly I.
Case 4 (I is LÑ). In this case the following deduction is given:
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ, ϕ, ˝Σ1;H
...
Γ, ψ, ˝Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ, ˝Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
In this case mrpϕ Ñ ψq “ 0. So if IH in either case delivers ˝∆1 ñ ˝Λ1;H, we are
done. On the other hand, the following deduction can be constructed:
IH
Γ,ñ ϕ,Σ;H
IH
Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ;H
If ϕÑ ψ is not in the left-most sequent in then an application of Lemma 3.6 to
one of the branches, and TL give the result.
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Case 5 (I is L˝). Since the only sequent in Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝Σ1;H, is Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝Σ1,
L˝ cannot be the last rule in δ.
Case 6 (I is R˝). In this case δ is
...
ñ ϕ; Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
I
Γ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1, ˝ϕ;H
Since mrpΓ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;Hq “ xx1, ny, ny, it follows that řϕPΓYΣmrpϕq “ 0.
Lemma 3.6 can be applied to the deduction preceding I yielding a deduction of ñ
ϕ; ˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H. An application of R˝ to this gives a deduction of ˝Γ1 ñ ˝ϕ, ˝Σ1;H
Remark 2. In each of the above Lemmas, the only cases that relied on the use of
the cut rule were cases where the inference being considered was an instance of Cut.
Therefore, if a deduction that meeting the antecedent of any of the lemmas does not
make use of Cut, then an application of one of the lemmas will preserve this feature.
3.6 Cut Elimination
3.6.1 Important Lemmas for Cut Elimination
This section proves that Cut is eliminable. It first introduces a new rule, Cut*, of
which all Cuts are instances. It proves that Cut* is eliminable by induction over the
rank of the main formula of a Cut* rule. There are two sub-inductions in this proof.
The first, in the base case, is an induction over the depth of the main formula of the
Cut* rule. The second sub-induction is in the case where the main formula of the
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Cut* rule is of the form ˝ϕ. In this case a new measure, disarray, on hypersequents
is defined. The sub-induction is over the amount of disarray in the hypersequents
under consideration.
Definition 12 (Cut-Free Deduction). A deduction δ making no use of the cut-rule
is called cut-free. δ $cfh G indicates that δ is a cut-free deduction of G, and $cfh G
indicates that there is some cut-free deduction of G.
Definition 13 (Fine Modal Rank). The fine modal rank of ϕ, fmrpϕq is defined
inductively as follows:
• If ϕ is atomic then fmrpϕq “ x0, 0y.
• If ϕ is  γ, and fmrpγq “ x0, ny then fmrpϕq “ x0, n` 1y.
• If ϕ is γ Ñ δ where fmrpγq “ x0, ny, fmrpδq “ x0,my, then fmrpϕq “ x0,m`
n` 1y.
• If ϕ is ˝ψ, where fmrpψq “ xm,ny then fmrpϕq “ xm` 1, 0y.
• If ϕ is  γ and fmrpγq “ xn,my, then fmrpϕq “ xn,m` 1y.
• If ϕ is γ Ñ δ, where fmrpγq “ xj, ky and fmrpδq “ xm,ny, j ` k ě 1, then
fmrpϕq “ xj `m, k ` ny
Fine modal ranks are ordered lexicographically. If Γ ñ Σ is a sequent, then the
fine modal rank of that sequent is the ordered pair of the maximum of the fine modal
ranks of sentences in Γ Y Σ, and the number of sentences of that fine modal rank,
fmrpΓ ñ Σq “ xmaxtfmrpϕq : ϕ P Γ Y Σu, |tψ : fmrpψq “ maxtfmrpϕq : ϕ P
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ΓY Σuu|y. The fine modal ranks of sequents are ordered lexicographically. The fine
modal rank of a hypersequent G, fmrpGq, is the ordered pair of the maximum of
the fine modal ranks of sequents in G, and the number of sequents of that fine modal
rank in G, fmrpGq “ xmaxtfmrpΓ ñ Σq : Γ ñ Σ P Gu, |t∆ ñ Λ : fmrp∆ ñ Λq “
maxtfmrpΓ ñ Σq : Γ ñ Σ P Guu|y. These too are ordered lexicographically.
Remark 3. The restriction on many lemmas that mrpΓ˝Γ1 ñ Σ˝Σ1;Hq “ xx1, ny, 1y,
for some n, could now be written as the restriction that fmrpΓ, ˝Γ1 ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;Hq “
xxxm, 0y, ny, 1y, for some n andm. Use of the modal rank as opposed to the fine modal
rank where possible allows simpler and more general proofs. this is particularly true
of Section 3.8. Because the definition of fine modal rank has more clauses than that
of modal rank cases that would have been repetitive can often be glossed over when
using modal rank as the inductive measure.
Lemma 3.9. If δ $cfh Γ, ˝ϕ ñ Σ;H, where mrpΓ, ˝ϕ ñ Σq “ x1,my for some m,
and mrpHq “ xx0, ny, oy for some n, o, and for any ϕ P Σ,mrpϕq “ 0 then either
there is a δ1 such that δ1 $cfh Γ ñ Σ;H, or there is a δ2 such that δ2 $cfh ϕ ñ; Γ ñ
Σ;H
Proof. The proof of this lemma proceeds by induction on the length of δ. The base
case is trivial. For the inductive case let I be the last inference in δ.
Case 1 (I is W or TR) These cases follow from IH and I.
Case 2 (I is TL). If ˝ϕ is not main, then the result follows from IH and I. If it
is, then the result is given by the deduction preceding I.
Case 3 (I is Drop). In this case an application of Lemma 3.5 to the deduction
preceding I gives the result.
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Case 4 (I is L , R , RÑ). These cases follow from IH and I.
Case 5 (I is LÑ). There are two sub-cases. Either the main sentence of I, ψ Ñ θ,
is in the left-most sequent or not.
Case 5.1 (ψ Ñ θ is in the left-most sequent). In this case δ is
...
Γ, ˝ϕ, θ ñ Σ;H
...
Γ, ˝ϕñ ψ,Σ;H
I
Γ, ˝ϕ, ψ Ñ θ,Σ;H
Applying IH to the left branch either gives a deduction of Γ, θ ñ Σ;H or a
deduction of ϕ ñ; Γ, θ ñ Σ;H. In the second case an application of Lemma 3.6,
followed by TL gives a deduction of ϕ ñ; Γ, ψ Ñ θ ñ Σ;H. Applying IH to the
right branch either gives a deduction of Γ ñ ψ,Σ;H or a deduction of ϕ ñ; Γ ñ
ψ,Σ;H. In the latter case an application of Lemma 3.6 and TL gives a deduction
of ϕ ñ; Γ, ψ Ñ θ ñ Σ;H. This leaves the case where there are deductions of
Γ, θ ñ Σ;H and Γ ñ ψ,Σ;H, in this case application of LÑ gives a deduction of
Γ, ψ Ñ θ ñ Σ;H.
Case 5.2 (ψ Ñ θ is not in the left-most sequent). In this case after an application
of IH, an application of Lemma 3.6 and TL gives the result.
Case 6 (I is L˝ or R˝). I cannot be L˝ or R˝.
Lemma 3.10. If δ $cfh ˝Γ ñ ˝Σ;H, where ˝Σ ‰ H and mrpHq “ xx0, ny,my for
some m and n, then there is a δ1 and ϕ P Σ, such that δ1 $cfh ñ ϕ; ˝Γ ñ;H
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of δ. The base case is trivial. Let
the last inference of δ be I.
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Case 1 (I is Drop). In this case an application of Lemma 3.7 and TR gives the
result.
Case 2 (I is W, TL, or TR). These cases follow from IH and I.
Case 3 (I is L , R , or RÑ). These cases follow from IH and I.
Case 4 (I is LÑ). After an application of IH to one of the branches, an application
of Lemma 3.6 followed by TL gives the result.
Case 5 (I is L˝). I cannot be L˝
Case 6 (I is R˝). In this case apply Lemma 3.7 deduction preceding I, perhaps
several times, to get a deduction of ϕñ; ˝Γ ñ;H.
Lemma 3.11. If δ $cfh Γ ñ Σ;G;ñ then there is a δ1 such that δ1 $cfh Γ ñ Σ;G
where lpδ1q ď lpδq, and for any atomic p P ∆ ñ Λ P Γ ñ Σ;H, dpp, δ1q ď dpp, δq.
Proof. This lemma is proved by induction on the length of deductions. In the base
case the Lemma holds trivially. For the inductive cases let δ be given and let I be
the last inference in δ. The only case where the result does not follow immediately
from an application of IH followed by I is where I is W . But in this case δ1 is the
deduction immediately preceding I.
3.6.2 Cut Elimination
The proof of cut-elimination proceeds much the same way as a Gentzen-style deduc-
tion. The main deduction is over the rank of the cut-formula. The lemmas from
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Section 3.5 do much of the work that the sub-induction over the depth of the cut-
formula would do. The greater complexity comes in the modal case, where it must
be shown that hypersequents involving cuts can be transformed into hypersequents
to which Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.10 can be applied.
Definition 14 (Product). If G is the hypersequent Γ1 ñ Σ1; . . . ; Γn ñ Σn and G1
is the hypersequent Γ11 ñ Σ11; . . . ; Γ1n ñ Σ1n, both containing n-many sequents, then
the even product of G and G1, rGG1s, is Γ1Γ11 ñ Σ1Σ11; . . . ; ΓnΓ1n ñ ΣnΣ1n. If G is the
hypersequent Γ1 ñ Σ1; . . . ; Γn ñ Σn and G1 is the hypersequent Γ11 ñ Σ11; . . . ; Γ1m ñ
Σ1m, where n ď m, then the uneven product of G and G1, GbG1, is the hypersequent
Γ1Γ
1
1 ñ Σ1Σ11; . . . ; ΓnΓ1n ñ ΣnΣ1n; Γ1n`1 ñ Σ1n`1; . . . ; Γ1m ñ Σ1m.
Importantly, GbG1 is the same as G1 bG.
Definition 15 (Cut*). The Cut* rule is the following:
G; Γ, ϕñ Σ;H G1; Γ1 ñ ϕ,Σ1;H 1
Cut* rGG1s; ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1;H bH 1
The Cut* rule requires that the sequents in which the main sentence of the rule
occurs, must be the same distance from the left of the hypersequent. What follows
them is the uneven product of the hypersequents following the main sequent.
Let h˚ be the system characterized by replacing Cut with Cut* in Figure 3.2.
Definition 16 (Cut-Proof). A cut-proof is a cut-free deduction whose only appli-
cation of the Cut* rule is the last inference. Call the main sentence of this inference
the cut*-sentence
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Definition 17 (In Position). A sentence, ϕ, in a hypersequent H, is in position
when either it is of modal rank 0, or it is both of modal rank 1 and in the left-most
sequent of that hypersequent.
Definition 18 (Complete). A hypersequent, H, is complete when all of its sentences
are in position.
Definition 19 (Disarray). Let H be a hypersequent. The disarray, dispHq, of H
is given by dispHq “ xmaxtfmrpϕq : ϕ P H and is not in positionu, |tψ P H :
fmrpψq “ maxtfmrpϕq : ϕ P H and is not in positionu and ψ is not in positionu|y.
Note 1. A hypersequent has disarray of xx0, 0y, 0y iff that hypersequent is complete.
Lemma 3.12. If Cut* is eliminable from Cut-proofs then Cut* is eliminable h˚, i.e.
if there is a deduction of G in h˚, then there is a cut*-free deduction of G in h˚.
Proof. Let Cut* be eliminable from cut-proofs. Let δ be a deduction involving cuts*.
Consider the top-most and left-most cut*. The sub-deduction of δ ending in this cut*
is a cut*-proof. By assumption, there is a cut*-free deduction of the same hyper-
sequent. Replace the cut*-proof with this deduction. Again consider the top-most
and left-most cut* in the new δ1. In the same way, this can be eliminated. Repeat
this process until all the cuts* are eliminated. This will be a cut*-free deduction of
end-sequent of δ.
Lemma 3.13. Cut* is eliminable from Cut-proofs.
Proof. The proof of this proceeds by induction on the rank of the cut*-sentence.
There are, furthermore, two sub-inductions over the depth of the sentence in the
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atomic case, and the modal rank of the main sequent in the case where the main
operator of the cut*-sentence is ˝. These sub-inductions occur in case 1, and case
2.3. Let δ be the deduction in question, and I be its last inference. Let the left
branch of δ be δ1 and the right branch be δ2.
Case 1 (Base Case: rkpϕq “ 0). In this case δ has the following form:
...
G; Γ ñ p,Σ;H
...
G1; Γ1, pñ Σ1;H 1
Cut* rGG1s; ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1;H bH 1
As mentioned above, a induction on the depth of p in δ is required.
Case 1.1 (dpp, δ1,Γ ñ Σ “ dpp, δ2,Γ1 ñ Σ1q “ 1). In this case both δ1 and δ2
introduce the cut*-sentence, which is atomic. Either p was introduced into δ1 by
means of Ax or TL. In the latter case, the result is given by the deduction preceding
TL and a combination of TL and TR. In the former case, either p was introduced into
δ2 by Ax or TR. In the latter case the result is given by the deduction immediately
preceding TR and a combination of TL and TR. In the former case, δ has the
following form:
pñ p pñ p
Cut* pñ p
Here the result is given by an instance of Ax.
For the inductive case let the maximum of dpp, δ1,Γ ñ Σq, dpp, δ2,Γ1 ñ Σ1q be n.
It is necessary to reduce the depth of p in whichever of the two is higher, if any. For
the sake of brevity let p be of greater depth in δ1, the case where it is in δ2 is similar.
This will proceed by checking the last inference of δ1, and showing that the depth of
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p can be reduced. If Γ, pñ Σ is not the left-most sequent in the hypersequent, then
the result is given directly by Lemma 3.6, TL, and TR. Therefore, it is only necessary
to consider cases where Γ, pñ Σ is the left-most sequent in the hypersequent.
Case 1.2 (I is W). In this case δ has the following form:
...
Γ, pñ Σ;H
W
Γ, pñ Σ;H;ñ
...
Γ1 ñ p,Σ1;H 1
Cut*
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1;H 1 b pH;ñq
There are two possibilities that require consideration. Case 1.2.1H;ñ is longer
than H 1, in this case cutting* before W and applying W will suffice.
Case 1.2.2 H;ñ is less than or the same size as H 1. In this case, the fact that
the product of ñ and Γ ñ Σ is Γ ñ Σ, means that Cut* can be applied above W
to give the desired deduction.
Case 1.3 (I is TL or TR). Only the case of TL will be considered since the case
of TR is similar. There are two possibilities
Case 1.3.1 (p is the Main sentence in I). In this case the result is given by using
TL and TR to get the desired hypersequent.
Case 1.3.2 (p is not the Main sentence in I). In this case the following deduction
is given:
...
Γ, pñ Σ;H
TL
Γ, p, ϕñ Σ;H
...
Γ1 ñ p,Σ1;H 1
Cut*
ΓΓ1, ϕñ ΣΣ1;H bH 1
The following deduction only uses Cut* on a deduction, δ1, where dpp, δ1,Γ ñ Σq ď
dpp, δ,Γ ñ Σq.
111
...
Γ, pñ Σ;H
...
Γ1 ñ p,Σ1;H 1
Cut*
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1;H bH 1
TL
ΓΓ1, ϕñ ΣΣ1;H bH 1
Case 1.4 (I is L , R , LÑ or RÑ). Each of these cases follows from cutting*
above I, then applying I. The case of LÑ is given as an example. Let the main
sequent in I not be Γ, p ñ Σ, the case where it is is analogous. In this case δ has
the form:
...
Γ, pñ Σ;G; ∆ ñ ϕ,Λ;H
...
Γ, pñ Σ;G; ∆, ψ ñ Λ;H
LÑ
Γ, pñ Σ;G; ∆, ϕÑ ψ ñ Λ;H
...
Γ1 ñ p,Σ1;H 1
Cut*
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1;H 1 b pG; ∆, ϕÑ ψ ñ Λ;Hq
Since the any product, even or uneven, will preserve the distance of a sequent from
the left, it is possible to assume, without loss of generality, that H 1 is longer than
G; ∆, ϕ Ñ ψ ñ Λ;H. In this case H 1 can be rewritten as G1; ∆1 ñ Λ1; J 1, where G
is the same length as G1. In this case let δ1 be
...
Γ, pñ Σ;G; ∆ ñ ϕ,Λ;H
...
Γ1 ñ p,Σ1;G1; ∆1 ñ Λ1; J
Cut*
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1; rGG1s; ∆∆1 ñ ϕ,ΛΛ1;H b J
and δ2 be
...
Γ, pñ Σ;G; ∆, ψ ñ Λ;H
...
Γ1 ñ p,Σ1;G1; ∆1 ñ Λ1; J
Cut*
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1; rGG1s; ∆∆1, ψ ñ ΛΛ1;H b J
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The following deduction has cuts* only when the depth of p is less than its depth
in δ.
δ1 δ2
LÑ
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1; rGG1s; ∆∆1, ϕÑ ψ ñ ΛΛ1;H b J
Case 1.5 (I is L˝). As above, this case is given by switching the Cut* with L˝.
Case 1.6 (I is R˝). This case follows from an application of Lemma 3.6 to the
deduction preceding I followed by I.
Case 2 (rkpϕq “ n ą 0). Case 2.1 (ϕ is  ψ). In this case δ has the form:
...
G; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H
...
G1; Γ1 ñ  ψ,Σ1;H 1
Cut* rGG1s; ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1;H bH 1
Applying Lemma 3.1 to G; Γ, ψ ñ Σ;H gives a deduction of G; Γ ñ ψ,Σ;H.
Similarly applying Lemma 3.2 to G1; Γ ñ  ψ,Σ1;H 1 gives a deduction of G; Γ, ψ ñ
Σ;H 1. Applying Cut* to these two deductions gives a deduction of rGG1s; ΓΓ1 ñ
ΣΣ1;H bH 1.
Case 2.2 (ϕ is γ Ñ δ). This case is similar to the above with the exception that
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 are used, and two cuts* are required as opposed to one.
Case 2.3 (ϕ is ˝ψ). If the main sentences of the cut* are not in the left-most
sequent of the end hypersequents of δ1 and δ2, then the result follows from an appli-
cation of Lemma 3.7, TL, TR, and possibly W will give the result.
This only leaves the case where the cut* sentences are in the left-most sequent
in both end hypersequents. This case requires an induction over the disarray of the
final hypersequent of the deduction. It is shown that the rank of the formula that
113
is cut* can be reduced when that hypersequent is complete, and that cuts* can be
transformed into cuts* over hypersequents of less disarray.
The base case is that the end hypersequents of δ1 and δ2 are of the form: Γ, ˝Γ1 ñ
Σ˝Σ1;H, where mrpHq “ xxx0,my, ny for some m and n, and mrpΓ˝Γ1 ñ Σ˝Σ1q “
x1, ny, i.e. both end hypersequents of δ1 and δ2 are complete.
The inductive case is on the sum of the disarrays of the two end hypersequents,
call this dis. The sum of disarrays of two hypersequents is the ordered pair of the
maximum of fmr of sentences not in position in either hypersequent, and num-
ber of formulas in either hypersequent that are of that fine modal rank and not
in position, i.e. if G and H are hypersequents where dispGq “ xxj, ky, ly and
dispHq “ xxm,ny, oy, then the sum of their disarrays is xmaxpxj, ky, xm,nyq, |tψ :
ψ P GYH,ψ is not in position, and fmrpψq “ maxpxj, ky, xm,nyqu.
Case 2.3.1 (Both end hypersequents are complete). If they are, then δ is
...
Γ ˝ Γ1, ˝ϕñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
...
∆ ˝ ∆1 ñ Λ, ˝Λ1, ˝ϕ;H 1
Cut*
Γ∆ ˝ Γ1 ˝ ∆1 ñ ΣΛ ˝ Σ1 ˝ Λ1;H bH 1
Importantly, for any ψ P ΓY ΣY∆Y Λ, mrpψq “ 0. Similarly, mrpHq “ xx0, jy, ky
and mrpH 1q “ xx0, ly,my. So an application of Lemma 3.8 to Γ ˝ Γ1, ˝ϕñ Σ ˝ Σ1;H
either gives a deduction of Γ ñ Σ;H, in which case the result is given by TL,
TR, and possibly W, or a deduction of ˝Γ1, ˝ϕ ñ ˝Σ1;H. Similarly, an application
of Lemma 3.8 to ∆ ˝ ∆1 ñ Λ, ˝Λ1, ˝ϕ;H 1 either gives a deduction of ∆ ñ Λ;H 1,
in which case the result is given by TL, TR, and possibly W, or a deduction of
˝∆1 ñ ˝Λ1, ˝ϕ;H 1. This leaves a case where there are deductions of ˝Γ1, ˝ϕñ ˝Σ1;H
and ˝∆1 ñ ˝Λ1, ˝ϕ;H 1.
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Applying to Lemma 3.10 to ˝∆1 ñ ˝Λ1, ˝ϕ;H 1 gives a deduction of ñ λ; ˝∆1 ñ
;H 1 for some λ P Λ1. If λ is not ϕ, then the result is given by R˝, TL, TR, and
possibly W. Assume that it is, i.e. there is a deduction of ñ ϕ; ˝∆1 ñ;H 1.
If ˝Σ1 ‰ H, then an application of Lemma 3.10 to ˝Γ1, ˝ϕ ñ ˝Σ1;H gives a
deduction of ñ σ; ˝Γ1, ˝ϕ ñ;H. Applying Lemma 3.5 to this gives a deduction of
ϕñ σ; ˝Γ1 ñ;H. This can be cut* withñ ϕ; ˝∆1;H 1 to getñ σ; ˝Γ1˝∆1 ñ;HbH 1.
Applying R˝, TL and TR gives the result.
If ˝Σ1 “ H, then Lemma 3.9 can be applied to ˝Γ1, ˝ϕ ñ ˝Σ1;H to get either a
deduction of ϕ ñ; ˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H or a deduction of ˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H. In the latter case
the result is given by TL, TR, and possibly W. In the former case, ϕñ; ˝Γ1 ñ ˝Σ1;H
can be cut* with ñ ϕ; ˝∆1 ñ;H 1 to get a deduction of ñ; ˝Γ1 ˝ ∆1 ñ ˝Σ1;Hb;H 1.
An application of Drop, TL and TR, gives the result.
There is no case where dis “ xx0, 0y, 1y.
Case 2.3.2 (dis “ xx1, 0y, 1y). In this case there is only one sentence that is not
in position, and it is of fine modal rank x1, 0y. If it is in the succedent of the sequent
in which it occurs Lemma 3.7 will reduce the case to one where both hypersequents
are complete. In this case applying the above will give a cut*-free deduction, an
application of TR will give the result. If it is on the left suppose it is in the end
hypersequent of δ1, the other case is analogous. Let δ be
...
Γ ˝ Γ1 ˝ ϕñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G; Π, ˝γ ñ Θ;G1
...
∆ ˝ ∆1 ñ Λ, ˝Λ1, ˝ϕ;H 1
Cut*
Γ∆ ˝ Γ1 ˝ ∆1 ñ ΣΛ ˝ Σ1 ˝ Λ1; pG; Π, ˝γ ñ Θ;G1q bH 1
where H “ G; Π, ˝γ ñ Θ;G1. Lemma 3.5 can be applied to Γ˝Γ1˝ψ ñ Σ˝Σ1;G; Π ñ
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Θ; Π1, ˝γ ñ Θ1;G1 to get a deduction of Γ ˝ Γ1 ˝ ψ ñ Σ ˝ Σ1;G; Π ñ Θ;G1. Where
G ‰ H, γ will appear in the sequent preceeding Π ñ Θ, where G “ H, γ will
appear in Γ. Since in either case, the hypersequent under consideration is complete,
the base case will give that there is a cut*-free deduction of Γ∆ ˝Γ1 ˝∆1 ñ ΣΛ ˝Σ1 ˝
Λ1; pG; Π, γ ñ Θ; Π1 ñ Θ1;G1q bH 1. Applying L˝ gives the result.
Case 2.3.3 (dis “ xx1, 0y, jy, dis “ xxk, 0y, 1y or dis “ xxn, 0y, jy). If any sentences
of the form ˝γ are in the succedent of a sequent, then an application of Lemma 3.7
followed by cut* will give a deduction with a cut* only over hypersequents of less dis-
array. Applying TR to the result will suffice. Otherwise, an application of Lemma 3.5
either reduce the maximum fine modal rank of a formula not in position, or reduce
the number of such formulas. Cutting* over the result, and applying L˝ will give the
required hypersequent.
Case 2.3.4 (dis “ xx1,my, 1y, dis “ xx1,my, jy, or dis “ lrxk,my, jy). In this case
either there is only one sentence of fine modal rank x1, ny or there are multiple, let
one such formula be θ. There are four cases to consider:
Case 2.3.4.1 (θ is  γ on the left). In this case the end-hypersequent of δ1 is
Γ, ˝ψ ñ Σ;G; ∆, γ ñ Λ;G1, where G; ∆, γ ñ Λ;G1 “ H. An application of
Lemma 3.1 yields a deduction of Γ, ˝ψ ñ Σ;G; ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G1. Cutting* yields a de-
duction of ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1; pG; ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G1qbH 1. Since the cut* was over hypersequents
the sum of whose fine modal ranks is less than dis, by the inner-inductive hypothesis,
there is a cut*-free deduction of ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1; pG; ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G1q b H 1. Applying L 
yields the required hypersequent.
Case 2.3.4.2 (θ is  γ on the right). This case is similar to the above with the
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exception that it uses Lemma 3.2 and R .
Case 2.3.4.3 (θ is γ Ñ δ on the left). In this case applying Lemma 3.3 to the
end hypersequent of δ1 yields deductions of Lemma 3.3 yields deductions of Γ ñ
Σ;G; ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G1 and Γ ñ Σ;G; ∆, δ ñ Λ;G1. Two applications of cut* to the
end hypersequent of δ2 yields deductions of ΓΓ
1 ñ ΣΣ1; pG; ∆ ñ γ,Λ;G1q bH 1 and
ΓΓ1 ñ ΣΣ1; pG; ∆, δ ñ Λ;G1q bH 1. Applying LÑ to this yields the result.
Case 2.3.4.4 (θ is γ Ñ δ on the right). This case is analogous to the above cases.
In the case where dis “ xx1,my, 1y, the above cases lower dis by lowering the
maximum fine modal rank of a formula not in position. In the case where there are
multiple such formulas, this will lower the number of formulas at that fine modal
rank.
Lemma 3.14. Cut* is eliminable from h˚.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 3.13 and Lemma 3.12.
Theorem 3.6.1. Cut is eliminable from Figure 3.2.
Proof. Let δ be a deduction of G using only the rules of Figure 3.2. Since every
application of Cut is also an application of Cut*, and all the other rules of Figure 3.2
are rules of h˚, this is also a deduction in h˚. By Lemma 3.14 there is a cut*-free
deduction of G. Since this deduction does not use Cut* it is also a deduction using
only rules of Figure 3.2 and not using the Cut rule.
Definition 20 (Subformula Property). A deductive system has the subformula prop-
erty if when δ is a proof of G, then any formula in any sequent in a hypersequent in
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δ is a subformula of a formula in a sequent of G
Lemma 3.15. Cut-Free Hypersequent System D has the Subformula Property.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of deductions. The base case is
an instance of Ax in which only two atomic sentences appear. So every formula
appearing in δ is a subformula of the instance of Ax in question. For the inductive
case let δ be given, and I be the last inference in δ. For brevity only select cases will
be considered.
Case 1 (I is W). In this case δ is
...
G
I
G;ñ
By IH any formula in any sequent of δ1 “ δ{I is a subformula of a formula in a
sequent of G. Since I does not remove any formulas, this property holds of G;ñ
Case 2 (I is Drop). In this case δ is
...
ñ;G
I
G
As above, the deduction preceding I has the property in questions. Since no
formulas occur in ñ , this property holds of G and δ.
Case 3 (I is TL, TR, L , R , LÑ, RÑ, L˝, or R˝). In these cases formulas are
only added, either not appearing in the sequent before, as in TL, or TR, or whose
subformulas appear in the previous sequent.
Corollary 2. For any deduction δ $h G, there is a deduction δ1 $h G, such that
any formula in any sequent in a hypersequent in δ is subformula of a formula in a
sequent of G.
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Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.6.1 and Lemma 3.15.
3.7 Uniqueness
The previous section establishes that the calculus of Figure 3.2 meets the requirement
on a theory of meaning that the Cut rule be eliminable. This section establishes the
result that that calculus meets the uniqueness constraint also. These two results
show that the calculus of Figure 3.2 can support a viable inferentialist account of
the meaning of deontic vocabulary.
Let Hypersequent System D1 be Hypersequent System D extended by the rules
G; p∆, ϕñ Λq; pΓ, ϕñ ψ,Σq;H
Ld
G; p∆ ñ Λq; pΓ,dϕñ Σq;H
pñ ϕq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
Rd p∆ ñ dϕ,Λq;H
Let $h1 G indicate that the hypersequent G is provable in Hypersequent System
D1.
Theorem 3.7.1. The following two facts hold:
1. $h1 G; Γ, ˝ϕñ Σ;H iff $h1 G; Γ,dϕñ Σ;H
2. $h1 G; Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σ;H iff $h1 G; Γ ñ dϕ,Σ;H
Proof. Case 1 (1). Suppose that δ $h1 G; Γ ˝ ϕ ñ Σ;H. Either G “ H or not. If
G “ H, as a consequence of Theorem 3.4.1 $h1 ˝ϕ ñ dϕ. Several applications of
W followed by several of TL or TR yields that $h1 Γ, ˝ϕñ dϕ,Σ;H. Cutting this
hypersequent with the end-hypersequent of δ yields that $h1 Γ ñ d,Σ;H. If, on the
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other hand, G ‰ H the result follows from Lemma 3.7 and TR. The lemmas used
here hold trivially for Hypersequent System D1.
The left to right direction is analogous.
Case 2 (2). Suppose that δ $h1 G; Γ ˝ ϕ ñ Σ;H. Again, either G “ H or
G ‰ H. In the first case, it follows from Theorem 3.4.1, W, TL, and TR that
$h1 Γ,dϕñ ˝ϕ,Σ;H. Cutting this with the end hypersequent of δ yields the result.
If G ‰ H, let G “ D; ∆ ñ Λ. By Lemma 3.5, $h1 D; ∆, ϕñ Λ; Γ ñ Σ;H. By Ld,
$h1 G; Γ,dϕñ Σ;H.
The proof of the other direction is analogous.
3.8 Equivalence To Sequent System D
Theorem 3.8.1. If $s Γ ñ Σ then $h Γ ñ Σ.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of deductions. The base case is
simply an instance of Axiom. But that all the instances of Axiom are derivable is
given by Corollary 1. For the inductive cases let δ be a derivation whose last inference
is I.
Case 1 (I is WL or WR). In this case IH and WL or WR give the result.
Case 2 (I is L , R , LÑ, or RÑ). As above these cases will follow from IH and
an application of the corresponding rule.
Case 3 (I is k). In this case δ has the following form:
...
Γ ñ ϕ
k ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
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Let the cardinality of Γ be n. With the help of IH, the following deduction can
be constructed:
IH
Γ ñ ϕ
W
Γ ñ ϕ;ñ
L˝ˆ n ñ ϕ; ˝Γ ñ
R˝ ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
Case 4 (I is d). In this case δ has the following form:
...
Γ ñ
d ˝Γ ñ
Again, for convenience let the cardinality of Γ be n.
IH
Γ ñ
W
Γ ñ;ñ
L˝ˆ n ñ; ˝Γ ñ
Drop ˝Γ ñ
Lemma 3.16. If $cfh Γ ñ Σ then $s Γ ñ Σ
Proof. This proof proceeds by induction on the length of deductions in the hyper-
sequent system D. The base case is a deduction consisting solely of Ax, but any
instance of Ax is also an instance of Axiom from the sequent system D. For the
inductive case let δ be given and I be the last inference in δ.
Case 1 (I is Drop). In this case δ has the following form:
...
ñ; Γ ñ Σ
Drop
Γ ñ Σ
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Let the deduction immediately preceding I be δ1. This case requires a sub-induction
over the modal rank of Γ ñ Σ.
Case 1.1 (Base Case). For the base case let mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x0, 0y. It follows from
Lemma 3.6 that $hñ;ñ, but by Corollary 2 this is impossible.
Case 1.2 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x1, 1y). In this case there is one formula of modal rank
1, call it ˝ϕ. If ˝ϕ P Σ, by Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 3.6, there is a deduction of ñ;ñ,
but this is impossible. If, on the other hand ˝ϕ P Γ then there by Lemma 3.5, there
is a deduction δ1 $cfh ϕ ñ; Γ{tϕu ñ Σ, where lpδ1q ă lpδq. By Lemma 3.6, there is
a deduction, δ2 $cfh ϕñ;ñ, where lpδ2q ď lpδ1q. Finally, by Lemma 3.11, there is a
deduction δ3 $cfh ϕ ñ, where lpδ3q ď lpδ2q. IH can be applied to this deduction to
get a deduction, δ1 $s ϕñ. An application of d, WL, and WR, then give the result.
The inner inductive hypothesis, IH1 is that if δa $cfh ñ; Γ ñ Σ then there is a δb
such that δb $s Γ ñ Σ, where lpδbq ď lpδaq.
Case 1.3 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x1, ny).
In this case there are multiple sentences of modal rank 1 in Γ ñ Σ. If any are on
the right, then an application of Lemma 3.7 yields a deduction δ1 $cfh ñ; Γ ñ Σ{t˝ϕu.
Since this is of modal rank less than Γ ñ Σ, an application of IH1 yields that
$s Γ ñ Σ{t˝ϕu. Applying WR yields the result.
If for each formula of modal rank 1 is in Γ, then applying Lemma 3.5 n-many
times yields a deduction, δ1 such that δ1cfh Γ
1 ñ; Γ{ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ, where lpδ1q ă lpδq. An
application of Lemma 3.6 yields that there is a δ2 such that δ2 $cfh Γ1 ñ;ñ. Finally,
an applicatoin of Lemma 3.11 yields a deduction, δ3, such that δ3 $cfh Γ1 ñ, where
lpδ3q ă lpδq. Applying IH yields that $s Γ1 ñ. Application of d, WL, and WR
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yields the required sequent.
Case 1.4 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ xn, 1y). In this case there is a sentence, ϕ, in ΓYΣ, such
that mrpϕq “ n. There are four cases to consider
Case 1.4.1 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ P Γ). In this case an application of Lemma 3.3 gives
deduction δ1 and δ2 such that δ1 $cfh ñ; Γ, θ ñ Σ, and δ2 $cfh Γ ñ ψ,Σ, where
lpδ1q, lpδ2q ă lpδq. By IH1, there are deductions δ1a and δ1b such that δ1a $s Γ, θ ñ Σ,
and δ2aΓ ñ ψ,Σ. An application of LÑ to these yields the required sequent.
Case 1.4.2 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ P Σ). In this case an application of Lemma 3.4, gives
a deduction to which IH1 can be applied. Applying RÑ to the result, gives that
$s Γ ñ Σ.
Case 1.4.3 (ϕ is  ψ P Γ). An application of Lemma 3.1 gives a hypersequent to
which IH1 can be applied. Applying L to that yields the required sequent.
Case 1.4.4 (ϕ is  ψ P Σ). Applying Lemma 3.2 to the hypersequent preceeding
Drop gives a hypersequent to which IH1 can be applied. Applying R to that yields
the required sequent.
Case 1.5 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ xm,ny). This case is similar to the above case. Select
one of the formulas of modal rank m. Apply the same technique as cases 1.4.1–1.4.4
depending on the formula and its location in Γ ñ Σ. This will reduce n. Applying
IH1 and the relevant rule of Figure 3.1 will yield the required sequent.
Case 2 (I is TL or TR] This case follows from IH and WL or WR respectively.
Case 3 (I is L , R , LÑ, RÑ] These cases also follow from IH and the corre-
sponding inference in the sequent presentation of D.
Case 4 (I is L˝] I cannot be L˝ in this situation.
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Case 5 (I is R˝] In this case δ has the following form:
...
ñ ϕ; Γ ñ Σ
R˝
Γ ñ ˝ϕ; Σ
This case again requires a sub-induction on the modal rank of Γ ñ Σ. Let δ be
the deduction that precedes I.
Case 5.1 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x0, ny). In this case it follows from Lemma 3.6 that for
some δ1, δ1 $cfh ñ ϕ;ñ where lpδ1q ă lpδq. From Lemma 3.11 it follows that there is
a δ2 that δ2 $cfh ñ ϕ, where lpδ2q ă lpδ1q. From IH it follows that $sñ ϕ. Applying
k to this gives $sñ ˝ϕ. The result then follows from WL and WR.
Case 5.2 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x1, 1y). In this case there is a formula ˝ψ P ΓY Σ.
If ˝ψ P Σ, an application of Lemma 3.7 gives a deduction δ1 of ñ ϕ; Γ ñ Σ{t˝ψu,
where lpδ1q ă lpδq. Applying Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.11 gives a deduction δ2 of
ñ ϕ, where lpδ2q ă lpδq. Applying IH, k, WL, and WR yields the required sequent.
If ˝ψ P Γ, then an application of Lemma 3.5 gives a deduction δ1 of ψ ñ
ϕ; Γ{t˝ψu ñ Σ, where lpδ1q ă lpδq. An application of Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.11
gives a deduction δ2 of ψ ñ ϕ, where lpδ2q ď lpδq. An application of IH followed by
k, WL, and WR yields the required sequent.
Case 5.3 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ x1, ny). In this case applications of Lemma 3.7 and
Lemma 3.5, will give a deduction, δ1, of Γ1 ñ ϕ; Γ{ ˝ Γ1 ñ Σ{t˝ϕ : ˝ϕ P Σu, where
lpδ1q ă lpδq. Applying Lemma 3.6 and IH give that $s Γ1 ñ ϕ. An application of k
followed by WL and WR give the result.
The inner inductive hypothesis, IH1 is that if ñ ϕ; Γ ñ Σ, where mrpΓ ñ Σq is
reduced, then $s Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σq.
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Case 5.4 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ xn, 1y). In this case there is some one formula, γ, of
modal rank n. There are four sub-cases to be considered.
Case 5.4.1 (γ is ψ Ñ θ P Γ). In this case an application of Lemma 3.3, gives
deductions δ1 and δ2 of ñ ϕ; Γ, θ ñ Σ and ñ ϕ; Γ, ψ ñ Σ. Applying IH1 to
both gives deductions in sequent system D of Γ, θ ñ ˝ϕ,Σ and Γ ñ ψ, ˝ϕ,Σ. An
application of LÑ gives the result.
Case 5.4.2 (γ is ψ Ñ θ P Σ). In this case an application of Lemma 3.4 yields a
deduction to which IH1 can be applied. Applying RÑ to the sequent that results
finishes this case.
Case 5.4.3 (γ is  ψ P Γ). In this case an application of Lemma 3.1 gives a
deduction to which IH1 can be applied. Applying L to that deduction gives the
result.
Case 5.4.4 (γ is  ψ P Σ). In this case an application of Lemma 3.2 yields a
deduction to which IH1 can be applied. Applying R to that deduction gives the
result.
Case 5.4.5 (mrpΓ ñ Σq “ xn,my). In this case a formula whose modal rank is
n is either  γ or γ Ñ δ, and is either in Γ or Σ. Applying the same process as
described in 5.4.1–5.4.4 depending on which formula is selected will give the result.
Theorem 3.8.2. If $h Γ ñ Σ then $s Γ ñ Σ
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 3.6.1 and Lemma 3.16.
Theorem 3.8.1 and Theorem 3.8.2 establish that the calculus of Figure 3.2 cap-
tures System D. Theorem 3.6.1 and Theorem 3.7.1 establish that that calculus meets
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the uniqueness constraint and is Cut eliminable. It can, therefore, be used to under-
write a theory of the meaning of an operator that behaves as the ˝ of System D does.
Given the requirements on an inferentialist theory of meaning given in Section 3.1,
Figure 3.2 can offer an inferentialist treatment of at least one modal concept.
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Figure 3.2: Hypersequent System D
Structural Rules
Ax pñ p
pñq;G
Drop
G
G; pΓ ñ Σq;H
TL
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
G
W
G; pñq
G; pΓ ñ Σq;H
TR
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H
Cut
G; pΓ ñ Σq;H
Operational Rules
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H
L 
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
G; pΓ ñ ϕ,Σq;H G; pΓ, ψ ñ Σq;H
LÑ
G; pΓ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
L˝
G; pΓ ñ Σq; p∆, ˝ϕñ Λq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ Σq;H
R 
G; pΓ ñ  ϕ,Σq;H
G; pΓ, ϕñ ψ,Σq;H
RÑ
G; pΓ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σq;H
pñ ϕq; p∆ ñ Λq;H
R˝ p∆ ñ ˝ϕ,Λq;H
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Chapter 4
Sellars, Second-Order
Quantification, and Ontological
Commitment
Abstract.Sellars [63, 67] argues that the truth of a second-order sentence, e.g. Dffa,
does not incur commitment to there being any sort of abstract entity. This chapter
begins by exploring the arguments that Sellars offers for the above claim. It then
develops those arguments by pointing out places where Sellars has been unclear or
ought to have said more. In particular, Sellars’s arguments rely on there being a
means by which language users could come to understand sentences of a second-
order language wherein the truth of sentences of the form Dffa do not require there
to be abstract entities. In addition to this, as Sellars [67] notes, a formal account
of quantification is required that does not make use of the apparatus of sequences.
Both a translation of Dffa and a formal account of quantification are provided by
this chapter.
Keywords. Ontological Commitment, Wilfrid Sellars, Second-Order Quantification,
W. V. Quine
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In “On What There Is”, Quine [47] argues that the ontological commitments of a
theory are laid bare by first formalizing that theory and then examining what entities
must be in the range of that theory’s bound variables. This account of ontological
commitment places special emphasis on quantifiers and the variables bound by them.
Quine famously stated his view as “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply,
to be reckoned as the value of a variable”. This account of ontological commitment
entails that any language with second-order quantifiers will require there to be entities
which can be the values of the second-order variables of quantification. Twelve
years after the publication of “On What There Is”, Sellars published “Grammar and
Existence: A Preface to Ontology”. In that paper he argues that a theory making
use of second-order quantifiers need not be committed to any entities which are the
values of its second-order variables. In “Naturalism and Ontology”, he elaborates on
this position by offering further arguments in support of it. This chapter explores
Sellars’s arguments from those two works and develops novel arguments for the same
conclusions.
The first half of this chapter explores Sellars’s arguments that second-order quan-
tification does not, of itself, incur ontological commitments to abstract entities. There
are two main arguments to this effect. One argument attempts to cast doubt on the
claim that the only natural language translation of the formal sentence, “Dffa”, is
one that clearly incurs commitment to some abstract entity or other. The second ar-
gument examines the standard model-theoretic definition of the consequence relation
—which Sellars clearly ascribes to Quine —and argues that if it is adopted second-
order variables must be assigned entities as values. This offers a vindication of a
130
Quinean position that also adopts the standard model-theoretic account of the con-
sequence relation. The second half of the chapter addresses the weaknesses in Sellars’s
arguments. It offers an alternative translation of the formal sentence, “Dffa”, into
English and provides a proof-theoretic alternative to the standard model-theoretic
account of the consequence relation. It is argued that Sellars [63, 67] could and may
have endorsed the alternative proof-theoretic account of the consequence relation.
The chapter concludes by showing that the proof-theoretic alternative does not re-
quire entities to be assigned as the values of second-order variables of quantification.
4.1 A Quinean Argument
This chapter is concerned with arguments offered by Sellars. It is clear in “Naturalism
and Ontology” that he takes his disputant to be Quine. This does not entail that
Sellars has correctly interpreted Quine’s position. In what follows, Sellars arguments
are said to be leveled against a “Quinean” view. This Quinean view may not have
been Quine’s own in detail, but it is the view that Sellars argues against in “Grammar
and Existence” and “Naturalism and Ontology” and it is faithful to Quine’s views
in broad strokes.
Sellars [67] makes use of the term ‘reference’. This is unfortunate because that
term has been used variously by philosophers and it is unclear how Sellars’s use of it
there fits with his other work. ‘Reference’ is also unfortunately used by Quine [47] in
the expression ‘range of reference’, while Sellars [67] talks of ‘determinate reference’
and ‘indeterminate reference’. Whether there is a unified account of the meaning
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of that term is set aside. To make the argument under consideration clearer, new
terminology is introduced. The term ‘supposition’ describes the relation that an
expression must have to the world when that expression occurs in a true sentence.1
For instance, if the sentence ‘Helen is happy’ is true, then ‘Helen’ must supposit for
Helen. Similarly, if the sentence ‘Some donkey is running’ is true, then the expression
‘Some’ must supposit for some objects.2
Call the following Quinean3 argument the Argument from Abstracta:
1. Commitment to the truth of a sentence containing an expressions that supposits
for an entity entails an ontological commitment to that entity.—supposition
entails ontological commitment.
2. For any quantifier, if it is the main operator in a true sentence, it supposits for
something.
3. Second-order quantifiers could only supposit for properties, attributes, classes,
etc.
4. Properties, attributes, classes, etc. do not exist.
(C) Therefore, introducing second-order quantification into a language incurs com-
mitment to entities that do not exist.
1The medieval term is used both because it is long enough out of use that it can be re-purposed
for this chapter, and it may offer clarity to anyone familiar with the term to grasp the concept
aimed at by its use.
2Medieval philosophers also made a distinction between determinate and indeterminate suppo-
sition. It is crucial to note that these notions of ‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ have nothing
to do with the notions discussed below. ‘Supposition’ is a term used only to indicate a relation
between expressions in true sentences and entities in the world.
3It is emphasized that this argument may not be the one actually given by Quine, but it is one
to which Sellars responds.
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Suppose that second-order quantifiers were introduced into a language. In such a
language ‘Dffa’ is a logical truth, for any term ‘a’. By premise (2), the quantifier Df
supposits in that sentence. By premise (3) that entity is a property, attribute, class,
or other sort of abstract entity. Since any theory is committed to the logical truths,
by premise (1), every theory is committed to there being some property, attribute,
class or other abstract entity. By premise (4), those do not exist. So any theory in
a second-order language is committed to there being entities that do not exist.
Premise one is designed to be true. Its truth is built into the notion of supposition
that was introduced above. Since the sort of entity that is assigned to first-order
variables is the sort of entity that names stand for, the sort of entity that is assigned
to a second-order variable is the sort of entity that predicates stand for. Sellars is
committed to premise (4) by his nominalism.4 5
Premise (3) is worth an aside. Boolos [8] argued that second-order quantifiers
do supposit but do so multiply. They supposit for the same objects as first-order
quantifiers, but do so plurally. As he says in “To Be is to Be the Value of a Variable
(or some Values of Some Variables)”, “There are, rather, two (at least) different ways
of referring to the same things” [8, pg. 449]. The purpose of this chapter is not to
4There are nuances of Sellars’s view of abstract objects that are set to the side for the purposes
of this chapter. Sellars [64, 67] tries to preserve the grammar of sentences involving apparent
reference to abstract entities so that it turns out that it is true that ‘There are properties’. But he
also acknowledges that there really are no abstract entities, as he says in “Naturalism and Ontology”
“I shall, however, as you might expect, go on to argue that although there are attributes, there
really are no attributes.”[emphasis in original] [67, pg. 41]
5The conclusion of this argument locates the problem of second-order quantification. There
are interpretations of Quine [48] according to which second-order quantifiers are illegitimate for
use in theorizing because they mask the true set-theoretic nature of second-order quantification.
Quine [48] calls second-order logic “set theory in sheep’s clothing”. Whether this argument can be
sustained is a contentious issue. For arguments that it cannot, see Boolos [6],and Shapiro [69]. This
argument is set aside for the purposes of this chapter
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refute Boolos [8], but to offer an alternative Sellarsian justification of second-order
logic. Premise (3) is taken for granted in what follows.
This leaves only premise (2) to be denied. Premise (2) follows from the Quinean
claim introduced above that variables of quantification are assigned entities when
assessing the ontological commitments of a theory. Call the set of entities so assigned
to a variable the range of that variable. Second-order quantifiers bind second-order
variables and so if a second-order quantifier is the main operator of a sentence, there
must be some entity assigned to the variable it binds. If premise (2) is false, then
the Quinean idea that the ontological commitments of a theory are laid bare by
examining the entities in the ranges of variables of that theory must also be false.
It is easier to make explicit what it would take for a sentence of a formal language
to be true than to make explicit what it would take for a sentence of English to be
true. This chapter examines two ways of doing this, a model-theoretic method and a
proof-theoretic method. If formal methods are to offer clarification in metaphysical
or other discussion, there must be a way of translating discourse in those areas into
the formal language and vice versa. Since the truth conditions of a set of sentences
of a formal language are explicit, the translation from the formal language into
natural language provides truth conditions for the translated sentences of natural
language. Similarly, if S is a sentence of natural language that does not obviously
carry ontological commitment when accepted, and S is an adequate translation of
the sentence S 1 of a formal language, then this provides reason to doubt that S 1
carries ontological commitment when accepted. The process of coordinating the two
languages will ultimately lay bare the ontological commitments of both languages.
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The goal of section 4.2.1 is to suggest that there is a natural language translation of
the formal sentence ‘Dffa’ that does not incur ontological commitment to there being
some abstract entity, except possibly what is named by ‘a’. Section 4.4 provides a
translation of ‘Dffa’ and offers an explanation of how other sentences with second-
order quantifiers may come to be understood. Even if this is successful, if there is
no available account of the commitments of the formal sentence ‘Dffa’ that rules
out that the second-order quantifier supposits then the above translation cannot be
correct. Section 4.2.2 shows that if the model-theoretic account of the consequence
relation is accepted, commitment to the truth of ‘Dffa’ results in commitment to
an entity in to be the value of the varable ‘f ’. Section 4.3 provides an alternative
account of the consequence relation and shows that that account does not require
that second-order quantifiers supposit. The conclusion of this chapter is that there
is a coherent account of second-order quantification on which philosophers need not
be hesitant to make use of them.
Quine’s ([47, 48]) official position is that variables are the expressions of a first-
order quantified sentence that supposit. Sellars [67], on the other hand, holds that
quantifiers are the expressions of a first-order quantified sentence that supposit.
When there is no loss of clarity this distinction between the two philosophers is
ignored. Sellars [67] discusses the difference between himself and Quine as being
over how the truth conditions of quantified sentences of a formal language are to be
determined.
Sellars [63] attempts to cast doubt on Premise (2) of the Argument from Abstracta
by fixing what sentential forms of natural language carry ontological commitment
135
when accepted. He then suggests that the proper translation of ‘Dffa’ is neither
of one of those forms nor commits one to a sentence of one of those forms. If a
translation of ‘Dffa’ can be found which is neither of an ontologically committing
form nor entails commitment to a sentence with such a form, then the sentence ‘Dffa’
does not carry ontological commitment in virtue of the quantifier ‘Df ’. Under these
circumstances, by Premise (1) of the Argument from Abstracta, the quantifier ‘Df ’
does not supposit in ‘Dffa’. From this it follows that premise (2) of the Argument
from Abstracta is false.
Sellars points out that the paradigm case of an ontologically committing sentence
is ‘There is a K’ and the equivalent sentence ‘There are Ks’. This is because they are
the most straightforward answer to the question ‘What is there?’, the central question
of ontology. Commitment to the truth of such sentences results in commitment to
there being Ks. Any sentence of this form, or that entails a sentence of this form, is
ontologically committing. These forms are taken from [63, pg. 235]
. . . among the forms by the use of which one most clearly and explicitly
asserts the existence of objects of a certain sort . . . are the forms “There
is an N”, “Something is an N”, and “There are N ’s.”
4.2 Not All Quantifiers Supposit
4.2.1 The First Argument
For convenience call the sentences that have one of the above forms ontologically
committing. The question under discussion then is whether the formal sentence
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‘Dffa’, when translated into natural language, is or entails an ontologically com-
mitting sentence. In order to answer, in the first case, that the sentence ‘Dffa’ is
not itself of an ontologically committing form, Sellars reasons in analogy with the
accepted translation of first-order sentences.
Consider the pair of sentences
(A) Dxx is warm.
(B) Df S is f .
A standard translation of sentence (A) is ‘There is an x such that x is warm’. This,
however, cannot be an adequate translation. The first occurrence of ‘x’ is a common
noun, as ‘donkey’ in ‘Fred is a donkey’ is. It must be a common noun because it is
preceded by the indefinite article ‘a’. But the second occurrence of ‘x’ is a singular
term, the sort of grammatical item that names an entity, as ‘Fred’ is in ‘Fred is a
frog’. No expression used univocally can serve both purposes. Grammatically, that
translation of (A) has the same form as either ‘There is an apple such that apple is
warm’ or ‘There is a Fred such that Fred is warm’. Neither sentence is grammatically
correct. A similar issue arises if the same technique is used to translate (B). The
analogous translation is ‘There is an f such that S is f ’. The first occurrence of ‘f ’
is again a common noun such as ‘apple’, but the second is a predicate adjective such
as ‘red’, ‘cold’, or ‘loud’. That ‘f ’ is not being treated univocally is shown by the
sentences substituting a common noun and predicate adjective for ‘f ’: ‘There is an
apple such that S is apple’, and ‘There is a red such that S is red’. Since neither of
these sentences is grammatical, the original translation of (B) is not grammatical.
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The most immediate remedy is to introduce a Carnapian ([11]) universal word,
or what Sellars calls a category word, such as ‘thing’. (A) could then be translated
as ‘There is a thing, x, such that x is warm’. ‘x’ is being treated univocally in both
positions of that sentence. It is a singular term in both. The analogous translation
of (B) would then be ‘There is a property, f , such that S is f ’. Importantly, the
first occurrence of ‘f ’ renames the property that is supposited for by the quantifier
—Sellars has granted that ‘There is a property’ is of an ontologically committing
form —whereas the second occurrence of ‘f ’ is an adjective. If this sentence were
grammatical the sentence, ‘There is a property, loud, such that S is loud’ would have
to be. The proper names of properties are generally words with ‘-ness’, ‘-ity’, and
‘-hood’ suffixes. The properly grammatical sentence is ‘There is a property, loudness,
such that S is loud’.
If Quine [48] thought that the correct translation of (A) was ‘There is a thing, x,
such that x is warm’, and by analogy concluded that the correct translation of any
existentially quantified sentence required the introduction of a Carnapian universal
word, followed by a name for an entity of that category, then it is easy to make sense
of arguments he gives in Philosophy of Logic ([48]).
Consider first some ordinary quantifications: ‘Dx px walksq’, ‘@x px walksq’,
‘Dx px is primeq’. The open sentence after the quantifiers shows ‘x’ in a
position where a name could stand; . . . To put the predicate letter ‘F ’
in a quantifier, then, is to treat predicate positions suddenly as name
positions, and hence to treat predicates as names of entities of some sort.
The second sentence of this passage is an indication that Quine takes the correct
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translation of ‘x is warm’ to require ‘x’ to be a name. When ‘x’ occurs “in a quanti-
fier”, it must also be treated as a name to preserve grammaticality. Since Dx and DF
are both quantifiers, ‘F ’ must have the same grammatical category as ‘x’. The only
grammatical treatment of ‘DF ’ is to treat ‘F ’ as a name, and so the only translation
of ‘Dffa’ is “There is a property, f -ness, such that S is f”.
Boolos [6] criticizes Quine’s argument here on the grounds that he does not
consider the analogous argument:
Consider some extraordinary quantification: ‘pDF qpAristotle F q’ . . . the
open sentence after the quantifier shows ‘F ’ in a position where a predi-
cate could stand . . . to put the variable ‘x’ in a quantifier, then is to treat
name positions suddenly as predicate positions, and hence to treat names
as predicates with extensions of some sort.
If Quine’s reasons for making the above argument were that he could only see how
to translate the sentence ‘Df S is f ’ as ‘There is a property, f -ness, such that S is
f ’, then Boolos’s argument is off the mark. The open sentence ‘Aristotle is F ’ does
have F in a place where a predicate could stand, but the quantifier ‘DF ’ , and for
similar reasons ‘@F ’, cannot. It must have F in a place where a name could go. If
the above translation is the only one available, that phrase must be translated as
‘There is a property F -ness . . . ’
If, contrary to the above assumption, another translation of ‘Df S is f ’ is available
then it may be that second-order quantifiers do not suddenly treat predicate positions
as name positions. Sellars attempts to provide such a translation of (A), one that
is not itself of an ontologically committing form, though in the first-order case it
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entails a sentence of such a form. Sellars offers ‘Something is warm’ as a translation
of (A). This sentence is not among the forms listed above that were ontologically
committing. However, it entails a sentence which is of an ontologically committing
form, ‘There are warm things’. This explains the potentially perplexing remark he
makes in “Grammar and Existence”
. . . not even quantification over singular term variables of type 0 makes,
as such, an existence commitment involving an ontological category, i.e.
says ‘There are particulars’[emphasis in original]
‘Something is warm’ does not differ ‘only graphologically’ from ‘There is a warm
thing’. They are two importantly distinct sentences of English. The two sentences,
though of different form, are logically equivalent. Commitment to the difference
being merely the way the sentences are written or said may tempt one to think
that all uses of the word ‘something’ can be exchanged for the ontologically com-
mitting ‘There is a . . . thing’. This deprives formal language from the resources to
merely generalize without a corresponding ontological commitment. It sets the role
of quantifiers as expressions which can supposit in the forefront. This chapter sug-
gests that the generalizing role of quantification should be emphasized. The role of a
quantifier as an expression for suppositing is a secondary feature of those quantifiers
that generalize over grammatical categories that are themselves used for suppositing.
This is contrary to the received opinion that the role of quantifiers is primarily for
suppositing and only incidentally that they are used to generalize. There are other
philosophers who deny Quine’s Dictum. For instance, Azzouni [3] also denies that
quantification is the main vehicle of ontological commitment. The view in this chap-
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ter is importantly different from that account. Sellars, and the view espoused here,
take it that true sentences of the form “There are K’s” are ontologically committing.
There is nothing on the view under consideration that wishes to “free ontology from
its linguistic straitjacket.” Wright [76] has also argued against Quine’s dictum. As
is suggested at the end of this chapter, the view of quantification offered here com-
plements Wright’s views nicely. Sellars [67] offers an outline of how an alternative
to Quine’s Dictum might be articulated. The goal of this chapter is to elaborate on
and defend a Sellarsian account of quantification and ontological commitment.
The analogous way of translating (B) that Sellars first recommends is ‘S is some-
thing’. If the translation of (A) as ‘Something is warm’ is not itself of an ontolog-
ically committing form, but only entails a sentence of that form, then there is, at
first glance, reason to deny that commitment to the truth of a second-order sentence
incurs commitment to there being properties, attributes, sets, etc.
A possible concern is that the sentence ‘S is something’ is not grammatical. The
above argument relies heavily enough on finding a grammatical translation of ‘Dffa’
that if the translation Sellars recommends is not grammatical, one might accuse
Sellars of not being even-handed in his treatment of the issue. This criticism as it
is currently stated is too strong. One reply is that the ungrammaticality of ‘S is
something’ is of a different sort from the ungrammaticality of ‘There is an f such
that S is f ’. If ‘S is something’ is ungrammatical this is not because it can only
be understood to be treating expressions of different grammatical categories as if
they were the same expression. Sellars may argue that since natural language has
some flexibility to it, all that is required is a way of using natural language to teach
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others the meaning of the newly introduced sentence ‘S is something’ and so to
understand the meaning of ‘Dffa’. This would explain why Sellars says, “Now it
is easy enough, if I may be permitted a paradox, to invent an ‘ordinary language’
equivalent of [(B)]”[63, pg. 502]. It is, however, preferable to avoid such paradoxes.
A grammatical translation of ‘Dffa’ is presented below. (See section 4.4.)
A second concern is that just as ‘Something is warm’ entails a sentence of an
ontologically committing form, so too might ‘S is something’. Sellars addresses this
concern at length in both “Grammar and Existence” and “Naturalism and Ontol-
ogy”.
The sentence ‘Something is warm’, as noted above, entails the sentence ‘There
is a warm thing’. So commitment to the truth of (A) translated as ‘Something is
warm’ would commit one to there being warm things. Note, however, commitment
to the sentence ‘Something is warm’ would not commit one to there being warms
in the way that commitment to the sentence ‘Something is a cat’ commits one to
there being cats. If commitment to ‘Something is warm’ did not entail a sentence of
ontologically committing form, then by premise one of the Argument from Abstracta
‘Something’ in ‘Something is warm’ would not supposit for anything.
An argument that second-order quantifiers supposit can be generated by analogy
with the case of first-order quantifiers. Suppose that ‘Df S is f ’ is true and consider
the following series of inferences:
1. ‘Df S is f ’ is translated as ‘S is something’.
2. Thus, there is something that S is.
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3. Thus, there is a property which S is.
(C) Therefore, there are properties.
Sellars denies that the second sentence entails the third sentence in this case.
While ‘There is something. . . ’ appears to be an ontologically committing form, it is
not. ‘Something’ does not appear in that sentence as a kind term, or common noun.
In that sentence, ‘something’ takes the place of a predicate adjective. Sentences of
an ontologically committing form require a kind term to follow the ‘There is’, as in
‘There is a K’. The inference from the second sentence to the third substitutes ‘a
property’ for ‘something’ but ‘property’ is a common noun. This substitution makes
a grammatical mistake akin to the grammatical mistakes discussed above. In order
for the substitution to be valid, it must be valid to transform ‘something’ into a
common noun. The above argument requires this inference in the second-order case:
S is something
S is some thing
‘There is a property which S is’ does follow from ‘S is some thing’. But in order to go
from ‘S is something’ to ‘There is a property which S is’ relies on the above inference.
The inference might be made more explicit with the use of formal notation. It could
then be represented as
Dx S is f
Dfpf is a thing ^ S is fq
Since in the corresponding first-order inference the instances of the quantified sen-
tence will replace the variable with names of things the inference is innocent. But the
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above inference relies on holding that predicates stand for things. If the reasoning
above with respect to grammaticality is correct, then this conclusion of the inference
may not even be grammatical. The second instance of ‘f ’ is a name, while the third
is an adjective. The sentence should be ‘Dfpf -ness is a thing ^ S is fq’.
If translating ‘Df S is f ’ as ‘S is something’ avoids grammaticality worries and
does not entail ‘There is a property which S is’, then Sellars has taken the first steps
in divorcing quantification from supposition. If correct, this shows that to put a
predicate-variable after a quantifier is not to treat predicates as names for objects.
This section offered an understanding of formal sentences in terms of natural
language in such a way that premise two of the Argument from Abstracta is false.
It relied on the claim that the only sentences of natural language that are of an
ontologically committing form are ‘Something is a K, ‘There is a K’, and ‘There are
Ks’. Sellars offers no real argument for this claim. As was suggested above these
forms take center stage because they are the most perspicuous answers to the central
question of ontology, “What is there?”. There is, however, an argument that the
best understanding of the formal language requires a particular interpretation of our
natural language sentences such that premise two of the Argument from Abstracta
is true.
4.2.2 The Second Argument
Another argument for premise two of the Argument from Abstracta is as follows.
The best account of quantifiers in a formal language is the familiar Tarskian model-
theoretic account. This theory requires first-order quantifiers that are the main
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operators of true sentences to supposit. There is no reason to suppose that the
account should be any different from that of any higher-order quantifier. Therefore,
the best theory of quantification requires that all quantifiers supposit.
Sellars ([67, Ch. 1]) considers some form of this argument. There he considers
two different accounts of the existential quantifier, call them (a) and (b). The first
account, (a), again bifurcates, into (a1) and (a2). The second account, (b), is the
standard Tarskian model-theoretic account. On (a1) a sentence of the form ‘DxFx’
is true iff either ‘Fa1’ is true or ‘Fa2’ is true and so on for each expression ‘ai’. This
is standardly called substitutional quantification. On (a2) a sentence of the from
‘DxFx’ is true iff some statement of the form ‘Fc’ is true. It is crucial that the right
hand side of the biconditional is not to be interpreted as referring to a list as in the
strategy (a1). The crucial feature of strategy (a2) is that
“. . . a language not only consists of more than the grammatical strings
which are actaully deployed at any one time . . . It also includes, in a sense
difficult to define, the resources by which the language could be enriched
through being extended in specific ways.”[67, pg.8 ]
Sellars ultimately opts for strategy (a2), but does not give an explicit formal account
of this theory of quantification. A formal account is proposed in section 4.3 below.
The Tarskian model-theoretic account of quantification, (b) above, gives the truth
conditions for existential sentences by defining their truth in a model conditions.
Fix a language. A model for that language is a pair of a domain of objects and an
interpretation function. The interpretation function assigns each n-ary predicate in
the language a subset of the nth-Cartesian product of the domain of the model and
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each term an element of the domain of the model. Along with each model comes a
set of sequences. A sequence is a function that assigns each variable of the language
an object of the domain. The set of sequences for a model is the set of all such
functions. For convenience consider only the sentence ‘DxFx’. This sentence is said
to be satisfied by a sequence, s, in a model, M , if some sequence, s1, exactly like s
except possibly for what it assigns to x, satisfies Fx. A sequence satisfies Fx iff the
object assigned to x by that sequence is in the set that the interpretation function
assigns to F . A sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence.
Sequences, therefore, do the main work in making quantified sentences true. It
is the variables of quantified formulas that are assigned objects in the domain of a
model. There is no need for a quantified sentence to get its truth conditions via
a sentence involving a name. Sellars [67] says that this is not a helpful model of
natural language. But the details of his concerns would take this chapter off topic.
The goal of this chapter is merely to show that there is a viable alternative to the
Tarskian model-theoretic account of quantification. It is not here argued that the
Tarskian model-theoretic account of quantification will not serve the purposes of a
philosophical logician in trying to model natural language.
The Tarskian model-theoretic account of quantification, as stated above, entails
that if a person is committed to the truth of ‘DxFx’, then that person is committed
to there being an entity assigned to ‘x’ by some sequence, and that entity is F .
Similarly, if the account of quantification is to be generalized, it will hold that a
quantified sentence of the form ‘Dffa’ is true if and only if there is an entity assigned
to ‘f ’ by some sequence such that the entity denoted by ‘a’ is or has whatever entity is
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denoted by ‘f ’. It follows that the Tarskian model-theoretic account of quantification
entails that all quantifiers, if they are the main operators of a sentence, supposit.
This means that if the response to Argument from Abstracta given in section 4.2
is to succeed, an alternative to the Tarskian model-theoretic account of quantification
is required.
4.3 An Alternative Account of Quantification
The account of quantification presented here is embedded in a framework first devel-
oped by Restall [53].6 Restall offers an explication of the notion of a position used
in the question ‘what is Y ’s position on topic T?’ or the statement ‘My position on
T is X’. A position is an ordered pair of sets of sentences. Positions can be coherent
or incoherent depending on the sentences that they contain. The rules governing the
assertion and denial conditions of sentences featuring logical vocabulary determine
the coherent and incoherent positions. Those positions in which a sentence can be
(in)coherently asserted or denied are the primary semantic machinery of the frame-
work. The rules governing the structure of positions and the conditions of assertion
and denial for a sentence determine whether or not it is coherent to assert or deny
that sentence in a position. The semantic contribution that a logical expression, such
as  or D, makes to a sentence is given by the rules governing coherent assertion and
denial of that sentence. This inferentialist theory of the meaning of sentences follows
the spirit of Sellars [66, 67].
It is important to note that the truth of this framework is not argued for here. It
6This is similar to work done by Koslow [22]
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is presented only as an alternative to the Tarskian model-theoretic picture presented
above. The goal of this chapter is only to show that there is a prima facie viable
picture of quantification and ontological commitment that can germinate from the
kernel planted by Sellars [63, 67]. In what follows a formal account both of positions
and of ontological commitment are developed. It is then shown that on this view not
all quantifiers which are the main operators in true sentence must supposit. More
precisely, if an expression in a true atomic sentence does not supposit, then the
quantified sentence that generalizes over that expression does not supposit in any
way that the original atomic sentence does not.
Fix a formal language. Let there be an infinite set of names c1, . . . , cn, . . ., an
infinite set of variables, x1, . . . , xn, . . ., and for each arity, m, an inifinite set of pred-
icates, Rm1 , . . . , R
m
n , . . . Call the union of the set of names and the set of variables
the set of terms. The set of logical vocabulary is t ,^, Du. If ϕ is a formula, then
ϕrti{tjs is the result of replacing every occurrence of tj in ϕ by ti. The set of formulas
of the language is defined recursively by
• If Rmn is anm-ary predicate, and t1, . . . , tm arem-many terms, thenRmn t1, . . . , tn
is a formula.
• If ϕ and ψ are formulas then so are  pϕq, pϕ^ ψq, and Dxipϕq7
• Nothing else is a formula.
A sentence is a formula with no unbound variables.
7Parenthesis are dropped when convenient.
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Definition 21 (Position). Let Γ and Σ be sets of sentences. Γ ñ Σ is the position
one takes up by asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ.
Γ ñ Σ in the formal language represents the position a person would be in if
they were to assert all of Γ and deny all of Σ.
Figure 4.1: First-Order Logic
Structural Rules
Id ϕñ ϕ
Γ ñ Σ
WL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ϕñ Σ
Cut
Γ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
WR
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Operational Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ
L^
Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ Σ
Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ
LD˚
Γ, Dxϕñ Σ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ ñ ψ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ
Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ
RD
Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ
˚ t does not occur in the conclusion of LD
A deduction is also defined inductively
• All instances of Id are deductions.
• If δ1, . . . , δn are deductions, R an n-premise rule that has the last positions of
δ1, . . . , δn as premises and Γ ñ Σ as a conclusion, then
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δ1
... . . .
δn
...
R
Γ ñ Σ
is a deduction.
A position, Γ ñ Σ is incoherent iff there is a deduction of Γ ñ Σ, written
$ Γ ñ Σ. This generates the reading a rule of fig. 4.1, e.g. R
Γ ñ Σ
R
∆ ñ Λ
as indicating that if it is incoherent to assert all of Γ and deny all of Σ, then it is
incoherent to assert all of ∆ and deny all of Λ. On this understanding, Id corresponds
to the fact that assertion and denial are exclusive speech acts. It is incoherent to
assert and deny the same sentence. WL and WR indicate that if a position is
incoherent, then asserting or denying more sentences will not change that.
R read contrapositively indicates that if it is coherent to assert all of ∆ and deny
all of Λ, then it is coherent to assert all of Γ and deny all of Σ. Cut, on this reading,
indicates that if it is coherent to assert all of Γ and deny all of Σ, then for any
sentence ϕ, either it is coherent to assert all of Γ and assert ϕ and deny all of Σ,
or it is coherent to assert all of Γ and deny ϕ and all of ∆. Cut thus entails that
any coherent position can be expanded to a coherent position that either asserts or
denies each sentence of the language.
Similar to the Cut rule, the LD rule is a rule for the expansion of a position.
The LD rule read from bottom to top indicates that if Γ, Dxϕñ Σ is coherent, then
it is coherent to add a new term, t, to one’s language and assert ϕrt{xs. On this
account of quantification, the contribution that a quantifier makes to the sense of
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a sentence is to mark what is coherent or incoherent in expansions of the language.
The general role of quantifiers in a language, on the view under consideration, is to
account for the ways in which that language can be expanded. LD indicates that
if it is coherent to assert Dxϕ, then it is coherent to expand the resources of the
language by a new name, c, and assert ϕrc{xs. This is embodied in the familiar
pattern of reasoning that names what is existentially quantified over, e.g. moving
from “There is a set containing such and such numbers” to “Call it ‘A’.” and
asserting “A contains such and such numbers”. RD indicates that if it is coherent
to deny Dxϕ, then for any term, t —even terms in an expansion of the language
—it is coherent to deny ϕrt{xs. This account of quantifiers thus offers a way of
understanding one sense in which a language that includes quantification has the
resources to put restrictions on expansions of the language. In the first-order case,
quantifiers mark what is coherent and incoherent when the language is expanded by
new names. Second-order quantifiers mark what is coherent and incoherent given
expansions of the language by predicates. Sentential quantifiers cover the case of
expansions of the language by sentences.
It is more appropriate, on this account of quantification, to assign quantifiers the
role of generalizing rather than of marking the number of entities that fall under
a kind, property, attribute, etc. This particular role of first-order quantifiers is
due to the fact that they are generalizing over names. As is discussed below, that
quantifiers have such ontological significance is not essential to quantifiers as such
but is a feature of those quantifiers that generalize over grammatical expressions that
have ontological significance.
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Ontological commitment is a species of commitment. This chapter agrees with
the standard picture that the most straightforward way to be committed to F s is to
be committed to the sentence DxFx. A position, Γ ñ Σ is said to be committed to
a sentence, ϕ iff $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ, i.e. a position is committed to ϕ when it is incoherent
to take up that position and deny ϕ.
To come to an explication of the notion of an ontological commitment it is nec-
essary to consider all the ways that a coherent position can be expanded. ∆ ñ Λ
is an expansion of Γ ñ Σ iff Γ Ď ∆ and Σ Ď Λ. A position is maximal iff for each
sentence, ϕ, it either asserts ϕ or it denies ϕ. A maximal coherent expansion of a
position is a way of completing that position’s account of everything. A maximal
position takes a stand on every sentence of the language. An expansion of a position
asserts and denies all the sentences that the original position asserts and denies,
and possibly others. A coherent expansion of a position is thus a coherent way of
continuing the description that the original position makes. The maximal coherent
expansions of some position thus correspond to complete characterizations of ways
things could be given that the original position is adopted.
Let Γ ñ Σ be a coherent position. The set of maximal coherent expansions of
Γ ñ Σ, MEpΓ ñ Σq is defined by a construction that makes use of both the Cut
rule and the LD rule. Both rules guarantee ways of coherently expanding a position.
The LD rule offers a way of expanding a position by a new term, and the Cut rule
guarantees that given a coherent position, there is a maximal coherent expansion
of that position. Using these two rules a tree is constructed. The set of maximal
coherent expansions of a position are constructed using this tree.
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In order to construct the tree, let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . . be an ordering on the sentences
of L . Let W be a denumerably infinite set of witnesses, and let w1, . . . , wn, . . . be
an ordering on W . W is the set of expressions that account for the dynamic nature
of language. They are the terms that are not in the language of a coherent position,
but are added to witness the truth of existential sentences. Let LW and LD be two
lists that at the beginning of the procedure are empty. Each branch will have its own
LD list. This list will be identified by a superscript of a sequence of ‘l’s and ‘r’s. This
index corresponds to the branch of the tree to which that list belongs. For instance,
the list LrrD is thus associated with the right branch of the right branch of the tree.
An example is given in fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2: A Sample Tree With Labeled Lists
Li
LliL
r
i
LrliL
rr
i
Lrri
Sequences of ‘l’s and ‘r’s are abbreviated by ‘d’s. To determine the set MEpΓ ñ
Σq, begin a tree whose root is Γ ñ Σ. The leaves of the tree are those positions
that do not have any positions above them. A leaf of the tree, ∆ ñ Λ, is open
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iff & ∆ ñ Λ, otherwise it is closed. At stage n consider sentence ϕn and do the
following for each open leaf ∆ ñ Λ of the tree:
• If for any sentence of the form Dxϕ, Dxϕ P ∆ and Dxϕ R LdD, then take the least
element of W R LW , wn, expand the branch by
∆, ϕrwn{xs ñ Λ
∆ ñ Λ
Add wn to LW , ϕ to L
dD, and add the set of sentences formed using wn to the
end of the list of sentences.
• If & ∆, ϕn ñ Λ and & ∆ ñ ϕn,Λ, the tree branches and becomes
∆, ϕn ñ Λ ∆ ñ ϕn,Λ
∆ ñ Λ
If LdD was associated with that branch, then LdlD is associated with the left
branch, and LdrD is associated with the right branch.
• If exactly one of & ∆, ϕn ñ Λ or & ∆ ñ ϕn,Λ holds extend the branch by
that sequent.
Cycle through the sentences of the language in this way until no new sentences
are added to any open leaves of the tree.
Let Γ ñ Σ,∆1 ñ Λ1, . . . ,∆n ñ Λn, . . . be an open branch on this tree. CallŤ
i ∆i ñ
Ť
i Λi the maximal leaf of this branch.
Definition 22 (Maximal Coherent Extensions). The set of maximal coherent exten-
sions of a position Γ ñ Σ, MEpΓ ñ Σq is the set of maximal leaves after the process
described above is completed.
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As discussed above, the most natural answer to the question “What is there?”
is “There are K’s”, or some variant. The central question of ontology is thus best
answered by indicating what non-empty kinds there are. An account of ontological
commitment requires an account of what non-empty kinds a position is committed
to. If ϕ is a sentence in which a term t occurs, let ϕrξ{ts be a kind term. Intuitively,
the kind-term ‘Fξ’ corresponds to being an F .
The maximal coherent extensions of a position are all the ways that things could
be given the truth of that position, i.e. that was it asserts is true and what it denies
is false. A position Γ ñ Σ is said to be committed to a sentence ϕ iff for each
∆ ñ Λ PMEpΓ ñ Σq, ϕ P ∆. A position is thus committed to a sentence if on any
way of coherently filling it in, ϕ is asserted. It is worth remarking that $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
iff for any ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq, ϕ P ∆. From this it follows that a position is
committed to ϕ iff it is incoherent, given that position, to deny ϕ. A position Γ ñ Σ
is committed to there being entities of kind K iff for each ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq,
Krt{ξs P ∆ for some term or witness t. Given the construction of MEpΓ ñ Σq
it follows from this definition that Γ ñ Σ is committed to there being K’s iff it
is committed to DxKrx{ξs iff $ Γ ñ DxKrx{ξs,Σ.8 Thus a position Γ ñ Σ is
committed to there being K’s iff $ Γ ñ DxKrx{ξs,Σ. The first order existential
sentences to which a position is committed are those closely tied to the ontological
commitments of a position.
The ontological commitments of a position Γ ñ Σ on this account, depend on
what sentences are in the set of maximal coherent extensions of Γ ñ Σ, and what
8A proof of these is offered in the section 4.5.
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parts of unquantified sentences are taken to be ontologically significant. On the
above definition kinds were taken to be of primary ontological significance. But it
is consistent with this view that whatever is named by a predicate has ontological
significance as well. Whether or not commitment to the sentence ‘Dffa’ carries com-
mitment to there being something which the entity named by ‘a’ is or has, depends
on whether commitment to sentences of the form ‘Ha’ carry such a commitment.
That will depend on what the right account of the supposition of atomic sentences
is. What determines the ontological significance of a quantified sentence depends on
what the ontological significance of its instances in an expanded language are.
Sellars [65, 68] goes to great lengths to provide a theory of predication whereby
predicates occurring in true sentences do not supposit. If both Sellars’s account of
predication and the present treatment of quantification are correct, then there is no
reason to think that second-order quantifiers, when occurring as the main operator
of a true sentence, supposit. Thus, premise two of the Argument from Abstracta on
this account is false. The sentence ‘Dffa’ does not mask commitment to properties,
attributes, sets, classes, etc. Coherently asserting ‘Dffa’, does not that there be some
entity which a is or has. A coherent assertion of ‘Dffa’ only requires that there is a
coherent expansion of the language by a newly defined predicate H, such that it is
coherent to assert ‘Ha’. This account of quantification and ontological commitment
serve Sellars’s purposes. It is worth noting that it can also be seen as an account that
can serve the purposes of Wright [76], who claims that the ontological commitments
of a quantified sentence are reducible to the ontological commitments of its instance.
He calls this position ‘Neutralism’.
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4.4 A Grammatical Interpretation of ‘Dffa’
Sellars argues against several translations of ‘Dffa’ into English on the grounds that
they are not grammatical. He offers various alternatives as translations, such as ‘a
is something’, ‘a is somequale’, and ‘a is somehow’.9 It may be that none of these
sentences are grammatical either. Their ungrammaticality, however, does not consist
in translating ‘f ’ equivocally, sometimes as an adjective, sometimes as a common
noun, and sometimes as a name. Sellars’s suggested translations do not commit that
grammatical error. Instead, they are not obviously sentences of English. This may
be acceptable given that natural language is flexible, and they could be introduced
as sentences of English with little trouble.
New sentences such as ‘a is somehow’ can be introduced into English and given
a coherent meaning. The introduction of such sentences would provide correlates
for the sentence ‘Dffa’. These sentences could then be used to assess whether the
second-order quantifier, when the main operator of a true sentence, supposits. If ‘a
is somehow’ could be introduced so that it is clearly a translation of ‘Dffa’ and does
not clearly entail a sentence like ‘There is some how or way that a is’, this could
defuse worries that the sentence ‘Dffa’ had problematic ontological commitments.
Even with the introduction of new sentences, it is helpful to point out that such
resources are already available in English. It may be difficult to make clear what one
might express by asserting the sentence ‘Homer is somequale’ or ‘Fred is somehow’.
The latter is worrying because it looks like an incomplete sentence of English to
9The latter of these was first suggested by Prior [45], and later used by Rayo [49] as a translation
of second-order sentences.
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which an interlocutor might respond ‘Fred is somehow what?’10 These sentences are
indicated in question and answer dialogs of the sort that Sellars considers at the end
of “Grammar and Existence”. Consider the following:
A : Bart is doing something that you won’t like.
B : What is Bart doing?
A : He’s being mean to Lisa.
The first sentence of the dialogue is the one containing the translation of the second-
order quantifier. For a small set of cases it is appropriate to translate ‘Dffa’ as ‘a is
doing something’. Appropriate specifications of the first sentence are phrases such
as ‘being mean’, ‘being kind’, etc. The expression ‘is doing something’ is as much a
part of English as the expressions, ‘Lisa is doing something about the issue’, or ‘Gil
is doing something new’. The above dialogue suggests that it is not inappropriate
to use the expression ‘doing something’ to generalize over ways that persons might
be. ‘a is doing something’ is not itself of an ontologically committing form as defined
above. It also does not entail the sentence ‘There is some thing that a is doing’ which
is of an ontologically committing form. The latter is equivalent to the sentence ‘a is
doing some thing’ the former is not.
If ‘a is doing something’ is a legitimate translation of ‘Dffa’, this would dispel
the worry introduced at the end of section 4.2.1 that there is no translation of ‘Dffa’
into English that is not of an ontologically committing form.
10One such interlocutor posed exactly this question to Sellars in the discussion period following
Sellars’s first Dewey lecture. (See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UiV-vMOueY). Sellars’s
response is that ‘somehow’ is being used in a non-standard way.
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4.5 Proof of Claims
Lemma 4.1. If ∆ ñ Λ PMEpΓ ñ Σq, then Γ Ď ∆ and Σ Ď Λ
Proof. There is no step in the construction of MEpΓ ñ Σq that removes sentences
from Γ ñ Σ. So every element of MEpΓ ñ Σq is an expansion of it.
Theorem 4.5.1. $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ iff for every ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq, ϕ P ∆, for a
sentence ϕ containing no witnesses.
Proof. For the left to right direction, suppose that $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. Suppose that there
is a ∆ ñ Λ PMEpΓ ñ Σq such that ϕ P Λ. By lemma 4.1, Γ Ď ∆ and ΣYtϕu Ď Λ.
Since $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ by weakening $ ∆ ñ Λ. But then ∆ ñ Λ R MEpΓ ñ Σq. So
there is no ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq such that ϕ P Λ. Let ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq.
Since ϕ R Λ and ∆ ñ Λ is maximal, ϕ P ∆.
For the right to left direction suppose that for every ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq,
ϕ P ∆. But also suppose that & Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. The only way for this to be the
case is that at the stage, call it n, where ϕ was considered, there was no open leaf,
Π ñ Θ such that & Π ñ ϕ,Θ. Since & Γ ñ ϕ,Σ, there must be a stage earlier
than n, m, such that it was still the case that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1, but that at stage
m ` 1 $ Π2 ñ ϕ,Θ2. Let each time a witness is added for an existential sentence
count as a sub-stage. The sub-stages of a stage i are i.1, i.2, . . .. Let the sentence in
consideration at stage m` 1 be ψ. There are four cases to consider.
Case 1. Suppose that this happens at stage m.i. Since witnesses are added there is a
sentence, Dxψ P Π1, such that & Π1, Dxψ ñ ϕ,Θ but $ Π1, ψrwi{xs ñ ϕ,Θ. However,
159
since, wi does not occur in ϕ, it is guaranteed by LD that & Π1, ψrw{xs ñ ϕ,Θ. So
this cannot be where the each leaf became committed to ϕ.
Case 2. Suppose that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1, that both & Π1, ψ ñ Θ1 and & Π1 ñ ψ,Θ1.
From the assumption it follows that both $ Π1, ψ ñ ϕ,Θ1 and $ Π1 ñ ψ, ϕ,Θ1. But
then by Cut $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ, contradicting the assumption.
Case 3. Suppose that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1, and that both & Π1, ψ ñ Θ1 and $ Π1 ñ ψ,Θ1.
By assumption $ Π1, ψ ñ ϕ,Θ1. But then by Cut $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ, a contradiction.
Case 4. Suppose that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1, and that both $ Π1, ψ ñ Θ1 and & Π1 ñ ψ,Θ1.
By assumption $ Π1 ñ ψ, ϕ,Θ1. But then by Cut $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ, a contradiction.
Theorem 4.5.2. If for each ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq, Krt{ξs P ∆ for some t, then
$ Γ ñ DxKrx{ξs,Σ.
Proof. Suppose that for each ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq, Krt{ξs P ∆ for some t.
Suppose that there is a ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq such that DxKrx{ξs R ∆. Since
∆ ñ Λ is maximal, DxKrx{ξs P Λ. Thus, there is some finite stage on that branch
with position, Π ñ Θ, where Krt{ξs P Π for some t and DxKrx{ξs P Θ. The following
deduction establishes that that branch is closed
Id
Krt{ξs ñ Krt{ξs
RD
Krt{ξs ñ DxKrx{ξs
WL/WR
Π, Krt{ξs ñ DxKrx{ξs,Θ
This contradiction the assumption that ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq. Thus, there is no
such ∆ ñ Λ. So for each ∆ ñ Λ P MEpΓ ñ Σq, DxKrx{ξs P ∆. By theorem 4.5.1,
$ Γ ñ DxKrx{ξs,Σ.
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Chapter 5
Atomic Ontology
Abstract. The aim of this chapter is to offer a method for determining the ontologi-
cal commitments of a formalized theory. The second section shows that determining
the consequence relation of a language model-theoretically entails that the ontology
of a theory is tied very closely to the variables that feature in that theory. The third
section develops an alternative way of determining the ontological commitments of a
theory given a proof-theoretic account of the consequence relation for the language
that theory is in. It is shown that the proof-theoretic account of ontological commit-
ment does not entail that the ontological commitments of a theory depend on the
variables of that theory. The last section of the chapter discusses how this account of
ontological commitment can be used in other philosophical projects such as Wright’s
abstractionism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the upshots of adopting
the proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment for ontology generally.
Keywords. Ontological Commitment, Quine’s Dictum, Quantification
5.1 Introduction
The primary question of ontology is “What is there?” After the linguistic turn this
question has been answered by a two step divide and conquer strategy. In the first
step a general account is given of what entities a person is committed to by the
statements that they accept. This is the formal answer to the primary question
of ontology. The second step is to figure out which theory ought to be accepted.
This is the material answer to that question. The task of offering a material answer
belongs to the various areas of – broadly construed – scientific inquiry. The answer
to the primary question of ontology is thus given in a roundabout way. It is answered
materially by the physicists, ethicists, mathematicians, etc. Offering a formal answer,
on the other hand, is the task of the philosopher of language and the philosophical
logician.
Providing a formal answer to the primary question of ontology is providing a
method for determining how a person commits themselves to there being entities of
such and such a sort. Theories themselves do not have commitments. A person who
endorses a particular theory may incur certain commitments because of the content
of that theory. For instance, a person endorsing the statement that it is raining and
it is Tuesday is committed to the statement that it is raining. This is because the
statement that it is raining follows from the statement that it is raining and it is
Tuesday. In what follows the phrase “ontological commitments of a theory” should
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be understood in light of the above. The ontological commitments of a theory are
what a person would be committed to there being if they were to endorse that theory.
A formal answer to the primary question of ontology was famously given by Quine
[46, 47]. According to Quine the ontological commitments of a theory are determined
by examining what entities are in the ranges of that theory’s variables. Quine sums
this up as, “To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the
value of a variable” [47]. Call this Quine’s Dictum. Quine’s Dictum is the dominant
account of how to determine the ontological commitments of a theory. The goal of
this chapter is to offer an alternative to Quine’s Dictum.
As [72] points out, things are not so simple as the preceding paragraphs may
suggest. In fact two steps are required for determining the ontological commitments
of a theory. First the theory must be formalized and then, according to Quine’s
Dictum, the ontological commitments of that theory are determined by examining
the ranges of the variables occurring in that theory. One way to think of the process of
formalizing a theory is as a translation from natural language into a formal language.
A concern with this first step is that there is no apparent reason to think that
there is a unique translation into a formal language or that there is a particular
formal language that must be the object of the translation. That there is no unique
translation would only be a problem if what was to be determined was the ontology of
the theory as stated unreflectively by the theorist. But the aim of someone offering a
formal answer to the primary question of ontology is to discover the commitments of
the theorist who has carefully translated their theory. As Van Inwagen points out the
formalization of a theory that is ultimately adopted may arise from some charitable
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back and forth between theorist and formalizer. One attempted formalization and
analysis may be met by the theorist with “I did not mean to commit myself to that”
after which some refinement could take place.
In order to avoid this difficulty it is assumed either that this has already taken
place or that the theorist is fluent in the formalism. In either case what formal-
ization is settled on is assumed as given and that the theorist offering the theory
will accept what commitments are determined to come along with that theory. The
determination of what formal sentences a theory accepts is taken for granted in what
follows.
Below (section 5.2) it is argued that the standard model theoretic account of
consequence entails Quine’s Dictum. It follows that in order to offer an alternative
to Quine’s Dictum some other account of consequence must be offered. Section 5.3
presents an alternative account of consequence and ontological commitment. Sec-
tion 5.4 discusses upshots of and objections to the view presented in section 5.3.
The only formal language that Quine admits for determining the ontological com-
mitments of a theory is the language of first-order logic with identity. The points
made in this chapter can be made without invoking identity. For the sake of simplicity
it is left to the side. Call the first-order set of sentences under consideration L . Let
N “ tc1, . . . , cn, . . .u be a denumerably infinite set of names, V “ tx1, . . . , xn, . . .u be
a denumerably infinite set of variables,1 and Pm “ tFm1 , . . . , Fmn , . . .u be a denumer-
ably infinite set of predicates of arity m for each natural number m. Let T “ N ŤV
be the set of terms of L and P “ ŤiPN Pi be the set of predicates of L . The set L
1Officially variables are ‘x’s decorated with sub-scripts, but for convenience ‘y’ and ‘z’ are be
used.
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is defined recursively by
• If F n P P and t1, . . . , tn P T then F nt1, . . . , tn P L .
• If ϕ P L then  ϕ P L .
• If ϕ and ψ are both in L then pϕ^ ψq P L .
• If ϕ P L and x P V then pDxϕq P L .
If ϕ P L then ϕrt1{t2s is the sentence that results from replacing every occurrence
t2 by t1 in ϕ. A sentence is called closed iff there are no variables occurring in that
sentence that are not bound by a quantifier. A consequence relation on a language
is a relation that holds between sets of sentences and sets of sentences.2
The most natural form for an answer to the question “What is there?” to take
is “There are Ks”. It is this form of the answer to the question that is considered
in detail below.3 Commitment to there being K’s is commitment to there being
an entity that is a K. A kind-term is an expression in the metalanguage of L . A
kind-term is formed by replacing some term in a closed sentence of L by the place
holder ξ. If ϕ is a closed sentence of L then ϕvξ{tw is the kind-term that results
from replacing t everywhere by ξ. For instance if Ftt is a closed sentence of L then
Fξt, Ftξ and Fξξ are all kind-terms. If K is a kind-term with place holder ξ and t is
a term then Kvt{ξw is the sentence that results from replacing t for every instance of
ξ in K. The ontological commitments of a theory are given by the set of kinds-terms
2The non-standard set-set consequence relation is adopted for ease in dealing with the proof-
theory presented in section 5.3.
3One upshot of the view offered here is that this is not necessarily the only intelligible question
that can be asked.
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such that according to the theory there are entities of which those kind terms are
true. For instance, a theory is committed to there being lions if according to that
theory there are entities of which the kind-term “ξ is a lion” is true.
5.2 Model-Theory and Quine’s Dictum
An account of quantification is fixed by a way of determining the consequence relation
for a language. This section argues that if the consequence relation of a language is
determined in the standard model-theoretic way then Quine’s Dictum is correct.
A model M is an ordered pair xDM , IMy of a non-empty domain of objects DM
and an interpretation function IM . For each name c, IMpcq P DM and for each
n-ary predicate P n, IMpP nq Ď DnM . Let ΣM be the set of functions from V into
DM . An individual such function σ is called a variable assignment. Two variable
assignments σ and σ1 are v-variants of one another, written σ „v σ1, iff for any
variable v1 that is not v, σpv1q “ σ1pv1q. A denotation function δ is defined relative
to variable assignments. Let t be a term of L . The denotation of t relative to a
variable assignment σ is given by
δσptq “
$’’&’’%
IMptq, if t P N
σptq, if t P V
A model M relative to a variable assignment σ satisfies a sentence ϕ, M,σ ( ϕ,
when
• if ϕ is P nt1, . . . , tn then M,σ ( ϕ iff xδσpt1q, . . . , δσptnqy P IMpP nq;
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• if ϕ is  ψ then M,σ ( ϕ iff M,σ * ψ;
• if ϕ is ψ ^ θ then M,σ ( ϕ iff M,σ ( ψ and M,σ ( θ; and
• if ϕ is Dxψ then M,σ ( ϕ iff there is a σ1 „x σ such that M,σ1 ( ψ
A sentence ϕ is true-in-a-model iff it for any variable assignment σ, M,σ ( ϕ. A
model M is a model of a set of sentences Γ, M ( Γ iff for each γ P Γ, γ is true-in-M .
M is an anti-model of a set of sentences Γ, M (Γ, iff for each γ P Γ M * γ. A set of
sentences Σ is a model-theoretic consequence of another set Γ, Γ ( Σ iff there is no
model M such that M ( Γ and M (Σ.
5.2.1 Ontological Commitment
As discussed above the question of what the ontological commitments of a theory are
in this instance is a question about what kinds of entities that theory is committed
to there being. A theory is a set of sentences. A theory Γ is committed to there
being Ks when there is no model that makes Γ true but has no entities of which the
kind term K is true.
A variable v is free for a kind-term K when v does not occur in K. All the
sentences of the language are finitely long and there are an infinite number of variables
so for any kind-term K there is a variable that is free for K.
Definition 23 (Empty in a Model). A kind-term K is empty in a model M iff there
is no variable assignment σ P ΣM such that Kvx{ξw is satisfied by σ, where x is free
for K.
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A theory Γ is committed to there being entities of which K is true iff there is no
model M such that M ( Γ and K is empty in M . The use of variable assignments
in definition 23 is crucial. There may be a model M such that there is an entity
a P DM but no name c such that IMpcq “ a. On the other hand for any variable v
there is a variable assignment σ such that σpvq “ a. On this account of ontological
commitment then variables play an indispensible role. It is variables via variable
assignments that have guaranteed contact with every element in the domain of a
model.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let Γ be a theory. Γ is committed to there being entities of which
K is true iff for any model M if M ( Γ then M,σ ( Kvx{ξw for some σ P ΣM and
x that is free for K.4
Theorem 5.2.1 shows that the model-theoretic account of quantification entails
Quine’s Dictum in the first-order case. A theory is committed to there being entities
of a certain sort if and only if there is an entity of that sort assigned to some variable
on every model making that theory true. On this account of consequence one could
know whether there are entities of such and such a kind by examining the ranges of
the variables of that theory.
Quine’s dictum requires that any variable that can be bound by a quantifier have
some ontological significance. Nothing about theorem 5.2.1 relied on the fact that
the language under consideration was first-order. If a second-order language were
given the same model-theoretic treatment Quine’s Dictum would hold for second-
order variables as well. On the model-theoretic account of quantification which
4Each theorem mentioned is proved in the appendix to this chapter.
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requires variable assignments and entities in a domain to be the values of variables, all
quantification is ontologically significant. A theory with quantifiers binding variables
of a particular syntactic expression requires that variables of that syntactic expression
have values in a domain.
Quine’s Dictum leads to limiting results when considering higher-order languages.
Since quantifiers require variables of quantification and variables of quantification re-
quire entities in domains, quantification requires entities in domains. As Boolos [7]
has pointed out, second-order quantification can express things not expressible in
first order logic. On the model-theoretic account of quantification this expressive
power must be bought with the coin of ontology. Introducing second-order quanti-
fiers to express what cannot be expressed in a first-order language requires introduc-
ing second-order variables. The values of those variables are most naturally kinds,
properties, attributes, etc. Any of which are not acceptable to a philosopher with
nominalist leanings. One upshot of the alternative account of ontological commit-
ment proposed below is that the expressive power of second-order quantification can
be bought without paying the model-theoretic cost.
5.3 Proof Theory and Ontological Commitment
The alternative account of consequence is presented in a framework developed by
Restall [50, 52, 53]. That framework takes as primitive two speech acts, assertion
and denial. A position is an ordered pair of assertions and denials. If Γ and ∆ are
sets of sentences then Γ ñ Σ is the position a person takes up by asserting all of
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Γ and denying all of Σ. Positions can either be coherent or incoherent. These two
statuses of positions are used to give the assertion and denial conditions of sentences
of L .
A horizontal bar separating positions indicates that if the positions above the bar
are incoherent then the position below the bar is also incoherent. For instance
∆ ñ Λ Π ñ Θ
Γ ñ Σ
indicates that if both of ∆ ñ Λ and Π ñ Θ are incoherent then so is Γ ñ Σ.
Contrapositively, if Γ ñ Σ is coherent then either ∆ ñ Λ is coherent or Π ñ Θ is
coherent.
Assertion and denial are exclusive speech acts. Asserting a sentence precludes
denying it and denying a sentence precludes asserting it. It is incoherent to assert
and deny the same sentence. If a person were to assert and deny the same sentence
they would either be doing something wrong or may be attempting to express two
propositions using homonymous sentences. There is no coherent interpretation of a
person univocally asserting and denying the same sentence. This is the sole notion
of incoherence that is at work in Restall’s account. That assertion and denial are
exclusive is given by Id in fig. 5.1.
If a position Γ ñ Σ is incoherent then asserting (denying) more sentences will
not change that. Contrapositively, if a position Γ ñ Σ is coherent then taking back
some assertions (denials) will preserve coherence. This corresponds to the rules of
TL and RL of fig. 5.1
A derivation δ is a tree whose root is a position Γ ñ Σ, each of whose nodes is an
application of some rule of fig. 5.1, and whose leaves are all instances of Id. In that
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Figure 5.1: First-Order Logic
Structural Rules
Id ci P NRc1, . . . , cn ñ Rc1, . . . , cn
Γ ñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ϕñ Σ
Cut
Γ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
TR
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Operational Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ, ϕ, ψ ñ Σ
L^
Γ, ϕ^ ψ ñ Σ
Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ
LD1 Γ, Dxϕñ Σ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ ñ ψ,Σ
R^
Γ ñ ϕ^ ψ,Σ
Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ
RD
Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ
1. t does not appear in the conclusion of this inference.
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case δ is said to be a derivation of Γ ñ Σ. Since all instances of Id are incoherent and
the rules of fig. 5.1 preserve incoherence, a derivation of Γ ñ Σ entails that Γ ñ Σ is
incoherent. This is indicated by prefixing a derivable position with a turnstile, e.g.
$ Γ ñ Σ. Furthermore, in this setting the only way for a position to be incoherent
is for there to be a derivation of it.
A rule, for instance R^, can be read as the claim that if Γ ñ ϕ,Σ and Γ ñ ψ,Σ
are both incoherent then so is Γ ñ ϕ ^ ψ,Σ. The contrapositive of this is that if
Γ ñ ϕ ^ ψ,Σ is coherent then either Γ ñ ϕ,Σ is coherent or Γ ñ ψ,Σ is coherent.
In other words, if it is coherent to deny ϕ^ψ while asserting all of Γ and denying all
of Σ then either it is coherent to deny ϕ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ
or it is coherent to deny ψ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ. This bears
a resemblance to the model-theoretic account given in section 5.2. On that account
if ϕ^ ψ is false, then either ϕ is false or ψ is false. Conversely if ϕ^ ψ is true then
ϕ is true and ψ is true. This mirrors L^ which amounts to the claim that if it is
coherent to assert ϕ^ ψ then it is coherent to assert both ϕ and ψ.
The rules for quantification offer a reading that suggests a divergence from the
model-theoretic account. RD can be read as the claim that if it is coherent to deny
Dxϕ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ then for any term t that might be
introduced it is coherent to deny ϕrt{xs while asserting all of Γ and denying all of
Σ. LD amounts to the claim that if it is coherent to assert Dxϕ while asserting all of
Γ and denying all of Σ then it is coherent to introduce a new term t for which it is
coherent to assert ϕrt{xs while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ.
This account of quantification is broadly substitutional. It is not substitutional
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in the sense that DxFx is equivalent to the disjunction of all the instances of Ft
for a term t in the language. Such an account of quantification is called simple
substitutional quantification. Any view according to which an existential quantifier
is logically equivalent to a disjunction of its instances, i.e. any simple substitutional
account, is not recursively definable. This result was proved by Belnap [14]. In that
article Dunn and Belnap also proposed an improvement on simple substitutional
quantification. On the improved account of quantification a quantified sentence Dxϕ
of a language L is true iff there is an extension of that language L 1 by a term t
such that ϕrt{xs is true in L 1. Other formal accounts of a similar quantifier have
been given by Geach [17] ,Bonevac [5], and [27]. An account of quantification along
these lines is referred to as expanding substitutional quantification.
Theorem 5.3.1. The proof-theoretic (fig. 5.1) and model-theoretic (section 5.2) ac-
counts of quantification agree, i.e. $ Γ ñ Σ iff Γ ( Σ.
Lavine [27] shows that the other expanding substitutional accounts of quantifi-
cation are also sound and complete with respect to model-theoretic account of con-
sequence given in section 5.2. Formally, all of these structures define the same con-
sequence relation on L . The view endorsed in this chapter takes proof-theory to
be primitive in determining the consequence relation. This chapter therefore can
offer an inferentialist explanation of the role of quantification in ontology and the
groundwork for an inferentialist picture of ontological commitment in general. 5
5Lance [26] also proposes an inferentialist account of ontological commitment. Lance’s method-
ology is to hold Quine’s dictum fixed and to offer an inferentialist explanation of the content of
existential sentences. This chapter offers an alternative to Quine’s dictum along inferentialist lines
and makes no commitment as to the particular content of existential sentences other than what can
be determined from their assertion and denial conditions.
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Among the results of this chapter is a formal explanation of why a person en-
dorsing the proof-theoretic view of the consequence relation need not endorse Quine’s
dictum.6 This, as is shown below, does not entail that quantification has no onto-
logical significance at all. Quantifiers that bind ontologically significant syntactic
positions are themselves ontologically significant. The ontological significance of, for
instance, first-order quantifiers does not derive from the fact that they are quanti-
fiers but from the fact that they quantify the syntactic position where a name could
appear. The fact that names are ontologically significant then explains the fact that
first-order quantifiers are ontologically significant.
5.3.1 Proof-Theory and Ontological Commitment
The Cut rule read from bottom to top says that for any sentence ϕ if Γ ñ Σ is a
coherent position then one of Γ, ϕ ñ Σ and Γ ñ ϕ,Σ is coherent. Cut entails the
claim that any coherent position can be filled in to a coherent position that either
6Bonevac [5] suggests that this account of quantification is a formal treatment of a view endorsed
by Sellars [62]. This is suggested by the following passage from that (1948) article.
It has not always, however, been realized that this train of thought leads directly to
the conclusion that our language claims somehow to contain a designation for every
element in every state of affairs, past, present, and future; that, in other words, it
claims to mirror the world by a complete and systematic one-to-one correspondence
of designations with individuals. If it is obvious that our language does not explicitly
contain such designations (and it would hardly be illuminating to say that it contains
them implicitly), it is equally clear that our language behaves as though it contained
them. [62, pg. 603]
More evidence that Sellars would have endorsed such a view can be found in Sellars [67]. There
he argues that an adequate account of quantification should reduce the “indefinite reference” of
quantified sentences to the “definite reference” of unquantified ones. In a footnote, he suggests
that this is best accomplished by considering expansions of a language. Sellars [63, 67] spends
considerable efforts arguing against Quine’s dictum. Similar remarks to those made by Sellars [63]
are made by Prior [45]. The results of this chapter can be seen as a formal explanation of the
insights of those philosophers.
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asserts or denies any sentence of L . The LD rule read from bottom to top says that
if Γ, Dxϕñ Σ is coherent then it is coherent to introduce into L a term t to serve as
a witness for that existential, i.e. the position Γ, Dxϕ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ is coherent where
t does not occur in Γ
ŤtDxϕuŤΣ.
A position Γ ñ Σ is maximal iff for any sentence ϕ it either asserts ϕ or it
denies ϕ, i.e. ϕ P Γ or ϕ P Σ. One position Γ ñ Σ is a superposition of another
∆ ñ Λ iff Γ ñ Σ asserts all the sentences that ∆ ñ Λ asserts and denies all the
sentences that ∆ ñ Λ denies, i.e. ∆ Ď Γ and Λ Ď Σ. The set of maximal coherent
superpositions of a position Γ ñ Σ, written OpΓ ñ Σq, are used to determine the
ontological commitments of Γ ñ Σ.
Above it was noted that the rule of Cut entails that if a position Γ ñ Σ is
coherent then there is a coherent position ∆ ñ Λ such that ∆ ñ Λ is a maximal
superposition of Γ ñ Σ. The Cut rule entails the stronger claim that if Γ ñ Σ is a
coherent position of L then if L 1 is an expansion of L there is a maximal coherent
superposition of Γ ñ Σ in the language of L 1. All the rules of fig. 5.1 are valid in
any expansion of the language L by additional expressive resources.
In order to generate OpΓ ñ Σq a tree is constructed with Γ ñ Σ at its root.
Let W be a denumerably infinite set of witness terms. The witness terms are those
expressions which are not in L but are in expansions of L . The elements of W
will extend the language L in the course of the construction. They serve, as in
standard completeness proofs, as the witnesses to the truth of existentially quantified
sentences. Let c1, . . . , cn, . . . be an ordering on the set N and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . . be an
ordering on the set of sentences of L . A leaf ∆ ñ Λ of the tree under construction
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is closed iff $ ∆ ñ Λ. A leaf is open iff it is not closed.
The construction of the tree proceeds in stages. Each stage consists of sub-
stages which themselves consist of sub-sub-stages. Let ϕi be the i
th sentence in the
ordering. At stage i consider the left-most open leaf of the construction that has not
been considered at stage i. Let ∆ ñ Λ be the nth such open leaf, call this sub-stage
i.n. At this stage extend the tree according to the following rules.
(a) If ϕj is of the form Dxψ, ϕj P ∆, and there is no sentence of the form ψrw{xs
in ∆, then take the least element of W that does not appear in ∆
Ť
Λ, wk, and
extend the branch by
∆, ϕrwk{xs ñ Λ
∆ ñ Λ
Call this stage i.n.j.
(b) If & ∆, ϕi ñ Σ and & ∆ ñ ϕi,Σ then extend the branch by
∆, ϕi ñ Λ ∆ ñ ϕi,Λ
∆ ñ Λ
Call this stage i.n.0.
(c) If $ ∆, ϕi ñ Λ then extend the branch by
∆ ñ ϕi,Λ
∆ ñ Λ
Call this stage i.n.0
(d) If $ ∆ ñ ϕi,Λ then extend the branch by
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∆, ϕi ñ Λ
∆ ñ Λ
Call this stage i.n.0
Let τpΓ ñ Σq be a tree constructed in the above way with Γ ñ Σ as its root.
Let Γ ñ Σ,∆1 ñ Λ1, . . . ,∆n ñ Λn, . . . be an open branch in this tree. CallŤ
i ∆i ñ
Ť
i Λi the maximal leaf of this branch.
Definition 24 (Maximal Coherent Superposition). If Γ ñ Σ is a position then
the set of maximal coherent superpositions of that position OpΓ ñ Σq is the set of
maximal leaves of open branches in τpΓ ñ Σq.
A position is a reckoning of how things are. A maximal position, if coherent, is an
account of how everything is. The maximal coherent positions leave nothing unsaid.
They are complete stories of how the world could be. The set OpΓ ñ Σq is the set
of complete stories of the world that the position Γ ñ Σ could tell. The complete
stories that a position could tell reveal the ontological commitments of that position.
If on every complete way of filling in a position a sentence of the form Fa is asserted,
then that position is committed to asserting that there are F ’s.
Theorem 5.3.2. For any sentence ϕ that does not contain elements of W , it holds
that $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ iff for every ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ Σq, ϕ P ∆.
Theorem 5.3.2 says that for a position Γ ñ Σ it is incoherent to deny a sentence
ϕ of L while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ iff ϕ is asserted in every maximal
coherent superposition of Γ ñ Σ. The sentences that a position rules out denying are
the sentences that each of its maximal coherent superpositions asserts. Restall [52]
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suggests that a position Γ ñ Σ is committed to a sentence ϕ when it is incoherent
to maintain that position and deny ϕ, i.e. $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. For instance, any position
asserting ϕ^ψ is committed to the sentence ϕ because it is incoherent to assert ϕ^ψ
and deny ϕ, $ ϕ ^ ψ ñ ϕ. This account of commitment avoids it being the case
that a person must know, assert, or explicitly believe what they are committed to.
A person is committed to what, given their assertions and denials, it is incoherent
for them to deny.
One of the benefits of this account of commitment is that it makes clear the com-
mitments of a position that asserts a disjunction. A position that asserts ϕ _ ψ is
not committed to either ϕ or to ψ, though it is incoherent to deny both at the same
time. It is natural to move from commitment to a sentence to commitment to a set
of sentences. Any position that asserts ϕ_ψ is set-committed to tϕ, ψu. The disad-
vantage of this approach is made clear by the consideration of quantified sentences.
In both of the above examples the commitments of a sentence could be expressed
in terms of their sub-sentences. A position that asserts Dxϕ is not committed to
any sentence of the form ϕrt{xs and not even set-committed to any set of the form
tϕrt0{xs, ϕrt1{xs, . . .u. The simple substitutional approach to quantification enforces
the latter set-commitment of an existential sentence. Theorem 5.3.2 shows that Re-
stall’s account of commitment can be captured by considering the set of maximal
coherent superpositions of a position. For instance, it follows from theorem 5.3.2
that if a position Γ ñ Σ asserts ϕ ^ ψ then ϕ appears in every maximal coherent
superposition of Γ ñ Σ. The commitments of a position which asserts an existen-
tial sentence can be described in terms of the instances of that existential sentence
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appearing in maximal coherent superpositions of the original position. The ability
to adequately capture the commitments incurred by asserting a sentence in terms of
its sub-sentences is what makes it possible to generate an account of the ontological
commitments of a position.
Definition 25 (Ontological Commitment). A position Γ ñ Σ is ontologically com-
mitted to there being entities of which K is true iff for each ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ Σq
there is a name or witness t such that Kvt{ξw P ∆.
On this account of ontological commitment a position is committed to there being
an entity of which K is true iff on every maximally coherent way of filling in that
position a sentence of the formKvt{ξw is true, i.e. K is true of something. Ontological
commitment to a kind is commitment to naming something of which K is true if one
were to tell the complete story of the world. According to this view to be assumed
as an entity is to be reckoned nameable in all maximal coherent superpositions. This
account of ontological commitment does not require that variables be given values
or even that variables have “ranges”. In order to learn the ontological commitments
of a position, one does not need to explore the ways that variables are matched to
objects in a domain, but to explore what objects are named in the maximal coherent
superpositions of that position.7
Expanding substitutional quantifiers when paired with this account of ontological
7This account of ontological commitment shows formally a way of accomplishing what Sellars
[67] was hoping to accomplish. He argues that the ontological commitments of a quantified sentence
(one that he says “refers indeterminately”) ultimately must rest on the non-quantified instances of
that sentence (sentences that he says “refer determinately”). In Sellars’s terminology this account
of ontological commitment is an explanation of how ‘indirect reference’ can be explained in terms
of ‘direct reference’.
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commitment treat variables as little more than bookkeeping devices. There is no spe-
cial relation that variables have to domains in a model or to ontological commitment
generally. Variables, and the quantifiers that bind them, mark which sentences may
be asserted or denied in complete stories of the world. The above construction makes
plain that the ontological commitments of a theory whose quantifiers are interpreted
in this way need not bear a special relation to a domain of quantification.
Call the account of ontological commitment described in this section proof-theoretic
ontological commitment and call the account of the previous section (section 5.2)
model-theoretic ontological commitment. Before considering extensions of first-order
logic the proof theoretic and the Quinean account of ontological commitment agree
with one another.
Theorem 5.3.3. A set of sentences Γ has a model-theoretic ontological commitment
to K iff the position Γ ñ has a proof-theoretic commitment to K.
5.4 Discussion
5.4.1 Second-Order Quantification
Theorem 5.3.3 shows that these two accounts of ontological commitment, at least
in the first-order case, completely agree. Their disagreement will arise when certain
other forms of quantification are introduced. An important philosophical difference
between the two accounts is that if a quantifier binds variables whose syntactic cat-
egory is in general non-denoting then the model-theoretic account of quantification
requires that entities be introduced to be the values of those variables. A propo-
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nent of the model-theoretic account of ontological commitment therefore cannot in
good conscience allow quantifiers to bind variables whose syntactic category is non-
denoting. For instance, if predicates do not denote then second-order quantifiers
cannot bind variables in predicate position. This would require there to be entities
to be the values of those variables.
Things go differently for the proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment.
Let L be expanded to L2 by the addition of second-order quantifiers and variables.
The rules governing the second-order quantifiers are
Γ, ϕrF {Xs ñ Σ
LD2 Γ, DXϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕrF {Xs,Σ
RD2 Γ ñ DXϕ,Σ
where F does not occur in the conclusion of LD2.8 According to the specification of
the consequence relation offered in section 5.3 LD2 says that if it is coherent to assert
DXϕ while asserting Γ and denying Σ, then there is an expansion of the language
by a new predicate F such that it is coherent to assert ϕrF {Xs. RD2 says that if it
is coherent to deny DXϕ while asserting Γ and denying Σ then on any expansion of
the language and for any predicate F it is coherent to deny ϕrF {Xs.
Let Γ ñ Σ be a position all of whose sentences are elements of L2. In order to
generate OpΓ ñ Σq add the set of predicates to the set of names and let W2 be a
denumerable set of second-order witnesses. Add the following step to the process
that generated τpΓ ñ Σq in the first-order case. Let the stage in question be i.n and
the open leaf being considered be ∆ ñ Λ.
8For convenience only atomic predication is considered. A discussion of comprehension principles
and quantification introduces unnecessary complication.
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(a˚) If ϕj is of the form DXψ, ϕj P ∆, and there is no sentence of the form ψrW {xs
in ∆, then take the least element of W2 that does not appear in ∆
Ť
Λ, Wk,
and extend the branch by
∆, ϕrWk{Xs ñ Λ
∆ ñ Λ
Call this stage i.n.j.
The ontological commitments of a position are defined in the same way as the first-
order case. There is nothing in this definition that requires second-order variables to
be matched via variable assignments to some element of a model. Whether or not
second-order sentences incur commitment to properties, attributes, sets, classes, etc.
is a matter of whether predicates themselves incur such commitment.
Without anything like an existence predicate defined independently of quantifi-
cation, a difference in ontology makes itself apparent in the object language only
in the case that the language in question is not recursively specifiable. A standard
example of such a language is second-order logic as characterized by the standard
models (as opposed to Henkin models). For any language that is recursively speci-
fiable the proof-theoretic and the model-theoretic characterizations of the language
will agree. There will be no object language sentence of, for instance, second-order
logic as characterized by the Henkin models over which the two accounts of ontolog-
ical commitment disagree. Any sentence of one language has the same consequences
and is a consequence of the same sentences in the other language. The difference
between the proof-theoretic and the model-theoretic account of ontological commit-
ment is only made apparent by considerations of how the consequence relation of
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the language is itself specified and how the ontological commitments of a theory or
position are to be determined. The ontological differences between the two ways of
specifying the consequence relation are only made apparent when the language itself
is analyzed.
Of particular interest for this account of ontological commitment is Wright’s ([75])
project called abstractionism. The abstractionist program attempts to derive various
branches of mathematics by the addition of abstraction principles to logic. Because
the only resources used by abstractionists are logic and abstraction principles it is
claimed that abstractionism has the potential to offer a plausible epistemology of
mathematical truths. It is essential to the abstractionist project that any resource
used that is not an abstraction principle is purely logical.
The program was initiated when it was shown that the Peano-Dedekind axioms
for the natural numbers follow from an abstraction principle, Hume’s Principle, in
second-order logic. In order for the abstractionist program to be successful it must be
the case that second-order quantification is purely logical. This claim was denied by
Quine [48]. It is commonly thought that a necessary condition on a piece of vocab-
ulary being logical vocabulary is that introducing it to a language does not require
the introduction of a new category of entity. If the model-theoretic account of onto-
logical commitment is correct second-order quantification along with a commitment
to nominalism violates this constraint.
Wright [76] proposes that the ontological commitments of a second-order sentence
are nothing more than the ontological commitments of any of its instances. He
calls this view neutralism. The proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment
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presented in section 5.3 is neutralist in this sense and so meets that need of the
abstractionist project. A theory Γ containing the sentence DFFa will be committed
to there being an entity a such that in every complete story of the world that is an
extension of Γ ñ there is a sentence of the form Wa. If, however, the sentence Wa
incurs no commitment to properties, attributes, classes, etc. then neither does DFFa.
The sentence DFFa indicates that a sentence of the form Wa occurs in the complete
story of the world for any position in which it is asserted. It does not, thereby,
say that there are properties, attributes, classes, etc. The proof-theoretic account
of ontological commitment thus offers a response to an objection that second-order
logic is not purely logical.9
5.4.2 Expanding Substitutional Quantification
This section deals with objections to the proposed method of determining the onto-
logical commitments of a theory.
Empty Names
The first objection is plausibly what motivated Quine [47] in “On What There Is” to
put forward his dictum that “to be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be
reckoned as the value of a variable”. Let ϕ be a proper translation of the sentence
‘Pegasus does not exist’. On the proposed account of ontological commitment the
position ϕ ñ is committed to the kind term “ξ does not exist”. Most people are
willing to endorse the position that asserts that Pegasus does not exist but are not
9It should be noted that it only shows that second-order logic meets a necessary condition on a
consequence relation being logical consequence.
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thereby committed to there being non-existent entities. The issue is how a position
could, as Quine puts it, “deny Pegasus” without being committed to there being
entities that do not exist.
The objection as put requires serious attention. In the construction of the maxi-
mally coherent superpositions of ϕñ no sentences are removed from the original
position. ϕ is asserted in every member of Opϕ ñ q. Given the proposed account
of ontological commitment this position is committed to the kind-term “ξ does not
exist” being non-empty. There are two avenues of response to this objection.
The first strategy follows Quine. It holds that at the stage where the theory in
question is translated into the language of first-order logic names are replaced with
predicates. A proper translation of “Pegasus does not exist” is the sentence  DxPx
where Pξ is the kind-term “ξ is a pegasizer”. On this strategy every position in
Op DxPx ñ q includes an assertion of  Pt for every term or witness, t. That is
to be expected. Since Pegasus does not exist, everything fails to be a pegasizer.
A second strategy points out that the above view assumes that all names denote.
An alternative to the Quinean use of predicates like “pegasizer” was pioneered by
Leonard [31] and later Lambert [24].10 Free logics allow non-denoting terms in a
language. If Γ and Σ are sets of sentences and A and B sets of names then A : Γ ñ
Σ : B is a name-position.11 A : Γ ñ Σ : B is the name-position that one takes up by
accepting all of A, asserting all of Γ denying all of Σ, and rejecting all of B.
According to this strategy the ability to “deny Pegasus” is taken as primitive.
A term is taken not to denote by a position if that position rejects that term. The
10For a helpful overview of free logics see Lehmann [28].
11The idea of a name-position was introduced by Restall [56, 57].
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rules governing quantification are modified along the lines of Restall [57] or Gratzl
[19] by using the following two instead of LD and RD:
A, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : B
LDf
A : Γ, Dxϕñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : B A : Γ ñ Σ : t, B
RDf
A : Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ : B
where t does not appear in the conclusion of LDf . LDf says that if it is coherent to
assert Dxϕ while accepting all of A, asserting all of Γ, denying all of Σ, and rejecting
all of B then there is an expansion of the language by a term t, such that it is
coherent to accept t and assert ϕrt{xs while accepting all of A, asserting all of Γ,
denying all of Σ, and rejecting all of B. The construction of τpA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq
is only modified slightly to account for this difference. (a) is modified so that the
witness wk is added to the accepted names of the position under consideration. On
this account a position A : Γ ñ Σ : B is committed to a kind-term K iff for any
position C : ∆ ñ Λ : D P OpA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq there is a name or witness t P C such
that Krt{ξs P ∆.
Let the sentence “Pegasus does not exist again” be ϕ. On the account of quan-
tification being proposed the position : ϕ ñ : is not committed to there being a
non-existent entity. There is a position in Op: ϕñ :q that rejects every term. So it
fails to meet the first condition for a kind-term to be empty in a maximal coherent
superposition.
Unnameable Entities
Another objection to this account of ontological commitment is that it assumes that
everything can be named. So stated the objection requires clarification. One way of
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making this objection more precise is to rephrase it as the claim that on this account
of ontological commitment there is no way for a person to commit themselves to the
existence of an entity that cannot be named. This objection is only worth considering
in this chapter if it goes on to add that on the model-theoretic account of ontological
commitment it is possible to commit oneself to there being entities which cannot be
named. But by theorem 5.3.3, this is not the case. Any ontological commitment of
a first-order theory determined proof-theoretically is an ontological commitment of
that theory determined model-theoretically, and vice-versa. If there is a sentence ϕ
that says the same thing as “There are unnamable entities” then asserting it on the
model-theoretic and on the proof-theoretic account commits one to the same entities.
The objection might continue by pointing out that the rule LD assumes that
every entity can be named and it is this fact that explains the coincidence of the two
accounts of ontological commitment, i.e. the truth of theorem 5.3.3. To address this
agreement let
Σ
be a quantifier defined by the following model-theoretic clause
˚ M |ù Σxϕ iff there is an expansion L of L 1 by a term t such that M |ù ϕrt{xs.
Σ
xϕ is true in a model, by definition, iff there is an expansion of L by a term t that
makes ϕrt{xs true that model. This definition does not assume that every entity can
be named, but
Σ
xϕ will be true only of an entity if it can be named. Given this
definition the following two proof rules are sound for the model-theoretic condition
˚
Γϕrw{xs ñ Σ
L
Σ
Γ,
Σ
ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ
Γ ñ Σϕ,Σ
where w does not occur in the conclusion in L
Σ
. The objection that the proof-
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theoretic account assumes that there are no unnamed entities (while the model-
theoretic account makes no such assumption) can now be restated as the point that
there are models in which the sentence “Dxx cannot be named” are true but “ Σxx
cannot be named” are false. That the objection so stated is false is established by
the following argument. The rules LD and RD are sound and complete for the model-
theoretic account of quantification. The rules L
Σ
and R
Σ
are at least sound for the
model-theoretic condition ˚. Let w not appear in a sentence ϕ of the language that
results from adding
Σ
to L . The following is a valid deduction in that language.
ϕrw{xs ñ ϕrw{xs
R
Σ
ϕrw{xs ñ Σxϕrw{xs
LD Dxϕñ Σxϕ
Since the rules L
Σ
and R
Σ
are at least sound for the rules presented above there
is no counter-example to the position Dxϕ ñ Σxϕ for any ϕ. Thus, there is no
model M that makes Dxϕ true and Σxϕ false. The objection so formulated cannot
be sustained.
Another way of putting the objection may be as a cardinality concern. Perhaps
there are more entities than there are expansions of a language. Let there be i-
many entities in the domain of a model M . The objection continues that there is
no way on the proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment to be committed
to all those entities. The objection, if it is aimed at the proof-theoretic account of
ontological commitment overshoots. The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem says that for
any theory T that has M as a model there is another model with ℵ0-many entities in
its domain. On the model-theoretic account of ontological commitment given above,
T is not committed to there being i-many entities. In fact, there is no sentence
188
of a recursively specifiable language that generates such a commitment. So long as
languages are thought to be recursively specifiable, this objection is not an objection
to the proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment.
A final way of stating the objection is specifically against the expanding substi-
tutional account of quantification. The expanding substitutional account of quan-
tification draws a tight connection between quantification and names. In certain
circumstances, in particular when no one object is specifiable, quantified sentences
do work that names could not. There are two responses to this objection in the
literature. Lance [26] argues that we can be entitled to DxFx even though we are not
entitled to name an object. We can introduce into our language names that do not
have definite denotations but whose meaning is given by the inferential connections
they have to other names and predicates. For instance the name w can be introduced
as a name of one of the o’s without it being specified which o it denotes. It can then
be used as the witness for the existential DxFx. The response denies the assumption
made in the objection that every name has a specifiable denotation.
Lavine [27] has proposed an alternative answer to the objection. He argues that
a language user’s inability to specify the expansion of their language does not mean
that there is no such expansion. The LD rule read properly says that if it is coherent
to assert Dxϕ then there is an expansion of the language by a witness w such that
it is coherent to assert ϕrw{xs. This response denies that if there is an expansion of
the language then there is a specifiable expansion of the language.
Because the aim of this chapter is to offer a proof-theoretic account of ontological
commitment the question of which of these is correct does not need to be settled
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here. It is enough for the purposes of this chapter that there are responses to the
objection so stated, even if the author is unable to specify which response is the right
one.
From Formal Language to Natural Language
Another concern for the account of ontological commitment proposed comes by way
of considering how sentences of a language like L are translated into sentences of
English. The sentence Dxpx walksq is commonly translated into English as ‘There
is a thing that walks’. Reasoning by analogy one may be tempted to translate
DF pF Aristotleq as ‘There is a thing that Aristotle is (or has)’. This sentence, how-
ever, talks about things which other things are or have. While it makes sense to,
in the same sentence name the walker as in, ‘There is a thing, Zoe, that walks’, the
sentence ‘There is a thing, person, that Aristotle is’ makes no sense. This suggests
that if the right translation of any existentially quantified sentence of the form Dεϕ
is ‘There is a thing such that ϕ’ then it only really makes sense for quantifiers to
bind variables in name position.
One response to this objection requires a translation to be provided for any
sentence of the form Dεϕ into English. The translation must not have the same
obvious ontological significance as the above translation of @F pF Aristotleq. This
has been attempted by Boolos [8] and others following him (see e.g. Hewitt [20])
who translate the sentence DFFa as ‘There are some things such that a is one of
them’. Others such as Prior [45], Sellars [67], and Rayo and Yablo [49] offer the
translation ‘a is somehow’.
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Another response to this objection is to attempt to show that no translation is
required. The formal language L is a language like any other. It can be learned in
the ways that other languages are learned —though perhaps not in all the ways other
languages are learned. This response would maintain that learning a language need
not be purely translational. One could learn under what circumstances assertions,
denials, etc. are appropriate even if one does not already have the resources to
translate the new language. An approach along these lines has recently been proposed
by Rossberg [58]. Rossberg cites the inability of the above solution to translate
relational quantifiers as in DXpXabq as a concern.
A middle way points out that there are devices for generalizing over predicates
in English. These devices are not clearly tied to ontology and so can help orient
someone bothered by quantifiers that merely generalize. For example, one can say
“Aristotle is doing something”12 if Aristotle is fixing his car or going for a walk.
These sorts of sentences can serve to point a person to the meaning of sentences
such as ‘DF pF Aristotleq’. Once one has a grip on those sentences, then the rules
for using other second-order sentences such as “DXpX Aristotle, Platoq” can convey
the meaning of those sentences
5.4.3 Atomic Ontology
The upshot of determining the ontological commitments of a position Γ ñ Σ in
the way discussed in section 5.3 is that they can be completely determined by an
examination of the atomic sentences appearing in OpΓ ñ Σq. The primary locus of
12This sentence is importantly distinct from the sentence “Aristotle is doing some thing”.
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ontological commitment is thus not a variable but an atomic sentence. This frees up
the apparatus of quantification from ontological significance. Quantification over a
syntactic category incurs commitments to there being entities denoted by expressions
of that syntactic category iff expressions of that syntactic category denote entities in
atomic sentences.
This feature of quantifiers explains why first-order quantifiers are often taken to
have the ontological significance they do. First-order quantifiers bind variables in
name-position and names are taken to be the paradigmatic case of expressions that
denote entities in atomic sentences. Given the assumption that names are denoting
expressions it is clear why first-order quantifiers incur ontological commitment.
This also brings to light an assumption that when questioned leads to further
avenues of research. It has been assumed throughout that the primary ontologically
interesting expressions are kind-terms. Perhaps there are other sorts of ontological
commitment that are of interest. If predicates denote entities then commitment to
a kind-term may incur not only commitment to entities of which that kind-term is
true but also to universals denoted by that kind-term.
These questions would be answered by offering a complete account of the onto-
logical commitments of atomic sentences. A theory of how atomic sentences come
to have contact with the world would, on the account of ontological commitment
presented above, complete the formal answer to the primary question of ontology.
If, as has been assumed, the only expressions in atomic sentences that denote are
names, the account presented above is complete. But whether this assumption is
justified remains to be shown.
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Appendix
Lemma 5.1. If ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ Σq, then Γ Ď ∆ and Σ Ď Λ.
Proof. Let Γ ñ Σ,∆1 ñ Λ1, . . . be an open branch in τpΓ ñ Σq. Since the root of
this branch is Γ ñ Σ, Γ Ď Γ YŤi ∆i and Σ Ď Σ YŤi Λi. Since that branch was
arbitrary this holds for every open branch in τpΓ ñ Σq and thus for every position
in OpΓ ñ Σq.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a theory. Γ is committed to there being entities of which
K is true iff for any model M if M ( Γ then M,σ ( Kvx{ξw for some σ P ΣM and
x that is free for K.
Proof. For the left to right direction let Γ be committed to there being entities of
which K is true. It follows that there is no model M such that M ( Γ and K is
empty in M . Let M be a model of Γ, i.e. M ( Γ. Since K is not empty in M there
is variable assignment σ and variable x such that x is free for K and M,σ ( Kvx{ξw.
For the right to left direction let it be that for any model M if M ( Γ then
M,σ ( Kvx{ξw for some σ P ΣM and X that is free for K. Suppose that Γ is not
committed to there being entities of which K is true. It follows that there is a model
M such M ( Γ and K is empty in M . Since K is empty in M there is no variable
assignment σ P ΣM and variable x that is free for K such that M,σ ( Kvx{ξw. But
by the assumption there is such a σ and variable.
Theorem 2. The proof-theoretic and model-theoretic accounts of quantification
agree, i.e. Γ ( Σ iff $ Γ ñ Σ.
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Proof. This is a familiar result for first-order classical logic. For a proof of this see
Ebbinghaus, Flum, and Thomas[15].
Theorem 3.For any sentence ϕ that does not contain elements of W , it holds
that $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ iff for every ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ Σq, ϕ P ∆.
Proof. For the left to right direction suppose that $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. Let ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ
Σq be such that ϕ P Λ and β be the open branch of τpΓ ñ Σq from which ∆ ñ Λ
is generated. By lemma 5.1 Γ Ď ∆ and ΣŤtϕu Ď Λ. Since ϕ P Λ there is an n
such that ∆1 ñ Λ1 in β and ϕ P Λ1. Let δ $ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. The following deduction
establishes that $ ∆1 ñ Λ1 and thus that β is not an open branch in τpΓ ñ Σq
contradicting the assumption that it was.
δ
...
Γ ñ ϕ,Λ
TL/ TR
∆1 ñ Λ1
For the right to left direction suppose that ϕ P ∆ for every ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ Σq
and for reductio that
(H) & Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Let ϕ be the nth sentence. Suppose that at stage n of the construction there is a
branch β P τpΓ ñ Σq with an open leaf ∆1 ñ Λ1 such that & ∆1 ñ ϕ,Λ1. At
this stage β is at least extended to β1 with open leaf ∆1 ñ ϕ,Λ1. But in this case
there is a branch β2 that passes through β1 when the construction of τpΓ ñ Σq is
completed such that the position ∆ ñ Λ is the maximal leaf of β2 and ϕ P Λ. Since
$ ∆1 ñ ϕ,Λ1 ϕ R ∆, contradicting the assumption. This establishes
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(B) There is no open leaf ∆1 ñ Λ1 at stage n such that & ∆1 ñ ϕ,Λ1.
Claim 2. There is no stage i such that there is an open leaf Π ñ Θ in the construc-
tion of τpΓ ñ Σq where & Π ñ ϕ,Θ but at i` 1 there is no open leaf Π1 ñ Θ1 such
that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1.
Suppose that claim 2 is true. It follows that for any stage i if there is an open
leaf Π ñ Θ at a stage i such that & Π ñ ϕ,Θ then there is an open leaf Π1 ñ Θ1at
i ` 1 such that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1. By (H) at stage 0, there is an open leaf Γ ñ Σ such
that & Γ ñ ϕ,Σ. This contradicts (B).
This leaves only the proof of claim 2. It is proved by reductio. Let i be a stage
such that there is an open leaf Π ñ Θ in the construction of τpΓ ñ Σq where
& Π ñ ϕ,Θ but at i ` 1 there is no open leaf Π1 ñ Θ1 such that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1. To
be specific let Π ñ Θ be the position under consideration at i.j.k. Either there is a
step i.j.k ` l with position Π1 ñ Θ1 such that $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1 or not.
Case 1 (There is a step i.j.k ` l with position Π1 ñ Θ1 such that $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1). In
this case Π1 ñ Θ1 is Π, ψrw{xs ñ Θ. It follows that Dxψj P Π, w does not appear
in Π
Ť
Θ, & Π, Dxψj ñ Θ. It was assumed that no witnesses occur in ϕ so w does
not appear in ϕ. By assumption $ Π, Dxψj, ψrw{xs ñ ϕ,Θ and & Π, Dxψj ñ ϕ,Θ.
However, LD read from bottom to top guarantees that if & Π, Dxψj ñ ϕ,Θ and w
does not occur in Π
Ť
Θ
Ťtϕu then & Π, Dxψj, ψrw{xs ñ ϕ,Θ contradicting the
assumption.
Case 2 (There is no step i.j.k ` l with position Π1 ñ Θ1 such that $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1).
Without loss of generality let there be no existential steps between i and i ` 1. If
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there are then there is a point at which case 1 applies. There are then three sub-cases
for how i is extended.
Case 1 (The branch with leaf Π ñ Θ is expanded according (b) in the construction
of τpΓ ñ Σq). In this case & Π, ψi ñ Θ and & Π ñ ψi,Θ. By assumption there are
no open leaves Π1 ñ Θ1 at this stage such that $ Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1, so there are deduction
δ and δ1 such that δ $ Π, ψi ñ ϕ,Θ and δ1 $ Π ñ ψi, ϕ,Θ. It was also assumed
that & Π ñ ϕ,Θ. The following deduction contradicts this assumption.
δ
...
Π, ψi ñ ϕ,Θ
δ1
...
Π ñ ψi, ϕ,Θ
Cut
Π ñ ϕ,Θ
Case 2 (The branch with leaf Π ñ Θ is expanded according to (c) in the construction
of τpΓ ñ Σq). In this case there is a δ such that δ $ Π, ψi ñ Θ but & Π ñ ψi,Θ.
By assumption there is no open leaf Π1 ñ Θ1 at this stage such that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1.
It follows that there is a δ1 such that δ1 $ Π ñ ψi, ϕ,Θ. The following deduction
contradicts the assumption that & Π ñ ϕ,Θ.
δ
...
Π, ψi ñ Θ
TR
Π, ψi ñ ϕ,Θ
δ1
...
Π ñ ψi, ϕ,Θ
Cut
Π ñ ϕ,Θ
Case 3 (The branch with leaf Π ñ Θ is expanded according to (d) in the construction
of τpΓ ñ Σq). In this case there is a δ such that δ $ Π ñ ψi,Θ but & Π, ψi ñ Θ.
By assumption there is no open leaf Π1 ñ Θ1 at this stage such that & Π1 ñ ϕ,Θ1.
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It follows that there is a δ1 such that δ1 $ Π, ψi ñ ϕñ Θ. The following deduction
contradicts the assumption that & Π ñ ϕ,Θ.
δ
...
Π ñ ψi,Θ
TR
Π ñ ψi, ϕ,Θ
δ1
...
Π, ψi ñ ϕ,Θ
Cut
Π ñ ϕ,Θ
Theorem 4. A set of sentences Γ has a model-theoretic ontological commitment
to K iff the position Γ ñ has a proof-theoretic commitment to K.
Proof. For the left to right direction suppose that Γ has a model-theoretic com-
mitment to K. By theorem 5.2.1 for any model M such that M ( Γ there is a
σ P ΣM and variable x that is free for K such that M,σ ( Kvx{ξw. It follows that
M ( DxKvx{ξw. Since this holds for any model M it follows that Γ ( DxKvx{ξw.
By theorem 5.3.1 $ Γ ñ DxKvx{ξw. It follows from theorem 5.3.2 that for any
∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ q, DxKvx{ξw P ∆. Let ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ q that is the maximal
leaf of a branch β. Since DxKvx{ξw P ∆ there is a node Π ñ Θ in β such that
DxKvx{ξw P Π was considered at stage n.j of the construction of τpΓ ñ q. Let
DxKvx{ξw be the kth sentence. At stage n.j.k a sentence the node directly above
Π ñ Θ is Π, Kvw{ξw for a witness w. By lemma 5.1 Kvw{ξw P ∆. Since ∆ ñ Λ was
selected arbitrarily it holds that for any ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ q there is a sentence of
the form Kvw{ξw P ∆. It follows that Γ ñ has a proof-theoretic commitment to
K.
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For the right to left direction suppose that Γ ñ has a proof-theoretic com-
mitment to K. It follows that for any ∆ ñ Λ P OpΓ ñ q there is a sentence of
the form Kvw{ξw P ∆. The sentence DxKvx{ξw is closed and contains no witnesses.
Since Kvw{ξw P ∆ DxKvx{ξw R Λ. If it were then ∆ ñ Λ would not be coherent.
Since ∆ ñ Λ is maximal DxKvx{ξw P ∆. By theorem 5.3.2 $ Γ ñ DxKvx{ξw. By
theorem 5.3.1 Γ ( DxKvx{ξw. Let M be a model of Γ. It follows that M ( DxKvx{ξw
and that there is a σ P ΣM such that M,σ |ù Kvx{ξw. So K is not empty in M .
Since M was arbitrary it holds that there are no models of Γ for which K is empty.
Γ has a model-theoretic commitment to K.
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Chapter 6
Theories of Meaning and Existence
Abstract. This paper motivates an account of first-order quantification that ad-
dresses concerns with non-denoting names. It begins with a traditional puzzle about
non-denoting terms and offers an explanation of how the proposed account of quan-
tification can be motivated and resolve the problem.
Keywords. Non-denoting terms, Free-logic, Ontological commitment
6.1 An Argument
The following argument has been put forth for consideration in various guises through-
out the history of philosophy. The conclusion of the argument is that every meaning-
ful genuine proper name must denote. Consider, for example, the sentence ‘Pegasus
does not exist’. This sentence is true. But if it is to be true, it must be true of some-
thing. The only candidate is Pegasus. But if the sentence is about Pegasus, then
Pegasus must in some sense be, otherwise there would be no way for a sentence to
be about Pegasus. So perhaps it is true that Pegasus does not exist, but nonetheless
Pegasus has some sort of being. Denying that Pegasus exists requires that there be
something that does not exist. But this can be generalized: for any singular term,
either what it denotes exists or not.
This argument is formally underwritten by classical logic. As is standard practice,
let the claim ‘Pegasus exists’ be formalized as ‘Dxpx “ pq’, where ‘p’ is another name
for Pegasus. The following deduction derives a contradiction from the claim that
Pegasus does not exist
 Dxpx “ pq
@xpx ‰ pq
p ‰ p p “ p
p “ p^ p ‰ p
Solutions to this puzzle have become part of the standard curriculum for students
of analytic philosophy. Famously Russell [60] offers a solution wherein he claims that
‘Pegasus’ is not a logically proper name, but a disguised definite description. On this
account to deny that Pegasus exists is to deny that there are any flying horses. But
that is no contradiction at all. Quine [47] takes this solution a step further proposing
that in an ideally regimented language there would be no logically proper names.
Plantinga [38] calls the argument of the first paragraph the Classical Argument.
The Classical Argument can be made explicit in the following way:
1. Pegasus does not exist.
2. For any true sentence if it features a name, then that name denotes.
3. Premise (1) is true and features the name ‘Pegasus’.
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C ‘Pegasus’ denotes.
The conclusion of the argument is that the singular term ‘Pegasus’ denotes. This
suggests that it is possible to name those entities that do not exist.
Philosophers such as Meinong and Parsons [37] suggest that this argument is
sound, and posit a difference between entities that exist and those that are. Call
such an account of being a Dense Ontology. The conclusion of this paper is that
such a distinction is under-motivated and can be avoided while maintaining most of
the intuitions that underwrite the classical argument. The conclusion of this paper
is that the Classical Argument does not underwrite a Dense Ontology.
The methodology of the paper is to apply a theory of meaning that has been
developed by Rumfitt [59] and Restall [50, 53], and apply it to the issue at hand. This
will result in an argument from the theory of meaning to a metaphysical conclusion,
and will provide a formalism to underwrite the conclusions drawn by Plantinga [38].
In the section 6.7 a model theory is shown to be sound and complete for the theory
of meaning that has been offered.
6.2 A Theory of Meaning
The theory of meaning endorsed in this paper is inferentialist in the following sense: it
is the use of a sentence that determines the meaning of that sentence. A declarative
sentence has two primary uses, it can he asserted or denied. The meaning of a
sentence is determined by the rules governing the coherent and incoherent assertion
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and denial of that sentence. 1 Following Restall [53], a position is an ordered pair of
assertions and denials. Positions can be either coherent or incoherent.
The incoherence in question is the sort of incoherence that is engendered by
someone who asserts and denies the same thing. If a person asserts ‘It is snowing’
and denies ‘It is snowing’ while refusing to retract either the assertion or the denial,
then one can reasonably conclude that either the person was not asserting and deny
the same sentence, but some homophones, or that they had done something rationally
wrong. There is no uniform way of understanding what position that person intends
to be adopting, assuming they intend to remain understandable. Throughout, this
is the sort of incoherence that is referred to.
The meanings of the sentences in a position determine whether or not that posi-
tion is incoherent. A formalization of the language thus makes explicit and precise
the rules governing the use of certain sentences. In particular, they make precise the
rules governing those sentences featuring the portion of the language for which the
theory of meaning is being given. It also allows for strict criteria of adequacy to be
stated and shown to hold of the theory. Without such constraints, the concern that
nothing has been clearly enough stated to be of value has greater pull, especially so
in the case of a theory of meaning.
1Coherence of assertion or denial is not a feature of the sentences themselves, but a feature of
the contexts in which they are asserted or denied. some sentences may be incoherent to assert in
any context, and that may underwrite the tendency to call such sentences incoherent. For instance,
there is a tendency to call the sentence ‘It is raining and not.’ incoherent. This cannot mean that
the sentence has no meaning; it is composed in a standard way from the meanings of ‘it is raining’,
‘and’, and ‘not’. Calling the sentence ‘It is raining and not’ incoherent amounts to claiming that
it is incoherent, in any context, to assert that sentence. Coherence is a feature of the context in
which a sentence is asserted or denied, not a feature of the sentence itself. The relevant notion of
context is a position.
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6.2.1 An Example Theory of Meaning
Let tp1, p2, . . .u be a denumerable set of atomic sentences. These are the set of
sentences whose meaning assumed to be given. The sequent calculus given in fig. 1.1
gives the rules determining the meanings of complex sentences using atomic sentences
as a base. The complete set of sentences of the language is given by the recursive
definition
• If ϕ P tp1, p2, . . .u, then ϕ is a sentence.
• If ϕ is a sentence then  ϕ is a sentence.
• If ϕ and ψ are sentences then pϕÑ ψq is a sentence.
• Nothing else is a sentence.
A sequent is a pair of sets of sentence. If Γ and Σ are sets of sentences, then
Γ ñ Σ is a sequent. The sequent Γ ñ Σ corresponds to the position that asserts
all of Γ and denies all of Σ. A calculus such as fig. 1.1, determines the set of
coherent and incoherent sequents. A derivation is a tree whose root is a sequent,
whose leaves are axioms, and is such that for each node in the tree, the node(s)
above are the premises of a rule of which the original node is the conclusion. If a
sequent is derivable, then the position to which it corresponds is incoherent. If a
sequent S is derivable, this is write, $ S. $ S, therefore, indicates that the position
corresponding to S is incoherent. At a minimum, if two sentences have the same
meaning, then the positions in which it is incoherent to assert or deny that sentence
must be the same. No commitment here is made that the converse must hold. It is,
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Figure 6.1: Propositional Logic
Structural Rules
Id pñ p
Γ ñ Σ
WL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ϕñ Σ
Cut
Γ ñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
WR
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
Operational Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ, ψ ñ Σ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
RÑ
Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
without further argument, plausible to hold that  pp^ qq and  p_ q do not have
the same meaning, though they are assertible or deniable in all the same positions.
The rules of a calculus thus have an intuitive reading in terms of coherence and
incoherence. The structural rules correspond to the the rules that govern assertion
and denial itself. Id corresponds to the fact, indicated above, that assertion and
denial are exclusive uses of sentences. It is incoherent to assert and deny the same
sentence. WL and WR correspond to the fact that if a position is incoherent, more
assertions and denial will not make it coherent. Contrapositively, if a position is
coherent, taking back assertions and denials will preserve its coherence. The rule
of Cut says that if it is incoherent to assert ϕ in a position, and it is incoherent
to deny ϕ in that position, then that position is itself incoherent. Reading Cut
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contrapositively, it amounts to the claim that if a position is coherent, then for any
sentence ϕ, it must be either coherent to assert ϕ or coherent to deny ϕ. For any
coherent position, there is a coherent way of expanding it to one such that for any
sentence of the language, it is either asserted or denied.
The operational rules of the language give the use of sentences that is particular
to the main connective of the sentence. The rules of negation establish that if it
is incoherent to assert a sentence in a position, then it is incoherent to deny the
negation of that sentence in that position; and if it is incoherent to deny a sentence
in a position then it is incoherent to assert the negation of that sentence in that
position. The meaning of ‘It is not raining’, is thus given by the rules saying that it is
incoherent to assert ‘It is not raining’ when it is incoherent to deny ‘It is raining’, and
vice-versa for denial and assertion. The LÑ rule says that if it is incoherent to assert
ψ in a position and incoherent to deny ϕ in that position, then it is incoherent to
assert ϕÑ ψ, in that position. This rule may be more illuminating when considered
contrapositively as the claim that if it is coherent to assert the sentence ϕÑ ψ in a
position then it must either be coherent to assert ψ in that position or coherent to
deny ϕ in that position. The RÑ rule claims that if it is coherent to deny ϕ Ñ ψ,
in a position, then it is coherent to assert ϕ and deny ψ in that position.
This formalization makes the following correlates of intuitive notions definable.
Definition 26 (Commitment). A position Γ ñ Σ is committed to a sentence ϕ iff
$ Γ ñ ϕ,Σ.
A position is committed to a sentence, when it is incoherent to deny that sentence,
in that position.
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Definition 27 (Good Inference). There is a good inference from a set of sentences
Γ to a sentence ϕ iff $ Γ ñ ϕ.
If adopting a set of sentences, Γ commits one to a sentence, ϕ, then there is a
good inference from Γ to ϕ. The validity of the Cut rule ensures that if it is coherent
to assert all of Γ, then whenever there is a good inference from Γ to ϕ then it is
coherent to assert ϕ.2
Definition 26 and definition 27 illustrate the link between the theory of meaning
for the logical connectives and logic as it is normally conceived as the theory of good
inference. Fixing in which positions a sentence is coherent to assert or deny, thus
fixes which inferences featuring the vocabulary in question are good.
In what follows the theory of meaning given by fig. 1.1 will be expanded to
include quantification. In order to account for this, the language must be expanded
to replace the set of atomic sentences above, with atomic sentences that make explicit
the names and predicates featuring in them. As above, the meaning of names and
predicates will be assumed to be given.3
6.2.2 Criteria for a Theory of Meaning
In what follows it will be important to have a concrete example to refer to. Let the
following rule be that example
Γ ñ ϕ˝ ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
2Let & Γ ñ, but $ Γ ñ ϕ. Cut guarantees that when & Γ ñ, either & Γ, ϕñ or & Γ ñ ϕ. So
& Γ, ϕñ.
3Even though the meaning of these expressions must be assumed to be given, something can still
be learned about what the contribution is of those expressions to sentences in which they feature.
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where ˝γ “ t˝Γ : γ P Γu. This rule gives the use of sentences featuring ˝. It generates
the conditions under which it is coherent or incoherent to assert or deny a sentence
featuring ˝. As with the rules above, it can be read in two ways. From top-to-
bottom it says that if the position Γ ñ ϕ is incoherent, then the position ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ
is incoherent. From bottom-to-top the rule says that if the position ˝Γ ñ ˝ϕ is
coherent, then the position Γ ñ ϕ is coherent.
Following Restall [53], the reading of the sequent rules from bottom-to-top sug-
gests a way of expanding coherent sequents into ideally coherent sequents. Given
a coherent sequent Γ ñ Σ, it is possible to apply one of the rules of which it is a
conclusion to get other coherent sequents, ∆1 ñ Λ1, . . . ,∆n ñ Λn. This process
can then be repeated until applying a rule would no longer yield a new coherent
sequent. The result is a set of coherent sequents that contain all the sub-sentences
of sentences in the original sequent. That set of coherent sequents can be thought
of as generating a set of models, and so the notions of truth-in-a-model, denotation,
etc. can be generated from the rules of the sequent calculus. This process is carried
out in a standard completeness proof where a model is built from an underivable
sequent. An example of this process can be found in section 6.7.
In this sense the truth-in-a-model conditions of a sentence in a position can be
derived from the rules of the calculus. A coherent position carries a set of coherent
expansions with it, that ideally considered give truth conditions for the sentences
contained in the position. This is an example of how it is possible to derive what are
generally considered to be representational aspects of language from their use. In the
above case, the notion of truth conditions is derived from the notion of a coherent
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position.
Since this account of language takes inference as explanatorily prior, the following
criteria for a meaning conferring rule can be introduced. These are necessary, though
not necessarily sufficient conditions for a set of rules to be meaning conferring. As
mentioned above, inferentialism is the claim that the use of a sentence determines the
meaning of that sentence. The rules of a sequent calculus correspond to those rules
of use. It is necessary, then, to guarantee that the rules have determined a single
meaning. If the rules that are given do not pin down a particular meaning, then
it is hard to see how they could be rightly considered to be meaning determining.
This corresponds to the requirement that Belnap [4] and Humberstone [21] calls
uniqueness. If the rules given do, in fact, pin down the meaning of a sentence, then
any connective introduced with those rules must be coherent and incoherent in all
the same sequents.
For example, let the connective ˝0 be governed by the rule4
Γ ñ ϕ˝0 ˝0Γ ñ ˝0ϕ
A language containing only ˝ and ˝0, cannot deduce the sequent ˝p ñ ˝0p. In
other words, it is coherent, in this language to assert ˝p and deny ˝0p. Though it is
incoherent to assert ˝p and deny ˝p. If a sentence is coherent to assert where another
is incoherent to assert then those two sentences cannot have the same meaning. So
in this language, ˝p and ˝0p have distinct meanings. But if the rules governing the
use of a connective must pin down a single meaning, then this example shows that
˝ is insufficient to do this. Of a language containing only ˝, one could ask whether
4As above, ˝0Γ “ t˝0γ : γ P Γu.
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the sentence ˝p in the original language corresponded to ˝p or ˝0p in the expanded
language. The rule ˝ does not determine uniquely a meaning for sentences of the
form ˝ϕ.
The above example leads to the following criterion for a sequent calculus to
provide an adequate account of meaning: For each n-ary connective d it must be
that the following two facts hold for any Γ, Σ, and d0 introduced by the same rules
as d
1. $ Γ,dpϕ1, . . . , ϕnq ñ Σ iff $ Γ,d0pϕ1, . . . , ϕnq ñ Σ.
2. $ Γ ñ dpϕ1, . . . , ϕnq,Σ iff $ Γ ñ d0pϕ1, . . . , ϕnq,Σ.
Call this requirement, following Humberstone [21], the Uniqueness Criterion.
The second criterion arises from considerations about the broad category of lan-
guage that is being theorized about. Because conditionals and negations seem to
be expressions that span various sub-species of a language, the next consideration
will be in force. Before philosophical speculation, it appears as though biologists
and bankers can communicate about issues not concerning their specialty with an
adequate understanding of one another. Particularly, it appears as though they both
fully grasp the meaning of conjunction. It is at least counter-intuitive to say that
what the biologist means by ‘I’m hungry and I’m tired’ is no different from what the
banker means by that same sentence. While there are portions of their dialect that
diverge, there is a large swath of overlap between them. The theory of meaning that
gives an account of such broadly linguistic notions as conjunction, conditional, nega-
tion, and quantification, should therefore do honor to this feature of our linguistic
experience.
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Suppose then that there were two such languages as the one spoken by the biolo-
gist, L1, and the banker, L2. Let L be the language that those two have in common.
L contains a conjunction, for convenience it will be written as ‘^’. Suppose that
p and q are sentences completely in the language L, and that if no-one had every
spoken L1 or L2, the position p ^ q ñ would be coherent, i.e. it is coherent in L,
L & p ^ q ñ 5 Once L is expanded into L1 and L2, however, it turns out that
L1 & p ^ q ñ and L2 $ p ^ q ñ. This means that p ^ q cannot have the same
meaning in L1 and L2. But as remarked above, it does not seem like knowledge of
biology or knowledge of banking should change the meaning of a conjunction having
to do with neither of those subjects.6
To put this matter more formally, let L1 be an expansion of a language L by the
addition of some new vocabulary. Let Γ and Σ be sets of sentences completely in the
language L. The following must hold:
• L $ Γ ñ Σ iff L1 $ Γ ñ Σ.
In the current setting this fact is guaranteed by the admissibility of the Cut rule.
Definition 28 (Admissible Rule). A rule R is admissible for a calculus, when for
any derivation, δ, of Γ ñ Σ, in that calculus using R, there is a derivation δ1, of
Γ ñ Σ that does not make use of R.
In the current setting the admissibility of the Cut rule guarantees that if there is
a deduction of a sequent Γ ñ Σ, then there is a deduction wherein only sentences
5The language in which a position is coherent or not will be prefixed to $. For example.
L˚ $ Γ ñ Σ says that Γ ñ Σ is incoherent in L˚.
6This requirement cannot hold for all language, it is plausible that there are some inferential
relations among atomic sentences for which this will fail. The concern here, however, is with
non-atomic language that appears to have a uniform meaning across a wide variety of discourse.
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appearing in ΓYΣ or their sub-sentences appear. If that is the case, then no sentence
not in the language of ΓY Σ can effect whether or not Γ ñ Σ is derivable.
6.3 Adding Names
In the case of propositional logic, a sequent calculus provides an account of the
contribution that a connective, say ^ makes to the sentences in which it occurs.
This generates an account of the meaning of ^, and sentences such as ϕ ^ ψ, given
the meanings of ϕ and ψ.
Below several sequent calculi are presented that offer an account of the contri-
bution that names make to atomic sentences in which they occur, and ultimately to
quantified sentences. Just as there are two uses of atomic sentences, and sentences
generally, there are two uses of names. Names can be accepted or rejected.7
Suppose it turns out that there was no individual answering to the name Homer.
Under this supposition, the historical blind poet does not exist and never existed.
The proper name ‘Homer’ would have no denotation. In the following dialog, speaker
B rejects the name ‘Homer’.
A: I was reading the Illiad a couple of days ago and decided to read up on its
author, Homer.
B: No, no. As it turns out, there was no Homer.
7In ‘On What There Is’ Quine comes close to the terminology used here. For instance he says,
“. . . what people are talking about when they deny Pegasus”. If one reads that article as though
Quine is looking for a way to deny Pegasus then the view expressed here responds to Quine by
taking it as primitive that Pegasus can be denied.
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There are two things worth noting about this dialog. The first is that B could have
accomplished the same thing by simply saying ‘No, no’. The second is that B’s
utterance of ‘No, no.’ is not denying any sentence uttered by A.
If B had only said ‘No, no.’, they could have made the same move that they did
in the first dialog. The fact that they go on to elaborate their position by uttering
‘As it turns out, there was no person Homer’, does not alter the force of what is B
intended to say by means of ‘No, no’. There may be other ways for a person in B’s
position to go on after an utterance of ‘No, no.’ One could go on to say ‘The life of
Homer is really boring’ or ‘You don’t have time to waste on Homer’. It suffices for
the purposes at hand that ‘No, no’ can be used to express the attitude that ‘Homer’
does not denote.
That B is objecting to this presupposition is made clear by noting that there is no
sentence uttered by A, to which B objects. It is coherent for B to accept everything
that A has said. A can have read the Illiad, and have decided to read up on Homer.
B can, accept both those claims and still coherently say ‘No, no.’ Without predicates
such as ‘exist’ or quantification, there is no sentence that be could assert that would
convey what was conveyed by their use of ‘No, no’, though without such vocabulary,
B could still object to A’s endeavor on the grounds that they had rejected ‘Homer’.
The force of B’s ‘No, no’ was to reject the name ‘Homer’.
Similarly, the following dialog is an instance of B accepting a name. As above,
B is not accepting any sentence uttered by A, but is accepting the name ‘Alex’.
A: I was talking to Alex yesterday.
B: Alex? Oh, yeah, Alex.
212
In this dialog B considers whether to accept the name ‘Alex’, then goes on to do so.
Again, it would be coherent for B to go on to reject what A said. B could know
that Alex was in another country yesterday whereas A was not. In such a case, B
would be rejecting A’s claim, while still accepting the name ‘Alex’. In such a case, it
would be wrong for A to criticize B for saying ‘Oh, yeah, Alex’. B’s saying that had
nothing to do with their accepting or rejecting whether or not A did in fact meet
Alex yesterday.8
The theory of meaning to be proposed must account for this aspect of the use
of names. This, however, requires that the notion of a position be expanded to
include accepted and rejected names. A name-position, then, is an ordered quadruple
consisting of two sets of names and two sets of sentences. If A and B are sets of
names, and Γ and Σ are sets of sentences, then the name-sequent A : Γ ñ Σ : B,
corresponds to the position that accepts all of A, asserts all of Γ, denies all of Σ, and
rejects all of B.
It is worth mentioning that a theory of language whereby names can be accepted
or rejected rejects something that some have taken to be a central feature of a
language: that the smallest unit of linguistic responsibility is a sentence. If names
can be accepted and rejected then one can be responsible for the names that one
accepts and rejects. On this view the smallest unit of responsibility is a name. This
does not imply that all linguistic responsibility can be reduced to the responsibility
that is incurred by the acceptance or the rejection of a name. Responsibility for
8While in Reference and Generality, Geach [17] suggests that there are uses of names independent
of predication [Ch 2. ¶20], the uses he suggests appear to be different from the uses suggested in
the previous two paragraphs.
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assertions and denials, which is of a different sort altogether is still required to have
a full blown linguistic practice. One could not reduce sentential responsibility to the
acceptance and rejection of names.
As mentioned above, sequent calculi can be used to give the coherent and incoher-
ent name-positions of a language. If a the name-sequent A : Γ ñ Σ : B is derivable
in a calculus, then the position corresponding to that sequent is incoherent. fig. 6.2
gives a sequent calculus for name-sequents from which the exploration of a theory of
meaning can begin.
6.4 Formal Theory
Before presenting the formal theory itself, the language considered must be expanded.
Let the language include a denumerably infinite set of names, N “ tc1, c2, . . .u, and
for each n let Predn “ tF n1 , F n2 , . . .u be a denumerably infinite set of n-ary relations.
Let the set of predicates of the language, Pred “ Yn P NPredn, be the union of all
sets of n-ary predicates. Finally, let V ar “ tx1, x2, . . .u be a denumerably infinite
set of variables. Given a sentence, ϕ, let ϕrxj{cis be the result of replacing some
occurrences of ci in ϕ, by xj. The set of sentences is given by the following recursive
definition
• If c1, . . . , cn are n-many names and F nm is an n-ary predicate, then Fci1 , . . . , cin
is a sentence.9
• If ϕ is a sentence, then so is  ϕ.
9Following standard usage, the sentence formed at this stage are referred to as atomic sentences.
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• If ϕ and ψ are sentences, then so is pϕÑ ψq.
• If ϕ is a sentence, then so is Dxϕrx{cs.
• Nothing else is a sentence.
A quick terminological aside: Let Dxϕ be called an existential sentence. If Dxϕ
has n-many occurrences of x bound by the outermost existential quantifier, then any
sentence ϕrt{xs, where r replaces each of the n-many occurrences of x, is called an
instance of Dxϕ.
There are two crucial points to note about the first-pass at a theory in fig. 6.2.
The first is that as opposed to having a single axiom, it has two. The first axiom,
Id(s) amounts, as above, to the claim that it is incoherent to assert and deny the
same sentence. Id(t) enforces that acceptance and rejection, like assertion and denial,
are exclusive uses of a sentence. It is incoherent to accept and reject the same name.
The other two structural rules governing names mimic those concerning sentences
discussed above. If it were coherent to be in a name-position that accepted (rejected)
a name, it would be coherent to be in a position that took no stance on that name.
Similarly, the rule Cut(t) gives that it if is incoherent to accept a name in a position
and to reject a name in a position, then that position is incoherent. For the purposes
of this paper, the Cut(t) rule is trivially admissible.10 For this reason is will be of
little concern here.
The second important point is that the quantifiers of this language differ from
10The Cut(t) plays a crucial role in language if sub-nominal connectives are considered, such as
the conjunction in ‘Jack and Jill surrounded the building’. Whether or not it is admissible in such
a language is a more complex matter.
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the classical account of quantification. This requires, if not justification, explanation.
The RD rule requires that if it is coherent to deny Dxϕ, then for any term t, either it is
coherent to deny ϕrt{xs or it is coherent to reject t. If a person denies that something
Figure 6.2: Positive Logic
Structural Rules
Id(s) : ϕñ ϕ :
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWL(s)
A : Γ, ϕñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWL(t)
A, c : Γ ñ Σ : B
Id(t) c : ñ : c
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWR(s)
A : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWR(t)
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, c
A : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : B A : Γ, ϕñ Σ : B
Cut(s)
A : Γ ñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, c A, c : Γ ñ Σ : B
Cut(t)
A : Γ ñ Σ : B
Operational Rules
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ψ ñ Σ
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ
A, c : Γ, ϕpcq ñ Σ : B
1LD
A : Γ, Dxϕpxq ñ Σ : B
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
RÑ
Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, c A : Γ ñ ϕpcq,Σ : B
RD
A : Γ ñ Dxϕpxq,Σ : B
1c cannot occur in the conclusion.
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is ϕ then they must be prepared for any term t to either reject t or deny that t is ϕ.
Conversely, if one were to assert that something is ϕ then one must hold that there
is an expansion of the language by a term w such that it is coherent to accept w
and assert that w is ϕ. This account of quantification takes into consideration which
terms are taken to denote and which are taken to fail to denote.
The alternative account of quantification does not take the acceptance and rejec-
tion of terms into consideration. The standard rules for quantification are
A : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : B
L
Σ
A : Γ,
Σ
xϕñ Σ : B A : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : B
R
Σ
A : Γ ñ Σxϕ,Σ : B
where t does not occur in the conclusion of L
Σ
. Call the quantifiers characterized
by these rules Meinongian, and the quantifiers characterized by the rules of fig. 6.2
Ontic. On the Meinongian account of quantification, denying an existential sentence
requires that for any name, one be prepared to deny the corresponding instance of the
existential sentence. The disagreement between these two theories will not be settled
by any of the considerations for a theory of meaning mentioned above. But would
have to be settled by other criteria. Both the Ontic and the Meinongian accounts of
quantification meet the criterion specified for a set of rules to be meaning conferring.
One such criterion is that the Ontic account of quantification invalidates the
argument given at the beginning of this paper. If it is true that Pegasus does not
exist, it does not follow, according to the former account, that something does not
exist. Similarly, if nothing is identical to Pegasus, it does not follow that Pegasus
is not self-identical. The Meinongian account of quantification must admit that
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Pegasus exists, or that something is identical to Pegasus. This is made clear by the
following two derivations
: ñ : p Ref“ : ñ p “ p :
LD
: ñ Dxpx “ pq :
: ñ p “ p :
L
Σ
: ñ Σxpx “ pq :
The Ontic derivation fails, so long as one is prepared to reject the name ‘Pegasus’.
However, the Meinongian derivation establishes that it is incoherent to deny that
something is Pegasus.
While this is merely grinding intuitions together, it is worth noting what is at
stake. If there were a meaning theoretic criterion to adjudicate the situation, then
what appears to be a metaphysical question could be settled by examining language.
The theory presented in fig. 6.2 corresponds to a positive free logic (see Lambert
[25], or Lehmann [28]). A positive free logic is one which allows for atomic sentences
featuring non-denoting names to be true. What it amounts to in this setting is that
it is coherent to assert or deny an atomic sentence featuring a name that is either
accepted or rejected. No such combination is itself incoherent. To the extent that
there is an intuition that it is coherent to assert ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’, while
rejecting ‘Pegasus’, this logic will capture that intuition.
6.5 Fully Positive, Negative, and Non-Denoting
Terms
The above discussion concerns quantification. On the ontic account of quantification,
it is coherent to assert that nothing is Pegasus, so long as one is prepared to reject
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the name ‘Pegasus’. Another issue concerns the relation between atomic sentences
and the acceptance or rejection of names that feature in those sentences. The rest
of the paper assumes as given the logic of fig. 6.2. The remaining concerns are what
further rules should be added to such a system. In particular, they are concerns
about the rules relating the acceptance and rejection of terms and the assertion and
denial of sentences.
The argument given above relied on the principle that in order for a sentence
to be true, it must be true of something. Call this the Existence Principle. The
Existence Principle, however, should not be accepted in full generality. Suppose that
for any sentence, ϕpcq, if it were coherent to assert ϕpcq, then it would be coherent
to accept c. The rule corresponding to this would be
A, c : Γ ñ Σ : B
EP
A : Γ, ϕpcq ñ Σ : B
This rule allows for the derivation that for any name, t, it is incoherent to reject t
Id(t)
t : ñ : t
EP
: Ftñ : t
Id(t)
t : ñ : t
:  Ftñ : t
Id(s)
: Ftñ Ft :
R 
: ñ Ft, Ft :
WR(t)
: ñ Ft, Ft : t
Cut(s)
: ñ Ft : tCut(s)
: ñ : t
There are several points to be made against this strategy. The first is that the above
deduction leads to what appears to be a false conclusion: that it is incoherent to
reject any term. The second point is that this rule will enforce Meinongian quantifiers
throughout. If it is incoherent to reject a term, then for any existential sentence,
denying it will require denying any instance of the sentence. Finally the above
derivation shows that this logic will not meet the criterion of cut admissibility. There
is no cut-free derivation of : ñ : t.
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While EP cannot underwrite a theory of meaning, there are plausible restrictions
of this principle that can. As Plantinga [38] points out, restricting EP to atomic sen-
tences appears to provide an intuitive account when non-denoting terms are involved.
The restriction of EP to atomic sentences is
A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B
AL
A : Γ, Rt1, . . . , t, . . . tn ñ Σ
in what follows Rt1, . . . , t, . . . , tn is written as Rptq for convenience. Read from
bottom-to-top AL is the claim that if it is coherent to assert an atomic sentence
featuring t, then it is coherent to accept t.
AL suggests three other rules concerning the use of atomic sentences featuring
accepted or rejected names
A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B
AR
A : Γ ñ Rptq,Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t
RL
A : Γ, Rptq ñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t
RR
A : Γ ñ Rptq,Σ : B
Read from top-to-bottom, RR is the claim that if it is incoherent to reject a term
then it is incoherent to assert an atomic sentence in which it features. There appears
to be a simple counter-example to this. It is incoherent, in the position this paper
adopts to reject the term ‘RR’, since it is the name of a rule. But it is not incoherent
to assert ‘RR is a rule’, since it is. Similar considerations suggest that RL is not a
valid rule.
AL and AR do not have such unintuitive features. According to the top-to-
bottom reading of AL, it claims that if it is incoherent to accept a name, then it
is incoherent to deny any atomic sentence featuring that name. Contrapositively, it
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claims that if it is coherent to deny an atomic sentence featuring a term, t, then it
is coherent to accept that term. If EP is restricted to in the way suggested above, it
corresponds to AL, which enforces that if it is coherent to assert an atomic sentence
featuring a term, t, then it is coherent to accept t.
This leaves four possible combinations of principles to cover the interaction be-
tween accepted names and atomic sentences
1. H
2. AL alone
3. AR alone
4. AL and AR
Following Lehmann [28] call the logic corresponding to (1) through (4), Positive Free
Logic, Negative Free Logic, Fully Positive Free Logic, and Classical* Logic.
If the intuitions behind the classical argument are to be trusted, then both (1)
and (3) can be ruled out as they deny the restricted form of EP, AL. This leaves
Negative Free Logic and Classical* Logic.
If one held, as philosophers such as Frege [16] and Geach [18] did, that sentences
featuring non-denoting names had no truth-value, then option (4) would appear best.
When considered model-theoretically, it will follow on this logic that any sentence
which features a non-denoting name is neither true nor false. Furthermore, there
is a plausible argument in favor of such a view if one adopts the claim that sense
determines reference.
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Suppose that the term t is rejected, and so has no denotation though it does have
a meaning. Let Rptq be a sentence in which t features. The referent of that sentence,
either the True or the False will be determined compositionally from the referents of
Rpq and t. But, as hypothesized t does not denote anything, so Rptq cannot have a
referent.
While this argument appears to be sound, it cannot be. The logic given by fig. 6.2,
AL, and AR, is not cut-admissible. Thus it cannot underwrite a theory of meaning.
This leaves only Negative Free Logic as offering a theory of meaning. If the Classical
Argument makes a mistake, it is in taking the Meinongian rule of quantification either
to be valid or to express existence. This motivated the theory of quantification given
in fig. 6.2. Adding EP, the second premise of the Classical Argument, to fig. 6.2,
was not cut admissible, and so a restricted version AL, was adopted. Finally, since
adding AR to this, as is suggested by Frege and Geach resulted in the failure of cut
admissibility, Negative Free Logic was settled as the logic which confers meaning.11
Before addressing the philosophical upshots of this, as well as offering a refinement
on the notion of an atomic sentence, an explanation of the failure of Frege’s argument
is required.
The picture of the relationship between truth and falsity must thus be different
than the one offered by Frege. The analogy that Frege suggests is of sentences
referring to either the True or the False, but a more accurate analogy makes clear
the distinction between the True and the False. An atomic sentence is true when the
11An account equivalent to the logic thus proposed as meaning conferring is given by Gratzl [19],
and shown there to be cut eliminable. However, since the rules given there differ from those proposed
here, a cut-admissibility result for the proposed system is required and offered in section 6.7.
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object denoted by the name is as the predicate says it is. It is false if that is not the
case. Frege’s mistake was to suppose that there was only one way for it not to be
the case that a sentence is true: when the object denoted by a name in an atomic
sentence is not as the predicate says it is. The picture presented by the logic above
holds that it is possible for an atomic sentence to be false also when there is no object
denoted by the name. Falsity is thus not a polar opposite of truth. A sentence is false
when it fails in some way. A better analogy is that of an arrow. The sentence aims
at truth, if it fails to hit its target, then it is false. There are two ways an assertion
of an atomic sentence can fail to be correct: either (1) it misapplies a predicate to a
name, i.e. attempts to say of some existing thing that it has a property that it fails
to have or (2) it applies a predicate to a name that does not denote. The second
way for an atomic sentence to be false is not a sub-category of the first. The first
way for an atomic sentence to be false requires that the name to which a predicate
is being applied denotes.
It is surprising that Geach [18] holds a similar view of truth and falsity. He
characterizes sentences as roads leading to a city. The true ones are those that will
lead to the city, the false ones are those that lead away, though not to any particular
place. The false sentence are those that are in some way defective. While the account
of truth and falsity presented here follows those lines, Geach [17] maintained that
sentences with non-denoting terms were neither true nor false.
The logic that has been argued for in this paper is given by fig. 6.3. Several
expressions have been added to the logic. The first of note is the identity relation.
Its addition does not disrupt the cut-admissibility result, and its use in much of the
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paper prompts its addition.
The second addition is λ-expressions. The purpose of this is to make more plau-
sible the restriction of EP. Once λ-expressions are added to the language the notion
of an atomic sentence can be expanded. So that sentences such as λx. Dy y “
xrPegasuss can be added to the language. This sentence says of Pegasus that it has
the property of being identical to nothing. It is incoherent to assert this sentence
given the rules of fig. 6.3
R= : ñ p “ p :
WL(t) p : ñ p “ p : Id(t) p : ñ : p
LD
p : ñ Dypy “ pq
L 
p :  Dypy “ pq ñ :
Lλ
p : λxpDyy “ xqpñ :
AL
: λxpDyy “ xqp, λxpDyy “ xqpñ :
: λxpDyy “ xqpñ :
λ-expressions can therefore be used to approximate the sentiments of EP.
In order to add λ-expressions to the language, the set of sentences must be rede-
fined. Let N , Pred and V ar be as above. For any sentence, ϕ in the set of sentences
let λxpϕrx{tsq be in Pred. Thus, as the set of predicates expands, so does the set of
atomic sentences, and so the set of sentences.
λ-expressions are used to form complex predicates. Consider the case of  . Say
that  features sententially in a sentence ϕ, when it does not occur within the
scope of any λ-expression, and predicatively otherwise. Asserting a sentence  ψ, is
thus the same as denying ψ, and denying  ψ is thus the same as asserting ψ. But
this is not the case when  occurs predicatively. The sentence λxp ϕqa does not
have this behavior. Asserting it is not only asserting  ϕra{xs, but also accepting a.
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Similarly, denying it is not the same as denying  ϕra{xs, but may also have the force
of rejecting a. For instance, suppose C takes it to be the case that ‘Pegasus’ does not
exist. They can coherently deny that it is true of Pegasus that it is winged and that it
is true of Pegasus that it is not winged, i.e. the position ñ λxp Wxqp, λxpWxqp
is coherent. C can do this only in circumstances where it is incoherent to accept
Pegasus. C’s position implicitly rejects Pegasus.
6.6 Conclusions
The Classical Argument of section 6.1 has the false statement that the term ‘Pegasus’
denotes as its conclusion. The problem with the Classical Argument is an ambiguity
in its use of the word ‘features’. If ‘features’ means ‘appears in’ then premise 2. is
false. There are true sentences, e.g. ‘It is not the case that Pegasus is winged’, in
which non-denoting names appear. If, on the other hand, ‘features’ means something
like ‘occurs as the logical subject’ then premise 3. is false. In order for premise 1.
(that Pegasus does not exist) to be true, ‘Pegasus’ cannot occur as its logical subject.
This is established by the fact that it is incoherent to assert the predication of non-
existence to any singular term. On either interpretation of ‘features’ the Classical
Argument has a false premise.
It has been assumed that there are logically proper names, such as ‘Pegasus’
that do not denote. This assumption, however, does not rule out a classical account
of quantification on the meaning theoretic grounds given in section 6.2. There is
nothing about Meinongian quantifiers that rules them out on meaning theoretic
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grounds. This suggests that the disagreement between philosophers who hold that a
thing can be without existing and those that hold that being is existence is not over
the legitimacy of an Ontic or Meinongian quantifier. A language that includes both
Ontic and Meinongian quantifiers meets the meaning theoretic constraints discussed
above. It is also sound and complete for exactly the same set of models for which
the logic of fig. 6.3 is sound and complete.
Elsewhere (see Chapter 5 of this dissertation [36]) it is argued that not all quan-
tification is ontologically significant. If that view is right then there is nothing that
prevents a philosopher who identifies being and existence from adopting both Ontic
and Meinongian quantifiers. The dispute between such a philosopher and one en-
dorsing a Dense Ontology is not revealed by what sentences are asserted or denied
but by what terms that position is committed to accepting or rejecting.
6.7 Cut Admissibility for Negative Free Logic
To prove that Cut(s) and Cut(t) are admissible, a model theory will be given and
shown to be sound for negative free logic, and complete for the cut-free fragment of
that system. It follows that for any deduction of a name-sequent, A : Γ ñ Σ : B,
there is a cut-free deduction of that name-sequent.
6.7.1 Models
The set of models given here is a variation on the theme of those proposed by Geach
[17] and Lavine [27]. Instead of making use of functions between variables and
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the domain of quantification, it makes use of expansions of the language to handle
quantification.
The syntax is as above, with the exception that a witness set, tw1, w2, . . .u, is
added to account for quantifiers.
A model, M , is a pair, xDM , IMy, of a set of objects, partitioned into De and Dn,
and an interpretation function defined by:
• For any term, t, IMptq P D.
• For any n-ary atomic predicate, F , IMpF q Ď De.
• For any complex predicate λxpψq, IMpλxpψq “ ty : y P De^ for any term t such that IMptq “
y, IMpψrt{xsq “ 1u
• If ϕ is an atomic sentence Ft1, . . . , tn, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptnqy P
IMpF q.
• If ϕ is tj “ tk, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff IMptjq is IMptkq.
• If ϕ is  ψ, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff IMpψq “ 0.
• If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff IMpψq “ 0 or IMpθq “ 1.
• If ϕ is Dxψ, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff there is an expansion of M , M 1, by a witness,
w, such that IM 1pψrw{xsq “ 1.
Definition 29 (Expansion). M 1 is an expansion of M by an element of the witness
set, w, when IMpwq is undefined, but IM 1pwq P De, and IM “ IM 1 everywhere else.
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Definition 30 (Counter-example). A model, M , is a counter-example to a name-
sequent, A : Γ ñ Σ, iff
1. for any term, t P A, IMptq P De;
2. for any sentence, γ P Γ, IMpγq “ 1;
3. for any sentence, σ P Σ, IMpσq “ 0;
4. and for any term, t P B, IMptq P Dn.
If there is no counter-example to a name-sequent, A : Γ ñ Σ : B, this is written
as ( A : Γ ñ Σ : B.
6.7.2 Soundness
Definition 31 (Rank). The rank of a sentence, rkpϕq, is defined inductively by
• If ϕ is atomic, then rkpϕq “ 0.
• If ϕ is λxpψqt, then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` 1.
• If ϕ is  ψ, then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` 1.
• If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ, then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` rkpθq ` 1.
• If ϕ is Dxψ, then rkpϕq “ rkpψq ` 1.
Lemma 6.1. Let M be a model with an extension M 1 making ϕrw{xs true or false,
where w is a witness. Let T “ AYB, be a finite set of terms, and S “ ΓY Σ finite
sets of sentences. There is a model, N , such that INpϕrt{xsq “ IM 1pϕrw{xsq and
INptq P De iff IM 1pwq P De, for a term t not appearing in T or S.
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Proof. This is proved by induction on the rank of ϕ.
Case 1 (rkpϕq “ 0). Let ϕ be Ft1, . . . , w, . . . , tn. We have that IM 1pϕq “ 1. So
xIM 1pt1q, . . . , IM 1pwq, IM 1ptnqy P IMpF q. It follows that IM 1pwq P De. Let t be a term
not occurring in T or in S. Such a term exists because the terms of the language is
infinite while the sets T and S are only finite. N can be defined DN “ DM , IMpt1q “
INpt1q for any term that is not t, and INptq “ IM 1pwq. That INpFt1, . . . , t, . . . , tnq “ 1,
is given by the fact that M , M 1, and N agree everywhere but possibly at t. But
INptq “ IM 1ptq. The proof is similar where IM 1 makes ϕ false.
Case 2 (ϕ is λzpψqc). Let IM 1pϕrw{xsq “ 1. So IM 1pcq P ty : y P De^ for any term n such that IM 1pnq “
y, IM 1pψrn{zsrw{xsq “ 1u. So IM 1ptq P De, and IM 1pψrt{zsq “ 1. By IH there is a
model, N such that INpψrt{zsq and INptq P De. It follows that INpϕrt{xsq “ 1.
Let IM 1pϕrw{xsq “ 0. So IM 1pcq R ty : y P De^ for any term n such that IM 1pnq “
y, IM 1pψrn{zsrw{xsq “ 1u. This leaves two cases. Either IMpcq R De or IMpϕrw{xsrc{zsq “
0. In the first case, either IM 1pψrw{xsrc{zs “ 1 or IM 1pψrw{xsrc{zs “ 0. Either way,
by IH there is an extension, N , such that INptq R D, so INpϕrt{xsq “ 0. In the
second case, there is a model N , and term t, such that INpψrt{xsrc{zsq “ 0, so
IMpϕrt{xsq “ 0.
Case 3 (ϕ is  ψ). Let IM 1pϕrw{xsq “ 1. So IM 1pψrw{xsq “ 0. By IH, there is a
model, N , and term, t, such that INpψrt{xsq “ 0. So INpϕrt{xsq “ 1. The case
where IM 1pϕq “ 0 is similar.
Case 4 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). Let IM 1ppψ Ñ θqrw{xsq “ 1. Either IM 1pψrw{xsq “ 0 or
IM 1pθrw{xsq “ 1. In the first case by IH there is a model, N , such that INpψrt{xsq “
0, so INppψ Ñ θqrt{xsq “ 1. In the second there is a model, N , such that INpθrt{xsq “
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0, so INppψ Ñ θqrt{xsq “ 1. The case where IM 1ppψ Ñ θqrw{xs “ 0 is similar.
Case 5 (ϕ is Dyψ). There are two sub-cases:
Case 4. (IM 1pDyψrw{xsq “ 1). In this case there is an extension M2 agreeing ev-
erywhere with M 1, with the exception that IM 1pw1q is undefined but IM2pw1q P De
and IMpψrw{xsrw1{ysq “ 1. By IH, there is a model, N that agrees everywhere
with M and M 1 except for w. But is such that INptq “ I 1Mpwq. Furthermore,
INpψrt{xsrw1{ysq “ 1. But then N is an extension of a model, N 1 by w1. So
I 1NpDyψrt{xsq “ 1.
Case 5. (IM 1pDyψrw{xsq “ 0). In this case there is no extension, M2, of M 1 such
that IM2pψrw{xsrw1{ysq “ 1. Suppose that N 1 is an extension of N , where N agrees
everywhere with M except on w, where INptq “ IM 1pwq. Let N 1 be an extension of
N by w1. By IH, IN 1pψrw{xsrw1{ysq “ 0. But this was general so INpDyψrt{xsq “ 0.
Lemma 6.2. If N and M are models or extensions of models agreeing on their
domain, and the interpretation of any expressions appearing in the name-sequent
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, then for any sentence, ϕ P Γ Y Σ, IMpϕq “ INpϕq and for any term
t in AYB or appearing in ΓY Σ, INptq “ IMptq.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is standard. The only worrying cases are if ϕ has a
λ-expression as its main operator or if ϕ is existential. First let ϕ be λxpψqa.
Case 1 (IMpϕq “ 1). In this case IMpaq P ty : y P De^ for any term n such that IMpnq “
y, IMpψrn{xsq “ 1u. So IMpaq P De, and IMpψra{xsq “ 1. By IH both INpψra{xsq
and INpaq P De. But then INpλxpψqaq “ 1.
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Case 2 (IMpϕq “ 0). In this case IMpaq R ty : y P De^ for any term n such that IMpnq “
y, IMpψrn{xsq “ 1u. Either IMpaq R De or IMpψra{xsq “ 0. In the first case, by IH,
INpaq R De. It follows that INpλxpψqaq “ 0. In the second case INpψra{xsq “ 0, so
INpϕq “ 0.
Let ϕ be Dxψ. There are two cases:
Case 1 (IMpϕq “ 1). In this case there is an extension M 1 of M by w such that
I 1Mpψrw{xsq “ 1. Let N 1 be the extension of N such that IN 1pwq “ IM 1pwq. By IH,
I 1Npψrw{xsq “ 1. So INpϕq “ 1.
Case 2 (IMpϕq “ 0). Let N 1 be an extension of N by w. Suppose that IN 1pψrw{xsq “
1. Similarly, let IM be an extension of M by w such that IM 1pwq “ IN 1pwq. But then
by IH IN 1pψrw{xsq “ IM 1pψrw{xsq “ 0.
Lemma 6.3. Let M and N be models or extensions. Let M and N have the same
domain and agree on all the expressions in ϕ except for t, but IMptq “ INpt1q.
IMpϕq “ INpϕrt1{ts.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the rank of ϕ. Again the difficult case is if
ϕ is Dxψ. Let IMpϕq “ 1. So there is an extension of M , M 1, by w, such that
IMpψrw{xsq “ 1. Let N 1 be the extension of N by w such that IN 1pwq “ IM 1pwq. By
IH IN 1pψrw{xsrt1{tsq “ 1. So INpϕrt1{tsq “ 1.
Let IMpϕq “ 0. So there is no extension of M , M 1, by any witness, w, such
that IM 1pψpw{xqs “ 1. Suppose that there is an extension N 1 of N by a witness,
w, such that IN 1pψrw{xsrt1{tsq “ 1. Let M 1 be the extension of M by w such that
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IM 1pwq “ IN 1pwq. But then by IH, IM 1pψrw{xsq “ 1, which is impossible. So there
is no such extension of N , from which it follows that INpϕrt1{tsq “ 0.
Theorem 6.7.1. If $ A : Γ ñ Σ : B, then ( A : Γ ñ Σ : B.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of the deduction of A : Γ ñ Σ : B.
Most cases will be omitted for the sake of space. The base cases are Id(s) and Id(t).
For these cases it is enough to note that no model assigns a sentence 1 and 0, and
that De YDn “ H. For the inductive cases it suffices to show that given a counter-
example to the conclusion name-sequent, there is a counter-example to one of the
premise name-sequents. The cases of AL, Cut(s), RÑ, LD, RD, L“, and R“ are
considered below.
Case 1 (AL). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ, F t1, . . . , t, . . . , tn ñ Σ : B.
So for any term, t P A, IMptq P De, for any sentence, γ P Γ Y tFt1, . . . , t, . . . , tnu,
IMpγq “ 1, for any sentence, σ P Σ, IMpσq “ 0, and for any term, t P B, IMptq P Dn.
In particular, IMpFt1, . . . , t, . . . , tnq “ 1. So xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptq, . . . , IMptnqy P IMpF q.
But IMpF q Ď De. Thus, IMptq P De. So M is a counter-example to A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B.
Case 2 (Cut(s)). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ ñ Σ : B. It is shown by
induction on the complexity of ϕ that there is a counter-example either to A : Γ ñ
Σ, ϕ : B, or A : Γ, ϕñ Σ : B. It is important to note that elements of the witnessing
set are not part of the language, but serve to as possible expansions of the language.12
In the case that ϕ is Ft1, . . . , tn, there are two sub-cases to consider:
12This is because, as Sellars [62] points out, the language under study is in some sense schematic:
it does not itself contain a term for everything there is, but the quantifiers presume that such a
language could exist.
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Case 6 (IMptiq P De, 1 ď i ď n). Either xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptnqy P IMpF q or not. In
the first case, M is counter-example to A : Γ, ϕ ñ Σ : B. In the second it is a
counter-example to A : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : B.
Case 7 (IMptiq P Dn for some i). In this case Ipϕq “ 0, because IMpF q Ď De. So M
is a counter-example to A : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : B
If ϕ is not an atomic, the result follows from the sub-inductive hypothesis. In
the case where ϕ is an existential sentence it follows from the fact that either there
is an extension of M that makes an instance of ϕ with a witness true or not.
Case 3 (RÑ). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ : B. So IMpϕq “ 1
and IMpψq “ 0. But then M is a counter-example to A : Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ.
Case 4 (Lλ). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ, λxpϕqt ñ Σ : B. In particular,
IMpλxpϕqtq “ 1. So IMptq P ty : y P De ^ for any term n such that IMpnq “
y, IMpϕrn{xsq “ 1u. But then IMptq P De and IMpϕrt{xsq “ 1. So M is a counter-
example to A : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : B.
Case 5 (Rλ). LetM be a counter-example toA : Γ ñ λxpϕqt,Σ : B. So IMpλxpϕqtq “
0. It follows that either IMptq R De or IMpϕrt{xsq “ 0. In the first case M is a
counter-example to A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t. In the second, M is a counter-example to
A : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : B.
Case 6 (LD). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ, Dxϕ ñ Σ : B. So there is an
extension of M , M 1 by a witness w, such that IMpϕrw{xsq “ 1. By lemma 6.1, there
is a model, N such that INpϕrt{xsq “ IMpϕrw{xs “ 1, where t does not appear in any
of A, B, Γ, or Σ, and N agrees everywhere else with M . So N is a counter-example
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to A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B.
Case 7 (RD). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ : B. So for any
extension M 1 of M by w, IM 1pϕrw{xsq “ 0. Let t be a term in the language. There
are two sub-cases to consider:
Case 8 (IMptq P De). Suppose that IMpϕrt{xsq “ 1. Let M 1 be an extension of M by
w, such that IM 1pwq “ IMptq. By lemma 6.2, IMpϕrw{xsq “ 1. But this contradicts
our hypothesis.
Case 9 (IMptq P Dn). In this case M is a counter-example to A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t.
Case 8 (L“). Let M be a counter-example to A : Γ, ϕ, ti “ tj ñ Σ : B. So
IMpϕq “ 1, and IMptiq “ IMptjq. That IMpϕrti{tjsq “ 1 is proved by induction on
the rank of ϕ, but from the more general fact that IMpϕq “ IMpϕrti{tjsq for any
model or extension M , when IMptiq “ IMptjq.
Case 10 (ϕ is atomic). Let ϕ be Ft1, . . . , tj, . . . , tn. Since IMpϕq “ 1, xt1, . . . , tj, . . . , tny P
IMpF q. But IMptjq “ IMptiq, so xt1, . . . , ti, . . . , tny P IMpF q. The case where
IMpϕq “ 0 is analogous.
Case 11 (ϕ is  ψ). Let IMpϕq “ 1. So IMpψq “ 0. But then by IH, IMpψrti{tjsq “ 0.
So IMpϕrti{tjq “ 1. The case where IMpϕq “ 0 is similar.
Case 12 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). Let IMpϕq “ 1. So either IMpψq “ 0 or IMpθq “ 1. In
the first case, by IH IMpψrti{tjsq “ 0, so IMpϕrti{tjsq “ 1. In the second, by IH
IMpθrti{tjsq “ 1, so IMpϕrti{tjsq “ 1.
Alternatively, let IMpϕq “ 0. So IMpψq “ 1 and IMpθq “ 0. By IH, IMpψrti{tjsq “
1 and IMpθrti{tjsq “ 0. So IMpϕrti{tjsq “ 0.
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Case 13 (ϕ is Dxψ). Let IMpϕq “ 1. So there is an extension M 1, Such that IM 1pψq “
1. But IM and IM 1 agree everywhere but W , so by lemma 6.2, IM 1pti “ tjq “ 1 So
by IH, IM 1pψrti{tjsq “ 1. But then IMpDxψrti{tjsq “ 1.
Let IMpϕq “ 0. So there is no extension, M 1, of M , such that IM 1pψq “ 1.
Suppose that IMpϕrti{tjsq “ 1. So there is an extension, M 1, of M such that
IM 1pψrti{tjsq “ 1. But then by IH, IM 1pϕq “ 1, which is impossible.
Case 9 (R“). Suppose that M was such that IMpt “ tq “ 0. Then it would be that
IMptq ‰ IMptq which is impossible.
6.7.3 Completeness
Completeness is proved in two stages. In the first stage, a procedure for expanding
an unprovable sequent is given. This relies on several lemmas, which are proved
first. Once an unprovable sequent has been fully expanded, it is shown how this
corresponds to a model. This model, finally, is shown to be a counter-example to the
unprovable sequent.
Lemmas
Fact 1. The rule
A, t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ : B
A : Γ, F t1, . . . , tn ñ Σ : B
is derivable.
Lemma 6.4. The following rule is derivable
235
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, ϕpt1q, . . . , ϕptnq : B
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, Dxϕpxq : B
Proof. This is proved by induction on the number of terms that the sequent accepts.
Let the base case be:
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, ϕpt1q, . . . , ϕptnq : B
t1 : ñ : t1TL/R(s/t)
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, ϕpt2q, . . . , ϕptnq : B, t1
LD
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, Dxϕpxq, ϕpt2q, . . . , ϕptnq : B
For the inductive case
ti : ñ : tiTL/R(s/t)
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, Dxϕpxq, ϕpti`1q, . . . , ϕptnq : B
δ1
...
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ, Dxϕpxq, ϕptiq, . . . , ϕptnq : B δ1...
t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ : Dxϕpxq, ϕpti`1q, . . . , ϕptnq : B
Lemma 6.5. The following is derivable
A, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : B
A : Γ, λxpϕqtñ Σ : B
Proof.
Lemma 6.6. The following is derivable
A : Γ, a “ c, a “ b, b “ cñ Σ : B
A : Γ, a “ b, b “ cñ Σ : B
Proof. This proof is made easier to see by making explicit the contraction steps that
are involved.13
13Since sequents consist of sets of sentences, these steps are really no more than organizing
notation.
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A : Γ, a “ c, a “ b, b “ cñ Σ : B
L“
A : Γ, b “ c, a “ b, b “ c, a “ bñ Σ : B
Contraction
A : Γ, b “ c, a “ b, a “ bñ Σ : B
Contraction
A : Γ, b “ c, a “ bñ Σ : B
Note, this did not depend on particular order of the identities, for any ti “ tj, it could
be replaced with tj “ ti above, and a proof of the same structure would work.
Lemma 6.7. The following is derivable
A : Γ, a “ b, b “ añ Σ : B
A : Γ, a “ bñ Σ : B
Proof. Again, the contraction steps are made explicit and left until the end.
A : Γ, a “ b, b “ añ Σ : B
L=
A : Γ, a “ b, b “ b, a “ bñ Σ : B
L=
A : Γ, a “ b, a “ b, a “ b, a “ bñ Σ : B
Contraction ˆ3
A : Γ, a “ bñ Σ : B
6.7.4 Constructing a Tree
The tree to be constructed will have as nodes sequents. Let A : Γ ñ Σ : B be a
sequent on the leaf of a tree. If either AXB ‰ H,ΓXΣ ‰ H, or c “ c P Σ for some
c, then the branch from the root of the tree to S is closed. Otherwise, the branch is
open.
Let Sent be the set of sentences of the language. Let C : ∆ ñ Λ : D be an
unprovable sequent. The construction of the tree proceeds in stages. Let L be a
list of sentences that grows with each stage. For each stage, Si, let ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . be
an enumeration of Sent. Let A1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : B1, . . . ,Γn ñ Σn be the leaves of
open branches of the tree. Let Γni “ tt : t appears in a setence of Γu, then A “
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Ť
1ďiďnpAi Y Bi Y Γni Y Σni . For each element, xϕi, tjy of Sent ˆ A —if A is empty
let it be ttu do the following:
1. If ϕi is atomic non-identity, then if tj is an argument of ϕ, for any leaf of an
open branch of the form Ak : Γk, ϕi ñ Σk : Bk, replace that sequent with the
derivation
Ak : tj : Γk ñ ϕi ñ Σk : Bk
Ak : Γk, ϕi ñ Σk : Bk
2. If ϕi is tn “ tm, then for any leaf of an open branch of the form: Ak : Γk, tn “
tm ñ Σ, replace that sequent with the derivation
Ak : Γk, tn “ tm, tm “ tn ñ Σ : Bk
Ak : Γk, tn “ tm,ñ Σ : Bk
For any leaf of an open branch of the form: Ak : Γk, tn “ tm, to “ tp ñ Σk : Bk,
where either n P to, pu or m P to, pu but not both, replace that sequent with
the derivation
Ck : ∆k, tn “ tm, to “ tp, tq “ tr ñ Λk : Dk
Ak : Γk, tn “ tm, to “ tp ñ Σk : Bk
where tq is one of tn or tm and tr is one of to or tp, and Ck : ∆k ñ Λk : Dk is
the result of making all possible substitutions of one of those terms for another
of them in Ak : Γk ñ Σk : Bk.
3. If ϕi is λxpψqt, then for any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak,Γk, λxpψqtñ
Σk : Bk, replace that sequent with the derivation
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Ak, t : Γk, ϕrt{xs ñ Σk : Bk
Ak : Γk, λxpϕqtñ Σk : Bk
For any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak : Γk ñ λxpϕqt,Σk : Bk replace
that sequent with the derivation
Ak : Γk ñ ϕrt{xs,Σk : Bk Ak : Γk ñ Σk : Bk, t
Ak : Γk ñ λxpϕqt,Σk : Bk
4. If ϕi is  ψ, then for any leaf of an open branch of the form: Ak,Γk, ψ ñ Σk :
Bk, replace that sequent with the derivation
Ak : Γk, ψ ñ ψ,Σk : Bk
Ak,Γk, ψ ñ Σk : Bk
For any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak : Γk ñ  ψ,Σk : Bk, replace that
sequent with the derivation
Ak : Γk, ψ ñ  ψ,Σk : Bk
Ak : Γk, ψ ñ  ψ,Σk : Bk
5. If ϕi is ψ Ñ θ, then for any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak : Γk, ψ Ñ
θ ñ Σk : Bk, replace that sequent with the derivation
Ak : Γk, ψ Ñ θ ñ ψ,Σk : Bk Ak : Γk, ψ Ñ θ, θ ñ Σk : Bk
Ak : Γk, ψ Ñ θ ñ Σk : Bk
For any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak : Γk ñ ψ Ñ θ,Σk : Bk, replace
that sequent with
Ak : Γk, ψ ñ ψ Ñ θ, θ,ΣK : Bk
Ak : Γk,ñ ψ Ñ θ,Σk : Bk
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6. If ϕi is Dxψ, then for any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak : Γk, Dxψ ñ
Σk : Bk do the following. If ϕi P L, then do nothing. If ϕi R L, then let ti R A,
and not appearing in Γi Y Σi. Replace that leaf with
Ak, ti : Γk, Dxψ, ψrti{xs ñ Σk : Bk
Ak : Γk, Dxψ ñ Σk : Bk
and add ϕi to L.
If ϕi is Dxψ, then for any leaf of an open branch of the form Ak : Γk ñ Dxψ,Σk :
Bk, replace that sequent with
Ak : Γ ñ Dxψ, ψrtj{xs,Σk : Bk Ak : Γ ñ Dxψ,Σk : Bk, tj
Ak : Γ ñ Dxψ,Σk : Bk, tj
If no branch is open, then from the lemmas and fact of section 6.7.3, the tree
is a deduction of C : ∆ ñ Λ : D, contradicting the assumption. Consider an open
branch on the infinite tree that results from completing stage n for each n P N. Let
node of the branch be enumerated from the root upwards, so that the name-sequent
at node j has the form Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bk. Define a sequent P : Π ñ Θ : Q as
P “ ŤjPNAj, Π “ ŤjPN Γj, Θ “ ŤjPNΣj and Q “ ŤjPNBj.
Fact 2. For each Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj and An : Γn ñ Σn : Bn that are nodes in the
infinite branch, if j ď n, then Aj Ď An, Γj Ď Γn, Σj Ď Σn, and Bj Ď Bn.
Lemma 6.8. If t appears in an atomic sentence in Π, then t P P .
Lemma 6.9. ΠXΘ “ H, P XQ “ H and for any term t, t “ t R Θ.
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Proof. Suppose there were a ϕ such that ϕ P Π and ϕ P Θ. Then there would have
to be a stage , with Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj and a stage m with Ak : Γk ñ Σk : Bk such
that ϕ P Γj and ϕ P Σk. But then by fact 2, at stage n`m, there is a name-sequent
Al : Γl ñ Σl : Bl such that ϕ P Γl X Σl. But then this branch would have closed.
A similar argument establishes that P XQ “ H.
Let t “ t P Θ. Then there must be a stage with a name-sequent Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj
such that t “ t P Σj. But then the branch would have closed after that stage.
Proof. Let ϕ be an atomic sentence in Π that has t as an argument. There is a Γj
such that ϕ P Γj, appearing at stage n. At stage n ` 1, the pair, xϕ, ty would have
been considered, and t added to Ak. So by section 6.8, t P P .
Lemma 6.10. If λxpϕqt P Π, then ϕrt{xs P Π and t P P , and if λxpϕqt P Θ then
either t P Q or ϕrt{xs P Θ.
Proof. Let λxpϕqt P Π. Then there must be some node Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj, where
 ϕ P Γj. This node would have been built at some stage n. Let k be some term in A
at stage n. When considering the pair xλxpϕqt, ky, at stage n` 1, both t would have
been added to Ak, and ϕrt{xs added to Γk. By fact 2, these would have remained in
P and Π.
Let λxpϕqt P Θ. Then there is a node, Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj, where λxpϕqt P Σj.
But at stage n` 1, at any further stage in which that sentence was considered there
is a branching such that t is added to the rejected terms on one branch, and ϕrt{xs
to the denied sentences on the other. Since the branch in consideration must go
through one of those, by fact 2 either t P Q or ϕrt{xs P Θ.
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Lemma 6.11. If  ϕ P Π then ϕ P Θ, and if  ϕ P Θ then ϕ P Π.
Proof. Let  ϕ P Π. Then there must be some node Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj, where
 ϕ P Γj.This node would have been built at stage n. Let t be a term in A at stage n.
At stage n ` 1, when considering x ϕ, ty, ϕ would have been added to Σm, m ě j.
But then ϕ P Θ. The second half of this proof is analogous.
Lemma 6.12. If ϕÑ ψ P Π, then either ψ P Π or ϕ P Θ. If ϕÑ ψ P Θ, then ϕ P Π
and ψ P Θ.
Proof. The proof of this is as above, but makes use of the rules used for conditionals.
Lemma 6.13. If Dxϕ P Π, then ϕrt{xs P Π, for some t P P . If Dxϕ P Θ, then either
ϕrt{xs P Θ for all t P P , or P “ H.
Proof. Let Dxϕ P Π, then there is some sequent Aj : Γj ñ Σj : Bj, such that
Dxϕ P Γj, created at stage n, and Dxϕ R L. At stage n ` 1, t would have been
introduced and the name-sequent Am, t : Γm, Dxϕ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σm : Bm put in the
branch.
Let Dxϕ P Θ, then at stage n, Dxϕ would have been in Σj in the sequent Aj :
Γj ñ Σj : Bj. Let P ‰ H and t P P . There is a stage, k, and set Al, such
that t P Al. By fact 2, at stage k ` n, there is a sequent Am : Γm ñ Σm : Bm,
such that t P Am and Dxϕ P Σm. At some point, the pair xDxϕ, ty would have
been considered. So the branch contains either Am : Γm ñ ϕrt{xs, Dxϕ,Σm : Bm or
Am : Γm ñ Dxϕ,Σm : Bm, t. But since the branch is open the latter is impossible.
So ϕrt{xs P Σm, and by fact 2, ϕrt{xs P Θ.
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6.7.5 Building a Model
The model will be build in the following way. Consider the set of sentences, of the
form ti “ tj P Π. Define a relation O, such that if ti “ tj P Π, then Oti, tj, and for
any t P P , which by lemma 6.8 includes any term appearing in an atomic sentence
in Π. Let Ott. O holds of terms by these two clauses only.
Lemma 6.14. O is an equivalence relation.
Proof. O was forced to be reflexive. Let Oti, Otj. If ti is not tj, then ti “ tj P Π.
Let Γm be the first appearance of this sentence, at stage n. At stage n` 1, it would
have been considered in the set Γk, and tj “ ti added to Γk. So tj “ ti P Π, and
thus Otj, ti. Suppose that Oti, tj and Otj, tk. The only way that these could hold
is if ti “ tj and tj “ tk are in Π. Let stage n be the first stage at which they both
appear, and Γk, the set in which tj “ tk is considered at stage n` 1. At that point,
ti “ tk would have been added to Γk, and so is in Π. But then Oti, tk.
A model M is built in the following way. Let rts “ tc : Otcu, and De “ trts : t P
P u. Let Dn “ tt : t R Π. Let DM “ De YDn. De XDn since no term is in both P
and Q. For a term t if t P De, then IMptq “ rts, otherwise, IMptq “ t. For a predicate
F , if Ft1, . . . , tn P Π, then let xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptnq P IMpF q, and let nothing else be
in IMpF q. Finally let IMpti “ tjq “ 1 iff IMptiq “ IMptjq. Let the rest of the model
be constructed according to section 6.7.1
Lemma 6.15. If t P P then IMptq P De and if t P Q then IMptq P Dn.
Proof. Let t P P . So IMptq “ rts, but then IMptq P De. Let t P Q. So IMptq “ t.
Since t R P , t P Dn, so IMptq P Dn.
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Lemma 6.16. If ϕ P Π then IMpϕq “ 1 and if ϕ P Θ then IMpϕq “ 0.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the rank of ϕ.
Case 1 (ϕ is atomic). Let ϕ be Ft1, . . . , tn. Let ϕ P Π. This case holds by definition
above. Let ϕ P Θ, but xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptnqy P IMpF q. This could only happen if
Ft1, . . . , tn were also in Π, but this cannot happen by lemma 6.9.
Case 2 (ϕ is λxpψqt). Let ϕ P Π. By lemma 6.10, ϕrt{xs P Π and t P P . By IH,
IMpϕrt{xsq “ 1, and by lemma 6.15, IMptq P De. So IMpλxpψqtq “ 1.
Let ϕ P Θ. By lemma 6.10, either ψrt{xs P Θ or t P Q. In the first case, by IH,
IMpψrt{xs “ 0. But then IMpϕq “ 0. In the second case, by lemma 6.15, IMptq P Dn,
so IMpϕq “ 0.
Case 3 (ϕ is  ψ). Let ϕ P Π. By lemma 6.11, ψ P Θ. So by IH IMpψq “ 0. But
then IMpϕq “ 1. Similarly, let ϕ P Θ. By lemma 6.11, ψ P Π. By IH, IMpψq “ 1 so
IMpϕq “ 0.
Case 4 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). This case is omitted as it follows the general pattern of the
above.
Case 5 (ϕ is Dxψ). Let ϕ P Π. By lemma 6.13, there is a term, t such that ψrt{xs P Π.
Let M 1 be the extension of M by w such that IM 1pwq “ IMptq. By lemma 6.3,
IM 1ppsirw{xsq “ IM rt{xs. But then IMpϕq “ 1. Let ϕ P Θ, and suppose that there
is an extension of M , N , by w such that INpψrw{xsq “ 1. By lemma 6.13, either
P “ H or for any t P P , ψrt{xs P Θ. Suppose that P “ H. Then Dn “ H. But then
there are no extensions of M . So Dxϕ is false. Let P ‰ H and N be an extension
of M by w, such that INpwq “ rts for some t P P . Since IMpψrt{xsq “ 0 and
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IMptq “ INpwq and they agree everywhere else, by lemma 6.3, INpψrt{xsrw{tsq “ 0,
which is equivalent to INpψrw{xsq “ 0. Since that was N was an arbitrary extension,
this holds for all extensions of M . Thus, IMpϕq “ 0.
$cf A : Γ ñ Σ : B indicates that A : Γ ñ Σ : B is provable without using either
Cut(s) or Cut(t).
Lemma 6.17. If ( A : Γ ñ Σ : B, then $cf A : Γ ñ Σ : B
Proof. It follows from lemma 6.15 and lemma 6.16 that M is a counter-example to
P : Π ñ Θ : Q. From fact 2, C Ď P , ∆ Ď Π, Λ Ď Θ, and D Ď Q. So M is also a
counter-example to C : ∆ ñ Λ : D. Generalizing, it follows that for any sequent not
derivable in the cut-free system has a model.
Theorem 6.7.2. If $ A : Γ ñ Σ : B, then $cf Γ ñ Σ : B
Proof. Let $ A : Γ ñ Σ : B. By theorem 7.5.1, there are no counter-examples to
A : Γ ñ Σ : B. Suppose that &cf A : Γ ñ Σ : B. But then there is a counter-
example to A : Γ ñ Σ : B.
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6.8 Failure of Cut Admissibility for a logic with
AR and AL
6.8.1 Model Theory
A model M is a pair, xDM , IMy, where DM is a non-empty set that is partitioned
into De and Dn. IM is a function obeying the following clauses:
• For any term t, IMptq P De YDn.
• For any n-ary predicate, F , IMpF q “ xF`, F´y, such that F` Ď Dne , F´ Ď Dne
and F` X F´ “ H and F` Y F´ “ Dne .
• For any sentence ϕ, IMpϕq is given by
˝ If ϕ is atomic, Ft1, . . . , tn, if xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptnqy P F` then IMpFt1, . . . , tnq “
1, and if xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptnqy P F´ then IMpFt1, . . . , tnq “ 0.
˝ If ϕ is  ψ, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff IMpψq “ 0.
˝ If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff IMpψq “ 0 or IMpθq “ 1.
˝ If ϕ is Dxψ, then IMpϕq “ 1 iff there is an expansion of M , M 1, by a
witness, w, such that IM 1pψrw{xsq “ 1.
Counter-example is defined as above. Let $ A : Γ ñ Σ : B indicate that
A : Γ ñ Σ is provable in the cut-free system including the rules from fig. 6.2, AL,
and AR. Let ( A : Γ ñ Σ indicate that there is no counter-example in the above
sense to A : Γ ñ Σ : B. Call this system RL.
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Theorem 6.8.1. If $ A : Γ ñ Σ : B then ( A : Γ ñ Σ : B.
Proof. The proof of this is much like the one above. For the axioms no model can as-
sign a sentence both 1 and 0. The only difference between this system and the above
is that AL. This is the only case that will be considered. The rest of the proof is simi-
lar to theorem 7.5.1. Let M be a counterexample to A : Γ ñ Ft1, . . . , t, . . . , tn,Σ : B.
So IMpFt1, . . . , t, . . . , tnq “ 0. Thus, xIMpt1q, . . . , IMptq, . . . , IMptnqy P F´. But then
IMptq P De. So M is a counter-example to A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B.
Lemma 6.18. There is a counter-example to  Dx Fxñ DxFx.
Proof. Let DM “ t1u and De “ H. It follows that there is no extension of M . So
IMpDxFxq “ 0 and IMpDx Fxq “ 0. But then IMp Dx Fxq “ 1.
Theorem 6.8.2. Cut is not admissible for system RL.
Proof. Consider the following two deductions:
t : ñ : t
AR
: Ftñ : t : Ftñ Ft :
RD
: Ftñ DxFt
t : ñ : t
AL
: ñ Ft : t
: Ftñ Ft :
R 
: ñ Ft :  Ft
RD
: ñ Dx Ft, F t
L 
:  Dx Fxñ Ft
Since neither of these derivations uses Cut(s), there is no counter-example to
their end-sequents. But there is a counter-example to :  Dx Fxñ DxFx.
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Figure 6.3: Negative Free Logic
Structural Rules
Id(s) : ϕñ ϕ :
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWL(s)
A : Γ, ϕñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWL(t)
A, c : Γ ñ Σ : B
Id(t) c : ñ : c
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWR(s)
A : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : BWR(t)
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, c
A : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : B A : Γ, ϕñ Σ : B
Cut(s)
A : Γ ñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, c A, c : Γ ñ Σ : B
Cut(t)
A : Γ ñ Σ : B
Operational Rules
A : Γ ñ Σ : Bpt0{t1q
L“ i, j P t0, 1u
A : Γ, ϕ, ti “ tj ñ Σ : B
A, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : B
Lλ
A : Γ, λxpϕqtñ Σ : B
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ Γ, ψ ñ Σ
LÑ
Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ
A, c : Γ, ϕpcq ñ Σ : B
1LD
A : Γ, Dxϕpxq ñ Σ : B
R“ : ñ t “ t :
A : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : B A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t
Rλ
A : Γ ñ λxpϕqt,Σ : B
Γ, ϕñ Σ
R 
Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ
Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ
RÑ
Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, c A : Γ ñ ϕpcq,Σ : B
RD
A : Γ ñ Dxϕpxq,Σ : B
t does not appear in the conclusion of LD
A : Γ ñ Σ : Bpt0{t1q is schematic for any replacement of t0 by t1 in A : Γ ñ Σ : B
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Chapter 7
PHIL: A Logic for Contingentism
Abstract. This chapter develops a Predicative Higher-Order Intensional Logic,
PHIL, that can underwrite a contingentist account of the nature of possibility.
Williamson has argued that such a logic would suffer from being ad hoc. Its first-
order quantifiers would be free but to maintain strength its second-order quantifiers
could not also be free. Prior has argued that any contingentist logic must deny the
interdefinability of necessity and possibility and the rule of necessitation. This chap-
ter shows that PHIL is a response to both challenges. In the latter half of the chapter
it is shown that the calculus used to specify PHIL is sound and complete for a set of
second-order Henkin models, that the rule of Cut is admissible for that calculus, and
that the calculus uniquely characterizes the logical vocabulary of PHIL. The chapter
concludes that PHIL is independently well-motivated in addition to being able to
solve the above challenges to a contingentist logic.
Keywords. Contingentism, Second-Order Modal Logic, Prior, Williamson
Necessitism has been described by Williamson [74] as the view that necessarily
everything is necessarily something, or that what does exist exists in every possible
world and what exists in any possible world exists in the actual world. Contingentism
is the denial of this claim. The contingentist view is naturally paired with “free” first-
order quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers whose range is restricted in some way. In this case
the range of a quantifier is restricted to those beings that exist at the world in which
it is being evaluated.1A logic is contingentist when it does not prove BF ` CBF
Dx♦ϕØ ♦Dxϕ (BF + CBF)
The core contingentist claim is that there are individuals that exist that could have
failed to exist and some individuals that do not exist though they could have existed.
The logic developed solves two problems for contingentists. The first is a response
to an argument given by Prior [43]. Prior held that a being a exists by definition
when there are true facts about that being, i.e. E!a “df Dffa. In other words a thing
exists just when something is true of it.2 There are concerns with this definition of
existence in the extensional case. For instance, it is true that Pegasus is not winged,
i.e.  Wp, but it follows from the truth of that sentence that Dffp and from there to
the existence of Pegasus. The solution to these issues is entailed by the solution to a
further problem that occurs when this definition of existence is embedded in a modal
logic. Prior [43] argues that adopting the above definition of existence requires that
the rules of necessitation and the interdefinability of ˝ and ♦ be abandoned. The
1A sequent calculus for free first-order quantification can be found in Gratzl [19] and Restall
[57]. This chapter follows Restall [57] in its formulation for first-order quantification.
2This definition was accepted by Prior [43].
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logic of this chapter holds that definition of existence without giving up the standard
S5 modal logic where ˝ and ♦ are interdefinable.
A second problem for contingentists has been raised by Williamson [74]. Williamson
[74] argues that a contingentist logic must have free first-order quantifiers. This is
taken for granted in the system presented below. He then argues that it is prima facie
ad-hoc that first-order quantifiers and second-order quantifiers should differ in their
treatment, i.e. that a contingentist logic with free first-order quantifiers but classical
second-order quantifiers is unmotivated. The problem with free second-order quanti-
fiers is that important principles governing the interaction of ˝ and other vocabulary
are underivable. For instance Williamson [74] highlights the following two sentences
as being underivable in a logic with free second-order quantifiers
Gen pTaa^ ♦ Taaq Ñ Dfpfa^ ♦ faq
Conj @f@gDh ˝ @xphxØ pfx^ gxqq
The logic given by fig. 7.1 and fig. 7.2 is a Predicative Higher-order Intensional Logic,
called PHIL. Both Gen and Conj are valid in PHIL but the second-order quantifiers
of that logic are nonetheless free.
Not only does PHIL avoid both of these pitfalls, it is cut-admissible and uniquely
characterizes all of the expressions for which there are left and right rules in fig. 7.2.
Because PHIL has these features it is well-motivated independently of its application
to the problems for contingentism raised above.3 Section 7.1 is an interpretation
and explanation of the formalism. Section 7.2 shows how PHIL solves the above
3For more on the importance of these features of a calculus see Belnap [4], Prawitz [41], and
Humberstone [21].
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issues for contingentists. Sections 7.3 to 7.6 establish that PHIL has desirable logical
properties such as a sound and complete model-theory, cut-admissibility, and the
unique characterization of expressions featuring in left and right introduction rules.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of what PHIL can be used to accomplish
and what questions PHIL leaves unanswered for future research.
7.1 Interpretation of PHIL
This chapter takes a proof-theoretic starting point for the investigation into a logic.
This is justified by what is taken to be the primary object of logical investigation,
a position. Following Restall [50, 53, 57], a position is an ordered pair of sets of
sentences, those that the position asserts and those that it denies. If Γ and Σ are
sets of sentences then Γ ñ Σ is a position. Γ ñ Σ is the position one takes up
by asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ. For example, if Γ “ tIt is rainingu and
Σ “ tIt is sunnyu then Γ ñ Σ is the position that asserts that it is raining and
denies that it is sunny.
Positions can be either coherent or incoherent. For instance, it is always inco-
herent to univocally assert and deny the same sentence. This is why any position of
the form ϕñ ϕ is incoherent. Rules of a sequent calculus define which positions are
incoherent. The rule of Identity ensures that any position that asserts and denies
the same sentence is incoherent. The standard L rule governing the introduction
of a negation on the left of a sequent
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
L 
Γ, ϕñ Σ
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says that if it is incoherent to deny ϕ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ
then it is incoherent to assert  ϕ while asserting all of Γ and denying all of Σ. In
general a rule of a calculus with premises P1, . . . , Pn and conclusion C says that if Pi
is incoherent for 1 ď i ď n then C is incoherent. Read contrapositively this indicates
that if C is coherent then one of the Pi’s is.
L along with Id guarantees that it is always incoherent to assert both a sentence
and its negation. This is given by the deduction
Id ϕñ ϕ
L ϕ, ϕñ
A deduction of a position guarantees that that position is incoherent. If a position
is not deducible given a calculus then for all that has been said that position is
coherent.4
In addition to rules governing specific expressions of a language, like L governs
 , there are structural rules that govern the language more generally. These rules are
justified by the theory of meaning that is being advanced. An example of such a rule
is Id. Id is justified by appeal to the incoherence of univocally asserting and denying
the same sentence. This is a feature of the practices of asserting and denying. The
rules of thinning on the left and right
Γ ñ Σ
TL
Γ, ϕñ Σ
Γ ñ Σ
TR
Γ ñ ϕ,Σ
are justified by the fact that if one is in an incoherent position asserting or denying
more things cannot change that. If it is incoherent to assert that it is raining and
4Since a logic of the sort given in this chapter is not a full account of the inference rules of a
language a position that is coherent relative to a calculus may turn out to be incoherent at a deeper
level of analysis.
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deny that it is raining then it is incoherent to assert that it is raining and that it is
cloudy and deny that it is raining. In the calculus under consideration the Cut rule
is admissible and so does not require a justification.
A consideration of positions alone is enough to pin down the meanings of the
propositional connectives. Because both modality and quantification are also objects
of study the notion of a position must be expanded to accommodate these features of
language. First-order quantification is closely tied to names. An important use of a
name, independently of its occurrence in a sentence is that it can be taken to denote
or not to denote. A name position takes into account the acceptance (taking to
denote) and rejection (taking to be non-denoting) of a name. If Γ ñ Σ is a position
and A and B are sets of names, then A : Γ ñ Σ : B is the name-position one takes
up by accepting all of A, asserting all of Γ, denying all of Σ, and rejecting all of B.
Because only name-positions are considered in what follows they are from this point
forward referred to as ‘positions’.
First-order quantifiers take into account which names are accepted and which are
not. The rule governing the introduction of a first-order quantifier on the left is
A, n : Γ, ϕrn{xs ñ Σ : B
LD1 A : Γ, Dxϕñ Σ : B
where n does not occur in A : Γ, Dxϕ ñ Σ : B. Read from bottom to top LD1
indicates that if it is coherent to accept A : Γ, Dxϕ ñ Σ : B then there is an
expansion of the language of that position with a new term n such that the position
A, n : Γ, ϕrn{xs ñ Σ : B is coherent. It is this feature of quantification that makes it
free. An existential sentence Dxϕ is coherent to assert only if there is an object that
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can be named, by e.g. n, such that ϕrn{xs is coherent to assert. The language itself
is free because there are coherent positions that take some names to fail to denote.
As mentioned above the notion of a position is further expanded to account for
modality. On the account of logic under consideration modal expressions mark ways
that positions can be related to one another. This is represented by means of a
hyper-position. A hyper-position is a set of positions. If A0 : Γ0 ñ Σ0 : B0, . . . , An :
Γn ñ Σn : Bn are positions then pA0 : Γ0 ñ Σ0 : B0q; . . . ; pAn : Γn ñ Σn : Bnq is
a hyper-position. A hyper-position pA0 : Γ0 ñ Σ0 : B0q; . . . ; pAn : Γn ñ Σn : Bnq
is incoherent when it is incoherent to take up the position An : Γn ñ Σn : Bn
and hold that each Ai : Γi ñ Σi : Bi are coherent positions relative to that one.
For instance the hyper-position p: ϕ ñ :q; p:ñ ♦ϕ :q is incoherent. One cannot
coherently deny that ϕ is possible and hold that there are coherent positions that
assert ϕ. If positions can be thought of as reckonings of how the world is, then hyper-
positions can be thought of as reckoning of how descriptions of the world relate to
one another.5
The above is an account of the author’s preferred way of thinking . It may be
more natural to for some readers to replace the notion of assertion with truth, denial
with falsity, and a position with a set of names that denote, a set of true sentences,
a set of false sentences, and a set of terms that do not denote. On this reading a
hyper-position corresponds neatly to a set of possible worlds in an S5 model. This
5What are here called hyper-positions are elsewhere called ‘hypersequents’ the change in ter-
minology allows for continuity between the positions of the propositional case and hyper-positions
in the modal case. The apparatus of hypersequents as a method of generating a proof system for
modal logic was first introduced by Mints [33]. It has more recently been used by Avron [2], Restall
[51], and myself (see Chapters 2 and 3) to generate calculi for modal logics.
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can be seen most clearly with definition 34.6 The reason to prefer the reading given
here is that it is easier to offer an account of what λ-operators do in this language.
Since they play the key role in untangling the Priorian concern with a logic for
contingentism the unconventional account above is used.
In order to be complete call the language under consideration L . Let N and V1
be denumerably infinite sets of names and first-order variables respectively. Let Pi
and Vi be denumerably infinite sets of predicates and variables respectively for each
arity i P N. Let P “ YiPi and V2 “ YiVi. Let L1 Ă L be the first-order fragment
of L and A Ă L1 be the set of atomic sentences of L . The set of sentences L
is defined inductively along with the set of atomic sentences of L and first-order
sentences L1. The set of sentences is given by the following definition:
1. If t1, . . . , tn P N Y V1 and f P Pn Y Vn then ft1, . . . , tn P A.
2. If ϕ, ψ P L1 then  ϕ,♦ϕ, pϕÑ ψq, and pD1vϕq P L1.
3. If ϕ P L1 and t1, . . . , tn P N then xλv1, . . . , vnϕyt1, . . . , tn P A.
4. If ϕ, ψ P L1 then  ϕ,♦ϕ, pϕÑ ψq, pD1vϕq, and pD2fϕq P L .
In cases where no clarity is lost parentheses are dropped. Clause (3) is responsible
for the comprehension schema of this language. All instances of the comprehension
schema are provable for which there is a λ-expression defined in clause (3). This,
in particular, leaves out λ expressions such as xλxDffxy which accounts for the fact
that PHIL is predicative.
6For an account of how to generate other modal logics by manipulation of the rules in fig. 7.1
see chapter 2
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Figure 7.1 gives the structural rules of PHIL. The rules Id and Idt indicate that
it is incoherent to assert and deny the same sentence and that it is incoherent to
accept and reject the same term. TL and TR indicate that if a position is coherent
then removing an asserted (denied) sentence or accepted (rejected) term preserves
coherence. The Cut rules indicate that if a hyper-position is coherent then for any
term or sentence of the language and any position in that hyper-position, there is
a coherent way of expanding the original hyper-position by that term or sentence.
W indicates that removing the empty position from a hyper-position maintains co-
herence.7 Finally, AL indicates that if it is coherent to assert an atomic sentence
featuring a term t in a position then it is coherent to accept t. This amounts to the
7Another paper, chapter 2 shows that this is equivalent to requiring transitivity for the modal
frames in the standard possible worlds account of modal logic.
Figure 7.1: Contingentist Predicative Second-Order Logic: Structural Rules
Id(s) p: Ft1, . . . tn ñ Ft1, . . . , tn :q
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
TL(s)
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
TL(t)
G; pA, t : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ Σ : Bq;H G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Cut
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
Id(t) pt : ñ : tq
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
TR(s)
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
TR(t)
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : t, Bq;H
G;H
W
G; p: ñ :q;H
G; pA, t : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tq;H
Cutt
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA, t : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
AL
G; pA : Γ, F t1, . . . , t, . . . , tn ñ Σ : Bq;H
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claim that all terms featuring in atomic sentences denote and it entails that if a term
does not denote then any atomic sentence in which it occurs is false.8
There are two more speech acts that are taken into account by this logic. Call a
judgment any assertion or denial. Call a predication a sentence that directly connects
a name with a predicate. All atomic sentences are predications but e.g.  ϕ is not a
predication. An assertion of a predication is called an act of predication.
The philosophical motivation for AL is that a judgment about a predication is
importantly different from a judgment about a negation or other sentence. Judging
that a predicate P is true of an entity o requires that that entity exist. AL is entailed
by what Williamson [74] calls the being constraint : if a thing has properties then
that thing exists. This fits well with the definition of existence discussed above.
Importantly AL only applies to atomic predicates because only in judging an atomic
sentence does one also either perform an act of predication or deny a predication.
Judging a sentence ϕ to be false by asserting  ϕ does not require anything to exist.
One could assert, for instance, the sentence “Pegasus is not winged” not because one
wants to judge that it is true of Pegasus that it is not winged but because Pegasus
does not exist and so cannot be winged. This chapter accepts the being constraint
in the following form: asserting a predication commits one to the existence of the
subject of that predication. In another mode of speech one might read AL as saying
that if anything is true of an object then that object exists. PHIL is distinguished
from other logics of contingentism by its acceptance of this principle which Yagisawa
[77] suggests contingentists deny.
8The logic is thus a negative free logic. See Lambert [25] or Lehmann [28] for details.
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The operational rules of PHIL are given in fig. 7.2. In this figure, let tGiu1ďiďn be
the set tG1, . . . , Gnu, and β be any predicate or λ-expression. The rules for negation
and conditional are standard sequent rules. L♦ amounts to the claim that if it is
coherent to assert ♦ϕ, it is coherent to expand one’s hyper-position by a new position
that asserts ϕ. R♦ amounts to the claim that if it is coherent to deny ♦ϕ then for
any position in one’s hyper-position it is coherent to deny ϕ.
Figure 7.2: Contingentist Predicative Second-Order Logic: Operational Rules
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
L 
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H G; pA : Γ, ψ ñ Σ : Bq;H
LÑ
G; pA : Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ Σ : Bq;H
p: ϕñ :q; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
L♦ pA : Γ,♦ϕñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : Bq;H
LD1
G; pA : Γ, Dxϕñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA, c1, . . . , cn : Γ, ϕrc1{xs . . . rcn{xs ñ Σ : Bq;H
Lλ
G; pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . xnϕyc1, . . . , cn ñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕrF {f s ñ Σ : Bq;H
LD2
G; pA : Γ, Dfϕñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ Σ : Bq;H
R 
G; pA : Γ ñ  ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ ψ,Σ : Bq;H
RÑ
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕÑ ψ,Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,Σ : Bq; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq;H
R♦
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq; pC : ∆ ñ ♦ϕ,Λ : Dq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : Bq;H G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tq;H
RD1
G; pA : Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrβ{f s,Σ : Bq;H
RD2
G; pA : Γ ñ Dfϕ,Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrc1{x1s . . . , rcn{xns,Σ : Bq;H tG; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, ciq;Hu1ďiďn
Rλ
G; pA : Γ ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyc1, . . . , cn,Σ : Bq;H
1. t does not appear in the conclusion of LD1
2. F does not appear in the conclusion of LD2
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The rules for first-order quantification interact with the accepted and rejected
terms of a position. This is because first-order quantifiers are usually taken to have
ontological significance. If ϕ is a sentence and ε1 and ε2 expressions of the same
syntactic category then ϕrε2{ε1s is the result of replacing ε2 for ε1 in ϕ. LD says that
if it is coherent to assert Dxϕ, then it is coherent to introduce a term t that does
not occur in one’s position, accept t, and assert ϕrt{xs, where ϕrt{xs is the result of
replacing x everywhere by t in ϕ. RD says that if it is coherent to deny Dxϕ in a
position then for any term t it is either coherent to deny ϕrt{xs or to reject t. As
noted above predication is taken to be ontologically significant. If one judges that a
predicate holds of a term then one is committed to that term having a denotation.
This is the reason that Lλ and Rλ interact with accepted and rejected terms in the
same way that first-order quantifiers do. A λ-expression e.g. λx Fx is a predicate.
Asserting xλx Fxya is judging that the predicate λx Fx holds of a. This is an
act of predication and as such according to the being constraint discussed above
requires that a exist. This is why the Lλ rule requires adding terms to the accepted
terms of a sequent. Similarly, denying xλx Fxya is a denial that λx Fx holds of
a. This denial would be justified if either a was not a non-F or a did not denote.
This is why the Rλ rule branches. It is through the use of λ-expressions that this
logic expresses the distinction between an act of judgment and an act of predication.
All acts of predication are judgments but not vice-versa. It is also not the case, as
standard accounts of λ-expressions assume, that the two are convertible, i.e. that
every judgment can be considered as an act of predication. This is how this logic
accounts for the logical coherence of asserting that Pegasus is not winged but denies
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that Pegasus exists. The assertion that Pegasus is not winged is a judgment that
cannot be converted into an act of predication.
The rules for second-order quantification are the standard proof-theoretic rules
governing second-order quantifiers. The comprehension schema is built into the
specification of L itself. The predicates that can be comprehended are those for
which there is a λ-expression in the language.
Though the rules governing second-order quantification in fig. 7.2 are the standard
ones, this is only to save space. The theory of second-order quantification at play in
this logic is free. For ease of notation and discussion only positions are considered for
this argument. Given theorem 7.6.3 and theorem 7.6.4 any result proved here about
the logic that does not contain modal operators can be ported without troubles into
the system that does contain modal logic.9 Expand the notion of a hyper-position
now to contain sets of λ-expressions. If A and B are sets of names, Γ and Σ sets of
sentences, and η and θ sets of λ-expressions then η *A : Γ ñ Σ : B + θ is a position.
As in the first-order case, second-order quantification takes into account whether or
not a λ-expression denotes.
One account of the denotation of a predicate is that a predicate term λxϕ denotes
iff there is some term to which it can be truly or falsely applied. The rules governing
such a criterion are the following
η * A : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : B + θ η * A : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : B + θ
LTD
η, λxϕ * A : Γ ñ Σ : B + θ
9This follows from the fact that cut admissibility in this case entails that any part of the language
conservatively extends the reset of the language.
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η * A : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : B + θ
RTD
η * A : Γ ñ Σ : B + λxϕ, θ
where t does not occur in the conclusion of LTD. LTD and RTD in a classical setting
entail that for any λ-expression, that λ expression denotes. This is because classical
logic enforces bivalence and the denotation of λ-expressions depends on the truth
of sentences that those λ-expressions feature in. In a three valued setting, such as
the logic Q developed by Prior [43], LTD and RTD would not guarantee that every
λ-expression denotes.
The corresponding rules for second-order quantification in such a context are
η, λxFx * A : Γ, ϕrλxFx{f s ñ Σ : B + θ
LD2˚ η * A : Γ, Dfϕñ Σ : B + θ
η * A : Γ ñ Σ : B + β, θ η * A : Γ ñ ϕrβ{xs,Σ : B + θ
RD2˚ η * A : Γ ñ Dfϕ,Σ : B + θ
where neither F nor λxFx appear in the conclusion of LD2˚ . These rules are equivalent
to LD2 and RD2 given that η *A : Γ ñ Σ : B +λxϕ, θ is derivable for any λ-expression
λxϕ. The second-order quantifiers of PHIL are therefore free under one interpretation
of what it would take for a λ-expression to fail to denote. Because the underlying
logic is bivalent the account of what it takes for a λ-expression to denote entails that
all λ-expressions denote. In order to avoid clumsier notation the rules LD2 and RD2
are used instead of LD2˚ , RD2˚ , LTD, and RTD.
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7.2 Challenges to Contingentism
7.2.1 Prior’s Arguments
As noted above Prior [43] argues that if “a exists” is defined as Dffa then it is
necessary to deny that ♦ and ˝ are interdefinable and to deny that necessitation
holds. Both of these arguments are discussed in Menzel [32].
Prior first argues that on the given definition of existence if a exists then it is
not the case that it is possible that a does not exist. Prior’s argument is along the
following lines: if a does not exist then there is something true of a, i.e. that it does
not exist. Since all definitions are necessary, by the given definition of existence it
follows that it is not possible that a does not exist. The rules governing classical
λ-abstraction are CLA and CRA.
G; pA : Γ, ϕra{xs ñ Σ : Bq;H
CLA
Γ; pA : Γ, xλxϕyañ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕra{xs,Σ : Bq;H
CRA
G; pA : Γ ñ xλxϕya,Σ : Bq;H
In a language with impredicative comprehension and classical λ-abstraction this
argument can be formalized as follows
Id(s) p:  Dffañ  Dffa :q
CRA p:  Dffañ xλx Dffxya :q
RD2 p:  Dffañ Dffa :q
Id(s) p: Dffañ Dffa :q
R p: ñ Dffa, Dffa :q
Cut p: ñ Dffa :q
L p:  Dffañ :q
W p:  Dffañ :q; p: ñ :q
L♦ p: ♦ Dffañ :q
R p: ñ  ♦ Dffa :q
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If ˝ and ♦ are inter-definable it follows that a necessarily exists. Prior rejects that
conclusion but accepts the other rules that are applied in the argument. This leads
him to reject the interdefinability of ♦ and ˝.
By the lights of PHIL this deduction fails at the first step. The application of
CRA to p:  Dffañ  Dffa :q is not an admissible rule of PHIL. CRA allows one to
convert any judgment to an act of predication. In this particular case the judgment
that a is nothing is converted to an assertion of the predication that nothing is true
of a. These two are importantly distinct. The judgment that a has no properties –
in this context, that a does not exist – does not require that a exists. Contrasted
with this is that the assertion of the predication of a that it has no properties does
entail that a exists. Because of the definition of λ-expressions above that guarantees
that PHIL is predicative the position that predicates of a that it has no properties
is not expressible in PHIL. However, in PHIL’s more relaxed relative Contingentist
Higher-order Impredicative Logic with Lambda-expressions, CHILL, the following
derivation rules out the coherence of such an assertion in any position.
Id
: Fañ Fa :TL(t)
a : Fañ Fa :
RÑ
a : ñ FaÑ Fa : Id(t) a : ñ : a
Rλ
a : ñ xλx.FxÑ Fxya
RD2 a : ñ Dffa
L 
a :  Dffañ :
Lλ
: xλx Dffxyañ :
Given the model theory of section 7.4 and theorem 7.5.1 it is possible to prove that
the position that asserts that a does not have any properties without predicating
that of a is not deducible and so is coherent. The position p: ñ  ♦ Dffa :q is
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coherent for similar reasons. According to PHIL it is coherent to deny that it is not
possible for a not to have a property.
The second argument that Prior gives hinges on the definition of existence given
above. It is a law of logic that Fa Ñ Fa. It follows that if Fa Ñ Fa then there is
something that a is, i.e. Dffa. It then follows that ˝pFaÑ Faq entails ˝Dffa. But
since FaÑ Fa is a logical law by necessitation ˝pFaÑ Faq is also a logical law. It
follows that ˝Dffa. This can be formalized as follows10
Id(s) p: Fañ Fa :q
RÑ p: ñ FaÑ Fa :q
W p: ñ FaÑ Fa :q; p: ñ :q
R˝ p: ñ ˝pFaÑ Faq :q
Id(s) p: FaÑ Fañ FaÑ Fa :q
CRA p: FaÑ Fañ xλx.FxÑ Fxya :q
RD p: FaÑ Fañ Dffa :q
W p: FaÑ Fañ Dffa :q; p: ñ :q
L˝ p:ñ Dffa :q; p: ˝pFaÑ Faq ñ :q
R˝ p: ˝pFaÑ Faq ñ ˝Dffa :q
Cut p: ñ ˝Dffa :q
Prior diagnoses the issue with this deduction to be the left most instance of R˝ which
in natural deduction settings is an instance of necessitation. The problem with this
deduction is similar to the above problem. Both deductions require an application of
CRA which is not an admissible rule of PHIL. As above there are counter-examples
to p: ñ ˝Dffa :q in the model theory given in section 7.4. Given this, theorem 7.5.1
entails that p: ñ ˝Dffa :q is not provable according to PHIL.
The logic proposed in this chapter diagnoses the problem as the instance of CRA
applied in the above deduction. The corresponding instance of Lλ is not valid. As
above a model where a does not exist is a counter-example to p: ñ ˝Dffa :q
10For the definable rules governing ˝ see section 7.3.1. The derivable rules governing the other
extensional connectives e.g. ^ and _ are the familiar rules embedded in hyper-positions.
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7.2.2 Williamson’s Challenge
Williamson [74] argues that a logic with free first-order quantification ought also
to use free second-order quantification. A logic with free second-order quantifiers,
Williamson argues, is too weak to capture normal intuitions govering valid arguments
of second-order modal logic. In particular, he cites Gen and Conj as examples.
It was argued above that the second-order quantifiers of this logic are free. It is
a theorem of PHIL that all λ-expressions denote. This is entailed by the account
of denotation for λ-expressions that is assumed and the fact that the logic is biva-
lent. Given this both Gen and Conj are valid. This is given by the following two
deductions.
Gen pTaa^ ♦ Taaq Ñ Dfpfa^ ♦ faq
Id(s) p: Taañ Taa :q
TR(t) pa : Taañ Taa :q
W p: ñ :q; pa : Taañ Taa :q
TL(s) p:  Taañ :q; pa : Taañ Taa :q
Id(t) pa : ñ : aq
TL(s) pa : Taañ : aq
W p: ñ :q; pa : Taañ : a
TL(s) p:  Taañ :q; pa : Taañ : a
Rλ p:  Taañ :q; pa : Taañ xλxTaxya :q
Id(s) p: Taañ Taa :q
W p: Taañ Taa :q; p: ñ :q
TL(s) p: Taañ Taa :q; p: Taañ :q
TL(t)ˆ2 pa : Taañ Taa :q; pa : Taañ :q
L pa : Taa, Taañ :q; pa : Taañ :q
Lλ p: xλxTaxya, Taañ :q; pa : Taañ :q
R p:  Taañ  xλxTaxya :q; pa : Taañ :q
R♦ p:  Taañ :q; pa : Taañ ♦ xλxTaxya :q
R^ p:  Taañ :q; pTaañ xλxTaxya^ ♦ xλxTaxya :q
RD2 p:  Taañ :q; pTaañ Dfpfa^ ♦ faq :q
L♦ pTaa,♦ Taañ Dfpfa^ ♦ faq :q
L^ pTaa^ ♦ Taañ Dfpfa^ ♦ faq :q
Conj @f@gDh ˝ @xphxØ pfx^ gxqq
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Id(s) p: Fa^Gañ Fa^Ga :q
TL(s/t) pa : Fa^Gañ Fa^Ga :q
Lλ p: xλy.Fy ^Gyyañ Fa^Ga :q
TL(t) pa : xλy.Fy ^Gyyañ Fa^Ga :q
Id(s) p: Fa^Gañ Fa^Ga :q
TL(t) pa : Fa^Gañ Fa^Ga :q
Id(t) pa : ñ : aq
TL(s) pa : Fa^Gañ : aq
Rλ pa : Fa^Gañ xλy.Fy ^Gyya :q
RØ pa : ñ xλy.Fy ^GyyaØ Fa^Ga :q
R@ p: ñ @xpxλy.Fy ^GyyxØ Fx^Gxq :q
W p: ñ @xpxλy.Fy ^GyyxØ Fx^Gxq :q; p: ñ :q
R˝ p: ñ ˝@xpxλy.Fy ^GyyxØ Fx^Gxq :q
RD2 p: ñ Dh ˝ @xphxØ Fx^Gxq :q
R@2 ˆ 2 p: ñ @fgDh ˝ @xphxØ pfx^ gxqq :q
As mentioned above, on the account of what it takes for a λ-expression to denote
the second-order quantifiers of this chapter are free. Second-Order quantifiers range
only over predicates that denote. In order for a predicate to denote it must either be
true or false of a term. However, because PHIL is bivalent these free second-order
quantifier collapse with the classical (Henkin) second-order quantifiers in this case.
This is what accounts for the validity of the above two deductions. Similar deductions
show that in general a comprehension schema for which there is a corresponding λ-
expression is valid.
7.3 Important Results
7.3.1 Interdefinabiliy of Necessity and Possibility
The modal operators ˝ and ♦ are interdefinable in PHIL. The rules governing ˝ in a
hyper-position calculus for S5 are11
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ Σ : Bq; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq;H
L˝
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq; pC : ∆, ˝ϕñ Λ : Dq;H
p: ñ ϕ :q; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
R˝ pA : Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
11These rules can be found in Restall [53] or Chapters 2 and 3 of this work.
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Theorem 7.3.1. $ G; pA : Γ, ˝ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ, ♦ ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H
and $ G; pA : Γ ñ ˝ϕ,Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ ñ  ♦ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Proof. Call the following deductions δ1 and δ2 respectively
Id(s) p: ϕñ ϕ :q
W p: ϕñ ϕ :q; p: ñ :q
L˝ p: ñ ϕ :q; p: ˝ϕñ :q
L p:  ϕñ :q; p: ˝ϕñ :q
L♦ p: ♦ ϕ, ˝ϕñ :q
R p: ˝ϕñ  ♦ ϕ :q
W + TL + TR
G; pA : Γ, ˝ϕñ  ♦ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Id(s) p: ϕñ ϕ :q
W p: ϕñ ϕ :q; p: ñ :q
R p: ñ  ϕ, ϕ :q; p: ñ :q
R♦ p: ñ ϕ :q; p ñ ♦ ϕ :q
R˝ p: ñ ♦ ϕ, ˝ϕ :q
L p:  ♦ ϕñ ˝ϕ :q
W + TL + TR
G; pA : Γ, ♦ ϕñ ˝ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Suppose $ G; pA : Γ, ˝ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H. Cutting this deduction with δ2 yields a
deduction of G; pA : Γ, ♦ ϕñ Σ : Bq;H. Suppose that $ G; pA : Γ, ♦ ϕñ Σ :
Bq;H. Cutting this with δ1 yields a deduction of G; pA : Γ, ˝ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H. The
other conjunct of the theorem is similar.
Theorem 7.3.2. $ G; pA : Γ, ˝  ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ,♦ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H
and $ G; pA : Γ ñ  ˝ ϕ,Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Proof. Similar to the proof of theorem 7.3.1.
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Theorem 7.3.1 and theorem 7.3.2 establish that unlike System Q – developed
by Prior [43] – in the logic given by fig. 7.1 and fig. 7.2 the operators ˝ and ♦ are
interdefinable.
7.3.2 Uniqueness
PHIL uniquely characterizes all of the operators that are given by rules of those
figures. The cases of the extensional connectives  and Ñ are familiar. The cases of
♦, λ, the first-order quantifier, and the second-order existential quantifier are given
below.
Lemma 7.1. Let L be expanded by ♦ˆ that is governed by the rules L♦ˆ and R♦ˆ that
result from replacing every occurrence of ♦ by ♦ˆ in L♦ and R♦. The following two
facts hold
1. $ G; pA : Γ,♦ϕñ Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ, ♦ˆϕñ Σ : Bq;H
2. $ G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ϕ,Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ˆϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Proof. Let δ1 and δ2 be the following deductions
δ1
Id p: ϕñ ϕ :q
W p: ϕñ ϕ :q; p: ñ :q
R♦ p: ϕñ :q; p: ñ ♦ϕ :q
L♦ˆ p: ♦ˆϕñ ♦ϕ :q
W + TL + TR
G; pA : Γ, ♦ˆϕñ ♦ϕ,Σ : Bq;H
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δ2
Id p: ϕñ ϕ :q
W p: ϕñ ϕ :q; p: ñ :q
R♦ˆ p: ϕñ :q; p: ñ ♦ˆϕ :q
L♦ p: ♦ϕñ ♦ˆϕ :q
W + TL + TR
G; pA : Γ,♦ϕñ ♦ˆϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Case 1. For the left to right direction let $ G; pA : Γ,♦ϕñ Σ : Bq;H. Cutting this
deduction with δ1 yields a deduction of G; pA : Γ, ♦ˆϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H. For the right to
left direction let $ G; pA : Γ, ♦ˆϕñ Σ : Bq;H. Cutting this deduction with δ2 yields
a deduction of G; pA : Γ,♦ϕñ Σ : Bq;H.
Case 2. For the left to right direction let $ G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ϕ,Σ : Bq;H. Cutting
this with δ2 yields a deduction of G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ˆϕ,Σ : Bq;H. For the right to left
direction let $ G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ˆϕ,Σ : Bq;H. Cutting this with a δ1 yields a deduction
of G; pA : Γ ñ ♦ϕ,Σ : Bq;H.
Lemma 7.2. Let L be expanded by λˆ that is governed by the rules Lλˆ and Rλˆ that
result from replacing every occurrence of λ by λˆ in Lλ and Rλ. The following two
facts hold
1. $ G; pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ, xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ
Σ : Bq;H
2. $ G; pA : Γ ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ ñ xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σ :
Bq;H
Proof. This proof is similar to lemma 7.1. The key to the lemma is proving that
$ G; pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σ : Bq;H and
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$ G; pA : Γ, xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σ : Bq;H. This is
given by the following two deductions.
Id(s) p: ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns :q
TL(t) pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns :q
Id(t) pt1 : ñ : t1q
TL(s/t) pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ : t1q . . .
Id(t) ptn : ñ : tnq
TL(s/t) pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ : tnq
Rλ pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn :q
Lλˆ p: xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕñ t1, . . . , tny ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn :q
W+TL+TR
G; pA : Γ, xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σ : Bq;H
Id(s) p: ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns :q
TL(t) pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns :q
Id(t) pt1 : ñ : t1q
TL(s/t) pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ : t1q . . .
Id(t) ptn : ñ : tnq
TL(s/t) pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ : tnq
Rλˆ pt1, . . . , tn : ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn :q
Lλ p: xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tny ñ xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn :q
W+TL+TR
G; pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ xλˆx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σ : Bq;H
The rest of this proof is similar to lemma 7.1.
Lemma 7.3. Let L be expanded by Dˆ1 that is governed by the rules LDˆ1 and RDˆ1
that result from replacing every occurrence of D1 by Dˆ1 in LD1 and RD1. The following
two facts hold
1. $ G; pA : Γ, D1xϕñ Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ, Dˆ1xϕñ Σ : Bq;H
2. $ G; pA : Γ ñ D1xϕ,Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ ñ Dˆ1xϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Proof. This proof is similar to the above. Let t be a term not appearing in D1xϕ.
The relevant deductions are
Id(s) p: ϕrt{xs ñ ϕrt{xs :q
TL(t) pt : ϕrt{xs ñ ϕrt{xs :q
Id(t) pt : ñ : tq
TL(s) pt : ϕrt{xs ñ : tq
RD1 pt : ϕrt{xs ñ D1xϕ :q
LDˆ1 p: Dˆ1xϕñ D1xϕ :q
W+TL+TR
G; pA : Γ, Dˆ1xϕñ D1xϕ,Σ : Bq;H
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Id(s) p: ϕrt{xs ñ ϕrt{xs :q
TL(t) pt : ϕrt{xs ñ ϕrt{xs :q
Id(t) pt : ñ : tq
TL(s) pt : ϕrt{xs ñ : tq
RDˆ1 pt : ϕrt{xs ñ Dˆ1xϕ :q
LD1 p: D1xϕñ Dˆ1xϕ :q
W+TL+TR
G; pA : Γ, D1xϕñ Dˆ1xϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Lemma 7.4. Let L be expanded by Dˆ2 that is governed by the rules LDˆ2 and RDˆ2
that result from replacing every occurrence of D2 by Dˆ2 in LD2 and RD2. The following
two facts hold
1. $ G; pA : Γ, D2xϕñ Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ, Dˆ2xϕñ Σ : Bq;H
2. $ G; pA : Γ ñ D2xϕ,Σ : Bq;H iff $ G; pA : Γ ñ Dˆ2xϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Proof. Let F be a predicate of the proper arity that does not occur in ϕ. The
following are the relevant deductions in this case
Id(s) p: ϕrf{F s ñ ϕrf{F s :q
RD2 p: ϕrf{F s ñ D2fϕ :q
LDˆ2 p: D2fϕñ Dˆ2fϕ :q
W + TL + TR
G; pA : Γ, D2fϕñ Dˆ2fϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Id(s) p: ϕrf{F s ñ ϕrf{F s :q
RDˆ2 p: ϕrf{F s ñ Dˆ2fϕ :q
LD2 p: Dˆ2fϕñ D2fϕ :q
W + TL + TR
G; pA : Γ, Dˆ2fϕñ D2fϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Theorem 7.3.3. PHIL uniquely characterizes all of the operators that are given by
rules of those figures.
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Proof. This is proved by induction on the depth of the occurrence of the operator
in question given in the sentence in question. The base case is given by lemmas 7.1
to 7.4. The inductive cases follow from an application of the inductive hypothesis and
the corresponding rule governing the main operator of the sentence in question.
7.4 Models
A model, M , for L is an ordered triple, M “ xWM , DM , IMy, where WM is a set of
worlds, DM is a set of sequences, and IM is an interpretation function.
With each world, w P WM , there is associated a set of domains. dMw p0q Ď DM is
the set of individuals that exist at w. For each i ě 1, let dMw piq Ď ℘ppDMqiq. The set
dMw piq is fully defined inductively alongside the satisfaction relation below. dMw piq is
the set of n-ary relations existing at w.
For each name, n P N , IMpnq P DM . For each n-ary predicate F P P , IMpw,F q Ď
dMw p0qn. Let ΣM be the set of functions, σ constrained by:
• σpεq P DM , if ε is first-order.
• σpw, εq P dMw piq, if ε is an i-ary second-order variable.
If σ and σ1 P ΣM , then σ1 is an ε-variant of σ, σ „ε σ1 iff the only place at which
σ and σ1 differ, if at all, is in the assignment to ε. Generalizing, σ „ε1,...,εn σ1 iff the
only places at which σ and σ1 differ, if at all, is in their assignments to ε1, . . . , εn.
A denotation function δ is defined relative to a model, M , world, w, and function
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σ P ΣM :
δMσ pw, εq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
IMpεq, if ε P N
IMpw, εq, if ε P P
σpw, εq, if ε P Vi
Satisfaction of a model relative to a world and variable assignment is defined
inductively alongside the rest of the definition of IM and DM . This is to account
for the interpretation of λ-expressions. ϕi is used to refer to a first-order sentence
with i-many iterations of λ-expressions, i.e. i-many occurrences of x. Satisfaction of
a sentence, ϕi by a model, M , relative to a world, w and sequence, σ is defined by
double induction, the outer induction is over i, and the inner is over the rank of ϕi.
Case 1. (First-Order Sentence: Base Case).
• If ϕ0 is Ft1, . . . , tn, M,w, σ |ù ϕ0 iff xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy P δMσ pw,F q.
• If ϕ0 is  ψ0, M,w, σ |ù ϕ0 iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ0.
• If ϕ0 is ψ0 Ñ θ0, then M,w, σ |ù ϕ0 iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ0 or M,w, σ |ù θ0.
• If ϕ0 is ♦ψ0, then M,w, σ |ù ϕ0 iff there is a world, v P WM such that M, v, σ |ù
ψ0.
• If ϕ0 is Dxψ0, then M,w, σ |ù ϕ0 iff there is a σ1 „x σ such that δMσ1 pw, xq P
dMw p0q and M,w, σ1 |ù ψ0.
• δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕ0q “ txδMσˆ px1q, . . . , δMσˆ pxnqy : σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pxiq P dMw p0q, 1 ď
i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù ϕ0u.
274
• δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕ0q P dMw pnq.
Case 2. (First-Order Sentence: Inductive Case).
• If ϕi is xλx1, . . . , xnψi´1yt1, . . . tn, thenM,w, σ |ù ϕi iff xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy P
δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψi´1q.
• If ϕi is  ψi, M,w, σ |ù ϕi iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψi.
• If ϕi is ψj Ñ θk, then M,w, σ |ù ϕi iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψj or M,w, σ |ù θk.
• If ϕi is ♦ψi, then M,w, σ |ù ϕi iff there is v P WM such that M, v, σ |ù ψi.
• If ϕi is Dxψi, then M,w, σ |ù ϕi iff there is a σ1 „x σ such that δMσ1 pw, xq P dMw p0q
and M,w, σ1 |ù ψi.
• δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕiq “ txδMσˆ px1q, . . . , δMσˆ pxnqy : σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pxiq P dMw p0q, 1 ď
i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù ϕiu.
• δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕiq P dMw pnq.
Case 3. (Second-Order Sentence).
• Nothing is an element of dMw pnq except by virtue of the above clauses.
• If ϕ is Dfψ, then M,w, σ |ù ϕ iff there is a σ1 „f σ, such that δMσ1 P dMw pnq and
M,w, σ1 |ù ψ.
Definition 32 (True-in-a-model). A sentence ϕ is true-in-a-model, M , at a world,
w, M,w |ù ϕ iff for all sequences σ, M,w, σ |ù ϕ.
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Definition 33 (Counter-Example to a Position). A model, M , is a counter-example
to a position, A : Γ ñ Σ : B at a world, w, and sequence σ, M,w, σ ­|ù A : Γ ñ Σ : B
iff for each c P A, δMσ pcq P dMw p0q, for each ϕ P Γ, M,w, σ |ù ϕ, for each ϕ P Σ,
M,w, σ ­|ù ϕ, and for each c P B, δMσ pcq R B. If this holds for all sequences, the
reference to σ is dropped.
Definition 34 (Counter-example). A model M is a counter-example to a hyper-
position G, at a sequence, σ, M,σ ­|ù G, iff for each S P G, there is a world, w, such
that M,w, σ ­|ù S. If this holds for all sequences, the reference to σ is dropped.
Fact 3. If there are no free variables in ϕ, and M,w, σ |ù ϕ, then M,w |ù ϕ.
Fact 4. Since λ-expressions do not have any free variables, δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕq “
δMσ1 pw, λx1, . . . , xnq for all σ and σ1.
This section establishes that the set of models given above is sound for the proof
theory given in fig. 7.1 and fig. 7.2. The theorem is established by induction on the
length of deductions.
7.5 Soundness
Lemma 7.5. Let δMσ pw, tq “ δMσ pw, cq for all w P WM . For any ϕ in which c occurs
unbound, for any w P WM , M,w, σ |ù ϕ iff M,w, σ |ù ψrt{cs
Proof. This is proved by induction on the rank of ϕ.
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Case 1 (ϕ is Ft1, . . . , tn). M,w, σ |ù Ft1, . . . , tn iff xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy P
δMσ pw,F q. Since δMσ pw, tq “ δMpw, cq for all w P WM ,
xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnq P δMσ pw,F q
„
δMσ pw, tq{δMσ pw, cq

But this is the case iff M,w, σ |ù Ft1, . . . , tnrt{cs.
Case 2 (ϕ is  ψ). M,w, σ |ù  ψ iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ. By IH, M,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff M,w, σ ­|ù
ψrt{cs, iff M,w, σ |ù  ψrt{cs.
Case 3 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). M,w, σ |ù ψ Ñ θ iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ or M,w, σ |ù θ. Since by IH,
M,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψrt{cs and M,w, σ |ù θ iff M,w, σ |ù θrt{cs, M,w, σ ­|ù ψ
or M,w, σ |ù θ iff M,w, σ |ù ψ Ñ θrt{cs.
Case 4 (ϕ is ♦ψ). M,w, σ |ù ♦ψ iff there is a world v P WM such that M, v, σ |ù ψ.
Since δMσ pv, tq “ δMσ pv, cq for all v P WM , by IH, M, v, σ |ù ψ iff M, v, σ |ù ψrt{cs.
M, v, σ |ù ψrt{cs iff M,w, σ |ù ♦ψrt{cs.
Case 5 (ϕ is xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn). M,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn iff xδMσ pw, s1q, . . . , δMσ pw, snqy P
δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq. δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq “ txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σ „x1,...,xn
σˆ&δMσˆ pw, xi P dMw p0q, 1 ď i ď n & M,w, σˆ |ù ψu.
LetM,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn. So xδMσ pw, s1q, . . . , δMσ pw, snqy P txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy :
σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pw, xi P dMw p0q, 1 ď i ď n & M,w, σˆ |ù ψu. Since that set is non-
empty, let σ1 be such that δMσ pw, siq “ δMσ1 pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n, σ „x1,...,xn σ1
and M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since neither ‘t’ nor ‘c’ is one of x1, . . . , xn, δMσ pw, tq “ δMσ pw, cq “
δMσ1 pw, tq “ δMσ1 pw, tq for all w P WM . So by IH, M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt{cs. It follows that
xδMσ1 pw, x1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, xnq P txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pw, xi P
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dMw p0q, 1 ď i ď n & M,w, σˆ |ù ψrt{csu “ δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψrt{cs). Since for each si,
δMσ pw, siq “ δMσ1 pw, xiq, xδMσ pw, s1q, . . . , δMσ pw, snqy P δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψrt{csq. Since
δMσ pw, tq “ δMσ pw, cq,
xδMσ pw, s1q, . . . , δMσ pw, snqy P δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψrt{csq
„
δMσ pw, tq{δMσ pw, cq

So M,w, σ |ù xx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , snrt{cs.
The converse direction is analogous.
Case 6 (ϕ is Dxψ). M,w, σ |ù Dxψ iff there is a σ1 such that M,w, σ1 |ù ψ and
σpw, xq P dMw p0q and σ1 „x σ. By IH, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ iff M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt{cs. Since
neither ‘t’ nor ‘c’ are ‘x’, M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt{cs iff M,w, σ |ù Dxψrt{cs.
Case 7 (ϕ is Dfψ). M,w, σ |ù Dfψ iff there is a σ1 „f σ, δMσ1 pw, fq P dMw piq, and
M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. By IH,M,w, σ1 |ù ψ iff M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt{cs. Since neither ‘t’ nor ‘c’
are ‘f ’, the former holds iff M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt{cs and σ1 „f σ and δMσ1 pw, fq P dMw piq iff
M,w, σ |ù Dfψrt{cs
Lemma 7.6. Let δMσ pw, εq “ δMσ1 pw, εq for all unbound ε in ϕ. It follows that for
any w P W , M,w, σ |ù ϕ iff m,w, σ1 |ù ϕ.
Proof. Let σ and σ1 be such that δMσ pw, εq “ δMσ1 pεq for all w P WM , and this holds
for all unbound ε in ϕ. That for any w P WM , M,w, σϕ iff M,w, σ1ϕ is proved by
induction on the rank of ϕ.
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Case 1 (ϕ is Ft1, . . . , tn). Let w P WM . M,w, σ |ù ϕ iff xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy P
δMσ pw,F q. By assumption, δMσ pw, tiq “ δMσ1 pw, tiq for all 1 ď i ď n and δMσ pw,F q “
δMσ1 pw,F q. So M,w, σ |ù ϕ iff xδMσ1 pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, tnqy P δMσ1 pw,F q iff M,w, σ1 |ù ψ.
Case 2 (ϕ is  ψ). M,w, σ |ù  ψ iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ. By IH, M,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff M,w, σ1 ­|ù
ψ. But M,w, σ1 ­|ù ψ iff M,w, σ1 |ù  ψ.
Case 3 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). M,w, σ |ù ψ Ñ θ iff either M,w, σ ­|ù ψ or M,w, σ |ù θ. By IH,
M,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff M,w, σ1 ­|ù ψ and M,w, σ |ù θ iff M,w, σ1 |ù θ. Either M,w, σ1 ­|ù ψ
or M,w, σ1 |ù θ iff M,w, σ1 |ù ψ Ñ θ.
Case 4 (ϕ is ♦ψ). M,w, σ |ù ψ iff there is a world, v, such that M, v, σ |ù ψ. By IH,
M, v, σ |ù ψ iff M, v, σ1 |ù ψ. There is a v such that M, v, σ1 |ù ψ iff M,w, σ1 |ù ♦ψ.
Case 5 (ϕ is xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn). M,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn iff xδMσ pw, s1q, . . . , δMσ pw, snq P
txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn σ&δMσˆ pw, xiq P dMw piq for all 1 ď i ď
n&M,w, σˆ |ù ψu. Similarly, M,w, σ1 |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1 . . . , sn iff xδMσ1 pw, s1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, snq P
txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn σ1&δMσˆ pw, xiq P dMw piq for all 1 ď i ď
n&M,w, σˆ |ù ψu.
Suppose that M,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn. So δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq is non-
empty. Let σ˚ be such that σ˚ „x1,...,xn σ, δMσ˚pw, xiq P dMw p0q, for all 1 ď i ď n,
M,w, σ˚ |ù ψ, and δMσ˚pw, xiq “ δMσ pw, siq for 1 ď i ď n. Let σ1 „x1,...,xn σ1 and
be such that δMσ˚pw, xiq “ δMσ1pw, xiq, for all w P WM . Since for all unbound ε
in xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn, δMσ pw, εq “ δMσ1 pw, εq and σ „x1,...,xn σ˚, δMσ pw, εq “
δMσ˚pw, εq “ δMσ1pw, εq “ δMσ1 pw, εq. Since σMσ˚pw, xiq “ σMσ1pw, xiq for all 1 ď i ď n,
for all w P WM , δMσ˚pw, εq “ δMσ1pw, εq for all ε unbound in ψ. By IH, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ.
From the other facts, δMσ1pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n and σ1 „x1,...,xn σ1. So
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xδMσ1pw, x1q, . . . , δMσ1pw, xnqy P δMσ1 pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq. But δMσ1pw, xiq “ δMσ pw, siq, for
1 ď i ď n. So M,w, σ1 |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn.
The converse direction is similar.
Case 6 (ϕ is Dxψ). Let M,w, σ |ù Dxψ. So there is a σ˚ „x σ such that σ˚pw, xq P
dMw p0q and M,w, σ˚ |ù ψ. Let σ1 „x σ1 be such that σ1pw, xq “ σ˚pw, xq, for all
w P WM . By IH, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ, since δMσ˚pw, εq “ δMσ1pw, εq for all ε unbound in ψ.
Since σ1 „x σ1 and σ1pw, xq P dMw p0q, M,w, σ1 |ù Dxψ.
The converse direction, and second-order case are similar.
Lemma 7.7. If M and N are models such that
1. WM “ WN ,
2. DM “ DN ,
3. dMw piq “ dnwpiq for each i and w P WM , and
4. for all expressions, ε appearing in ϕ, all sequences σ, and worlds, w, δMσ pw, εq “
δNσ pw, εq,
then for all w P WM and all σ, M,w, σ |ù ϕ iff N,w, σ |ù ϕ.
Proof. Let M and N be such models, and ϕ such a sentence. The proof proceeds by
induction on the rank of ϕ.
Case 1 (ϕ is Ft1, . . . , tn). M,w, σ |ù Ft1, . . . , tn iff xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ ptnqy P δMσ pw,F q.
By assumption δMσ pw, εq “ δNpεq for all ε appearing in ϕ. So xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ ptnqy P
δMσ pw,F q iff xδNσ pw, t1q, . . . , δNσ ptnqy P δNσ pw,F q iff N,w, σ |ù Ft1, . . . , tn.
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Case 2 (ϕ is  ψ). M,w, σ |ù  ψ iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ. By IH, M,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff N,w, σ ­|ù
ψ. But, N,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff N,w, σ |ù  ψ.
Case 3 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). M,w, σ |ù ψ Ñ θ iff M,w, σ ­|ù ψ or M,w, σ |ù θ. By
IH, M,w, σ ­|ù ψ iff N,w, σ ­|ù ψ and M,w, σ |ù θ iff N,w, σ |ù θ. Finally, either
N,w, σ ­|ù ψ or N,w, σ |ù θ iff N,w, σ |ù ψ Ñ θ.
Case 4 (ϕ is ♦ψ). M,w, σ |ù ♦ψ iff there is a world, v, such that M, v, σ |ù ψ. By
IH, M, v, σ |ù ψ iff N, v, σ |ù ψ. So M,w, σ |ù ♦ψ iff there is a world, v P WN “ WN
such that N, v, σ |ù ψ iff N,w, σ |ù ♦ψ.
Case 5 (ϕ is xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn). Let M,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn. So
xδMσ pw, s1q, . . . , xδMσ pw, snqy P txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn σ&δMσˆ pw, xiq P
dMw p0q for 1,ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù ψu. Since this set is non-empty, there is a σ1 such
that σ1 „x1,...,xn σ, δMσ1 pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1,ď i ď n, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ, and δMσ pw, siq “
δMσ1 pw, xiq for 1 ď i ď n. By IH, N,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since WM “ WN , DM “ DN , dMw piq “
dnwpiq for each i and w P WM , and for all expressions, ε appearing in ϕ, all sequences
σ, and worlds, w, δMσ pw, εq “ δNσ pw, εq, δMσ1 pw, xiq “ δNσ1pw, xiq and σ „x1,...,xn σ1,
xδNσ1pw, x1q, . . . , δNσ1pw, xnqy P txδNσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δNσˆ pw, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn σ&δNσˆ pw, xiq P
dNw p0q for 1,ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù ψu. By the definition of δNσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq,
xδNσ1pw, x1q, . . . , δNσ1pw, xnqy P δNσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq. Since δNσ pw, siq “ δMσ pw, siq “
δMσ pw, xiq “ δNσ pw, xiq, for 1 ď i ď n, xδNσ1pw, s1q, . . . , δNσ1pw, snqy P δNσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq.
So N,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψys1, . . . , sn.
The converse case is similar.
Case 6 (ϕ is Dxψ). M,w, σ |ù Dxψ iff there is a σ1 „x σ such that δMσ1 pw, xq P dMw p0q,
and M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since for all σ˚ and w, δMσ˚pw, xq “ δNσ˚pw, xq, and σ1 „x σ, for
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any ε unbound in ψ, for all σ˚ and w, δMσ˚pw, εq “ δNσ˚pw, εq, by IH M,w, σ1 |ù ψ iff
N,w, σ1 |ù ψ. But then M,w, σ |ù Dxψ iff there is a σ1 „x σ such that δMσ1 pw, xq “
δNσ1pw, xq P dNw p0q and N,w, σ1 |ù ψ iff N,w, σ |ù Dxψ.
The second-order case is similar to the above case.
Lemma 7.8. Let t1, . . . , tn not be any of x1, . . . , xn. For any model, M , and world,
w P WM , M,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn iff M,w, σ |ù ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtnsrxns and
δMσ pw, tiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n.
Proof.
Case 1 (Left-to-Right). LetM,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn. So xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy P
txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn σ&δMσˆ pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù
ψu. Thus, there is a σ1 such that
1. δMσ pw, tiq “ δMσ1 pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n,
2. σ1 „x1,...,xn σ, and
3. M,w, σ |ù ψ.
by (1), δMσ pw, tiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n. The evaluation of terms is not relative to
a world, i.e. δMw pvq “ σpvq for a variable, and δMσ pw, tq “ IMptq, for a term. Thus,
δMσ1 pw, xiq “ δMσ pw, tiq for each w P WM , for 1 ď i ď n. Since t1, . . . , tn are not any of
x1, . . . , xn, δ
M
σ pw, tiq “ δMσ1 pw, tiq for all w P WM , for each 1 ď i ď n. By lemma 7.5,
M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns. Since x1, . . . , xn do not occur in ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns,
by lemma 7.6, M,w, σ |ù ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns.
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Case 2 (Right-to-Left). Let M,w, σ |ù ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns and δMσ pw, tiq P dMw p0q
for 1 ď i ď n. Let σ1 „x1,...,xn σ be such that δMσ1 pv, xiq “ δMp v, tiq for all v P
WM , for each 1 ď i ď n. Since x1, . . . , xn do not appear in ψ, by lemma 7.6,
M,w, σ1 |ù ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns. By n-many applications of lemma 7.5, M,w, σ1 |ù
ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns iff M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since σ1 „x1,...,xn and δMσ1 pv, xiq “ δMp v, tiq P
dMw p0q, xδMσ1 pw, x1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, xnqy P txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn δMσˆ pw, xiq P
dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù ψu, i.e. xδMσ1 pw, x1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, xnqy P δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq.
So xδMσ1 pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, tnqy P δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq, andM,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnψyt1, . . . , tn.
Theorem 7.5.1. If $ G then |ù G.
Proof. This is proved by induction on the length of deductions. It is shown that
there are no counter-examples to Id(s) and Id(t) for the base cases. For the inductive
cases it is assumed that given a rule there is no counter-example to the premises, but
there is a counter-example to the conclusion. In each case this is shown to lead to a
contradiction. For each case let δ be the deduction of G, and I be the last rule of δ.
Case 1 (Base Cases).
Case 14 (I is an instance of Idpsq). In this case δ has the form
p: Ft1, . . . , tn ñ Ft1, . . . , tn :q
Let M be such that M ­|ù p: Ft1, . . . , tn ñ Ft1, . . . , tn :q. But this is impossible
since then there is a world, w P WM , and σ such that xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy P
δMσ pw,F q and xδMσ pw, t1q, . . . , δMσ pw, tnqy R δMσ pw,F q. But this is impossible.
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Case 15 (I is an instance of Idptq). In this case δ has the form
pt : ñ : tq
Let M be a counter-example too pt : ñ : tq. But then there is a world, w P WM
such that IMpw, tq P dMw p0q and IMpw, tq R dMw p0q. This, however, is impossible.
Case 2 (Inductive Cases).
Case 16 (I is TL(s)). In this case δ has the form:
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq;H
Let M be a model such that M ­|ù G; pA : Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq;H. For every position,
S P G Y H Y tpA : Γ, ϕ ñ ∆ : Bqu, there is a world, w, such that M,w ­|ù S. In
particular, there is a world, w, such that M,w ­|ù pA : Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq. Since for every
sentence, γ P Γ Y tϕu, M,w |ù γ, for every sentence, γ P Γ, M,w |ù γ. So M,w |ù
pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq. But then M is a counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H. The
cases of TL(t), TR(s), and TR(t) proceed in a similar way to this one.
Case 17 (I is Cut). In this case δ has the form:
...
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq;H
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,∆ : Bq;H
Cut
G; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H. Let w be a world,
such that M,w ­|ù pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq. Given the law of excluded middle in the
metalanguage, either M,w |ù ϕ or M,w ­|ù ϕ. In the first case, for each sentence,
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γ P Γ Y tϕu, M,w ­|ù γ. Thus M,w ­|ù pA : Γ, ϕ,ñ ∆ : Bq. So M is a counter-
example to G; pA : Γ, ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H. In the second case, for each sentence, θ P ∆,
M,w ­|ù θ. Thus, M,w ­|ù pA : Γ ñ ϕ,∆ : Bq, and M is a counter-example to
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H.
Case 18 (I is W). In this case δ has the form
...
G;H
W
G; p: ñ :q;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; p: ñ :q;H. So for each S P G Y H Y tp:
ñ :qu, there is a w P WM . From this it follows that for every position in G Y H,
there is a world, w P WM such that M ­|ù G;H.
Case 19 (I is AL). In this case δ has the following form
...
G; pA, t : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, F t1, . . . tn ñ ∆ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ, F t1, . . . , t, . . . , tn ñ ∆ : Bq;H. So
there is a sequence, σ P Σ and a world, w P WM , such that M,w, σ ­|ù pA :
Γ, F t1, . . . , t, . . . , tn ñ ∆ : Bq. In particular, this means that xδMσ pt1q, . . . , δMσ ptq, . . . , δMσ ptnqy P
IMpw,F q. Since F P P , IMpw,F q Ď ℘pdwpnqq, each element of xδMσ pt1q, . . . , δMσ ptq, . . . , δMσ ptnqy P
dwp0q. It follows that δMσ ptq P dMw p0q. But then M is a counter-example to G; pA, t :
Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H.
Case 20 (I is L ). δ has the form
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,∆ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq;H
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Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ, ϕ ñ ∆ : Bq;H. There is a world,
w P WM , such that M,w ­|ù pA : Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq;H. In particular, then M,w |ù  ϕ,
so M,w ­|ù ϕ. From this it follows that M,w ­|ù pA : Γ ñ ϕ,∆ : Bq. So M is a
counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,∆ : Bq;H. The case where I is R is similar.
Case 21 (I is LÑ). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕ,∆ : Bq;H
...
G; pA : Γ, ψ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ, ϕÑ ψ ñ ∆ : Bq;H. There is a world,
w P WM , such that M,w ­|ù pA : Γ, ϕ Ñ ψ ñ ∆ : Bq;H. So M,w |ù ϕ Ñ ψ and
either M,w |ù ψ or M,w ­|ù ϕ. In the first case, M,w ­|ù pA : Γ ñ ψ,∆ : Bq. So M
is a counter-example to G : pA : Γ ñ ψ,∆ : Bq. In the second case, M,w ­|ù pA :
Γ, ϕñ ∆ : Bq, so M is a counter-example to G; pA : Γ, ϕñ Σ : Bq;H.
The case where I is RÑ is similar.
Case 22 (I is L♦). In this case δ has the form
...
p: ϕñ :q;G; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ,♦ϕñ ∆ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ,♦ϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H. There is a world
w P WM , such that M,w |ù ♦ϕ. From this it follows that there is a world, v, such
that M, v |ù ϕ. M, v |ù p: ϕ ñ :q. Thus, M is a counter-example to p: ϕ ñ :
q;G; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H.
Case 23 (I is R♦). In this case δ has the form
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...
G; pC : Π ñ ϕ,Θ : Dq;G1; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H
G; pC : Π ñ Θ : Dq;G1; pA : Γ ñ ♦ϕ,∆ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pC : Π ñ Θ : Dq;G1; pA : Γ ñ ♦ϕ,∆ : Bq;H.
There is a world, w P WM such that M,w ­|ù ϕ. Thus there is no world, v P WM ,
such that M, v |ù ϕ. There is a world u P WM , such that M,u |ù pC : Π ñ Θ : Dq.
So M,u ­|ù ϕ. But then M,u |ù pC : Π ñ ϕ,Θ : Dq. So M is a counter-example to
G; pC : Π ñ ϕ,Θ : Dq;G1; pA : Γ ñ ∆ : Bq;H.
Case 24 (I is Lλ). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA, t1, . . . , tn : Γ, ϕrt{x1s . . . rtn{ns ñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ Σ : Bq;H
Let M ­|ù G; pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ Σ : Bq;H. So there is a world,
w P WM , such that M,w ­|ù pA : Γ, xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn ñ Σ : Bq. Let σ P ΣM .
M,w, σ |ù xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn. By lemma 7.8, M,w, σ |ù ψrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns
and δMσ pw, tiq for 1 ď i ď n P dMw p0q. Since σ was arbitrary, this holds for any
such σ. So M,w ­|ù pA, t1, . . . , tn : Γ, ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns ñ Σ : Bq. Thus M is a
counter-example to G; pA, t1, . . . , tn : Γ, ϕrt{x1s . . . rtn{ns ñ Σ : Bq;H.
Case 25 (I is Rλ). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns,Σq;H
...
tG; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tiq;Hui
G; pA : Γ ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σq;H.
There is a world, w P WM , such that M,w, σ ­|ù pA : Γ ñ xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn,Σq
for all σ P ΣM . Let σ P ΣM , M,w, σ ­|ù xλx1, . . . , xnϕyt1, . . . , tn. By lemma 7.8, either
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M,w, σ ­|ù ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns or there is a term ti in tt1, . . . , tiu such that δMw ptiq R
dMw p0q. Since ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns is closed, for any sequence, σ, either M,w, σ ­|ù
ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns andM is a counter-example toG; pA : Γ ñ ϕrt1{x1s . . . rtn{xns,Σq;H
or there is a ti such that M is a counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tiq;H.
Case 26 (I is LD1). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, Dxϕñ Σ : Bq;H
where t does not occur in G; pA : Γ, Dxϕñ Σ : Bq;H. Let M be a counter-example
to G; pA : Γ ñ Dxϕ ñ Σ : Bq;H. There is a w P WM , such that for every σ,
M,w, σ ­|ù pA : Γ, Dxϕ ñ Σ : Bq. So there is a σ1 „x σ, such that δMσ pw, xq P dMw p0q
and M,w, σ |ù ψ. Let N be a model, such that
1. WM “ WN ,
2. DM “ DN ,
3. dMw piq “ dnwpiq for each i and w P WM , and
4. for all expressions, ε appearing in G; pA : Γ, Dxϕñ Σ : Bq;H, all sequences σ,
and worlds, w, δMσ pw, εq “ δNσ pw, εq.
and such that δMσ pw, xq “ δNσ pw, tq for all worlds, w and sequences, σ. By lemma 7.7,
N,w, σ |ù ψ. By lemma 7.5, M,w, σ |ù ψrt{xs and δMσ pw, tq P dMσ pw, tq. Since this
holds for any σ, by several applications of lemma 7.7, N,w ­|ù pA, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ
Σ : Bq. By several more applications of lemma 7.7, N is a counter-example to
G; pA, t : Γ, ϕrt{xs ñ Σ : Bq;H.
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Case 27 (I is RD1). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : Bq;H
...
G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tq;H
G1; pA : Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G1; pA : Γ ñ Dxϕ,Σ : Bq;H. Let, M,w, σ ­|ù Dxψ.
So there is a no σ1 „x σ such that δMσ1 pw, xq P dMw p0q and M,w, σ |ù ψ. Let t be a
term, and σ1 be such that σ1 „x σ and δMσ1 pw, xq “ δMσ1 pw, tq for all w P WM . Either
M,w, σ1 ­|ù ψ or δMσ1 pw, xq R dMw p0q. In the first case, by lemma 7.7, M,w, σ1 ­|ù ψrt{xs.
Since ψrt{xs is closed, M,w ­|ù ψrt{xs and M is thus a counter-example to G; pA :
Γ ñ ϕrt{xs,Σ : Bq;H. In the latter case, since t is a term, M is a counter-example
to G; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tq;H.
Case 28 (I is LD2). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA : Γ, ϕrF {f s ñ Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ, Dfϕñ Σ : Bq;H
where F does not occur in G; pA : Γ, Dfϕñ Σ : Bq;H. Let M be a counter-example
to G; pA : Γ, Dfϕñ Σ : Bq;H. So there is a world, w P WM , and sequence, σ, such
that for any sequence σ1 „f σ, δMσ pw, fq P dMw piq where f is an i-ary variable, and
M,w, σ1 |ù ϕ. Let N be a model such that
1. WM “ WN ,
2. DM “ DN ,
3. dMw piq “ dnwpiq for each i and w P WM , and
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4. for all expressions, ε appearing in G; pA : Γ, Dfϕñ Σ : Bq;H, all sequences σ,
and worlds, w, δMσ pw, εq “ δNσ pw, εq.
and such that δMσ pw, fq “ δNσ pw,F q for all worlds, w and sequences, σ. By lemma 7.7,
N,w, σ |ù ψ. By lemma 7.5, N,w, σ |ù ψrF {f s. Several applications of lemma 7.7
gives that N is a counter-example to G; pA : Γ, ϕrF {f s ñ Σ : Bq;H
Case 29 (I is an instance of RD2). In this case δ has the form
...
G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrxλx1, . . . , xnψy{f s,Σ : Bq;H
G; pA : Γ ñ Dfϕ,Σ : Bq;H
Let M be a counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ Dfϕ,Σ : Bq;H and xλx1, . . . , xnψy
an arbitrary λ-expression. There is a w P WM such that for every sequence σ,
M,w, σ ­|ù Dfψ. So for any sequence, σ1 „f σ, M,w, σ1 ­|ù ψ. At some stage,
δMσˆ pxλx1, . . . , xnψyq was defined and added to dMw pnq. Let σ1 be a sequence such that
σ „f σ1 and δMσ1 pw, fq “ δMσ1 pw, λx1, . . . , xnψq for each w P WM . By lemma 7.5,
M,w, σ1 |ù ϕrλx1, . . . , xnψ{f s. Since ϕrλx1, . . . , xnψ{f s is closed, this holds for any
σ1. So M is a counter-example to G; pA : Γ ñ ϕrxλx1, . . . , xnψy{f s,Σ : Bq;H
7.6 Completeness
The completeness theorem is shown by means of a Hintikka-like construction. Im-
portantly, what is shown is that the logic that results from removing Cut from fig. 7.1
and fig. 7.2 is complete for the given model-theory. This fact is used to establish
that the contingentist second-order logic presented in this chapter is cut-admissible.
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The completeness proof relies on the theorem that Id holds for any sentence ϕ.
Theorem 7.6.1. $: ϕñ ϕ :
Proof. This is proved by induction on the rank of ϕ. If ϕ is Ft1, . . . , tn then the
deduction in question is an instance of Id. For the other cases, suppose that the
result holds for formulas of rank less than ϕ. The cases where ϕ is  ψ and ψ Ñ θ
are omitted.
Case 1 (ϕ is ♦ψ).
IH
p: ψ ñ ψ :q
W p: ψ ñ ψ :q; p: ñ :q
R♦ p: ψ ñ q; p: ñ ♦ψ :q
L♦ p: ♦ψ ñ ♦ψ :q
Case 2 (ϕ is Dxψ). Let w be a term not occurring in ψ.
IH
p: ψrw{xs ñ ψrw{xs :q
TL(t) pw : ψrw{xs ñ ψrw{xs :q
Id(t) pw : ñ : wq
TL(s) pw : ψrw{xs ñ : wq
RD1 pw : ψrw{xs ñ Dxψ :q
LD1 p: Dxψ ñ Dxψ :q
Case 3 (ϕ is xλx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn).
IH
p: ψrc1{x1s . . .ñ ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns :q
TL(t)ˆn pc1, . . . , cn : ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns ñ ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns :q
Id(t) tpci : ñ : ciqui
TL(s) tpci : ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns ñ : ciqui
TL(t)ˆn´ 1tpc1, . . . , cn : ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns ñ : ciqui
Rλ pc1, . . . , cn : ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns ñ xλx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn :q
Lλ p: xλx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn ñ xλx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn :q
Case 4 (ϕ is D2fψ). Let ϕ be a predicate not occurring in ψ.
IH
p: ψrF {f s ñ ψrF {f s :q
RD2 p: ψrF {f s ñ Dfψ :q
LD2 p: Dfψ ñ Dfψ :q
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The proof of completeness proceeds by showing how to construct a tree for any
given unprovable hyper-position. A model is then defined from the open branch of
this tree. Thus, for any unprovable sequent there is a model.
7.6.1 Building a Tree
Let G be an unprovable hyper-position. Let S “ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn . . . be an enumeration of
the sentences of the language, N “ c1, . . . , cn, . . . an enumeration of the names of the
language, and R “ ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . an enumeration of the predicates of the language,
i.e. an enumeration of the union of P and the set of λ-expressions. Consider the set
S ˆ N ˆ R, and let there be an ordering on it. Let W0 be a list, w1, . . . , wn, . . . of
first-order witnesses, and let Wi, i ě 1 be a list of i-ary witnesses, wi1, . . . , win, . . ..
Let W1 be an infinite set of first-order witnesses and let W2 be an infinite set of
second-order witnesses. Let T1 YW1 be ordered such that for there is no w P W1
such that there is a t P T1 and w is ordered earlier than t. Let there be a similar
ordering on the set of predicates and λ-expressions and W2. Call that set P .
A tree is constructed with G at its root. A branch of the tree with leaf G1 is closed
iff either there is a position, C : ∆ ñ Λ : D P G1, such that C XD ‰ H or there is a
position, C : ∆ ñ Λ : D P G1, such that ∆XΛ ‰ H. A leaf is open iff it is not closed.
At each stage of building the tree, consider each open leaf, H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1,
in the tree. For each position, A : Γ ñ Σ : B P H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1, and for each
sentence ϕ P ΓY Σ do the following:
1. If ϕ is F nt1, . . . , tn, then
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(a) if F nt1, . . . , tnΓ then expand the tree by
H; pA, t1, . . . , tn : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H
2. If ϕ is  ψ, then
(a) if  ψ P Γ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ ñ ψ,Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
(b) if  ψ P Σ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ, ψ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
3. If ϕ is ψ Ñ θ then
(a) if ψ Ñ θ P Γ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ ñ ψ,Σ : Bq;H 1 H; pA : Γ, θ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
(b) if ψ Ñ θ P Σ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ, ψ ñ θ,Σ : Bq;H 1
4. If ϕ is ♦ψ then
(a) if ♦ψ P Γ and there is no position, pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq such that ψ P ∆
expand the tree by
p: ñ ψ :q;H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
(b) if ♦ψ P Σ, let H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1 be pA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : Bq; . . . , pA : Γ ñ
Σ : Bq; . . . ; pAn : Γn ñ Σn : Bnq and expand the tree by
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pA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1, ψ : Bq; . . . , pA : Γ ñ Σ, ψ : Bq; . . . ; pAn : Γn, ψ ñ Σn, ψ : Bnq
5. If ϕ is xλx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn then
(a) if xλx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn P Γ then expand the tree by
H; pA, c1, . . . , cn : Γ, ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
(b) if xx1, . . . , xnψyc1, . . . , cn P Σ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ ñ ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns,Σ : Bq;H 1 tH; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, ciq;H 1u1ďiďn
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
6. If ϕ is Dxψ then
(a) if Dxψ P Γ then expand the tree by
H; pA,w : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
where w is the least element of T1YW1 not appearing in H; pA : Γ ñ Σ :
Bq;H 1.
(b) if Dxψ P Σ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ ñ ψrt{xs,Σ : Bq;H 1 H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : B, tq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
where t is the least element of T1 YW1 such that neither ψrt{xs P Σ nor
t P B.
7. if ϕ is Dfψ then
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(a) if Dfψ P Γ expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ, ψrW {f s ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
where W is the least element of W2 not appearing in H; pA : Γ ñ Σ :
Bq;H 1
(b) if Dfψ then expand the tree by
H; pA : Γ ñ ψrε{f s,Σ : Bq;H 1
H; pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq;H 1
where ε is the least element of P such that ψrε{f s R Σ
For convenience the stages are referred to by number. When a particular sentence
is considered at a stage, that is referred to as a step. Each step is a derivable rule of
the calculus of fig. 7.1 and fig. 7.2. Anything generated by (1) is an instance of AL.
Anything generated by (2) is either an instance of L or R , any thing generated
by (3) is either an instance of LÑ or RÑ. Anything generated by (4a) is an instance
of L♦, anything generated by (5) is an instance of Lλ or Rλ, and anything generated
by (6) or (7) is an instance of one of LD1, LD2, RD1, RD2. This leaves only (4b) which
is not an instance of any rule. Since hyper-positions are sets, this is derivable by
as many applications of R♦ as are necessary. Thus, if every branch of the above
construction closed, there would be a deduction of G. It would begin from closed
leaves, which are derivable by theorem 7.6.1, and proceed by means of derivable rules
of fig. 7.1 and fig. 7.2 to G. So there is a open branch of this tree after a stage for
each natural number has been completed.
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7.6.2 Building A Model
Consider a step a particular step in some stage. At this step some procedure of (1)
- (7) above was applied. Call it i. Let J be the hyper-position occurring at prior to
i and K be a hyper-position occurring directly above J in the tree. Let S P J and
S 1 P K. A predecessor relation is defined on S and S 1 via definition 35.
Definition 35 (Predecessor). S is a predecessor of S 1, S ă S 1 iff either S “ S 1 or S 1
results from S by an application of i where i is not (4a).
Suppose that S ă S 1. If it is also the case that S ă S2, then there is a stage and
step, i, such that there are four possibilities:
• S “ S 1 and S “ S2
• S “ S 1 and S2 results from S by an application of i
• S 1 results from S by an application of i and S “ S2
• S 1 results from S by an application of i and S2 results from S by an application
of i.
The second case is impossible. If S and S 1 are identical, they were identical before
the application of i, since i applied only to one element of J , S. But this cannot
be the case if S2 results from S by an application of i. Similar considerations rule
out the third possibility. On either of the other possibilities, S 1 and S2 are identical.
This establishes fact 5.
Fact 5. If S ă S 1, then for any S2 such that S ă S2, S2 “ S 1.
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Fact 5 legitimates the following notation, #S, is the unique S 1 such that S ă S 1
in a construction of the above sort. It is important to note that there will be some
positions that do not have predecessors, e.g. those positions in the root of the tree
or generated as a result of an application (4a).
Because steps (1) - (7) can at most expand a position in a hyper-position. For
any pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq ă pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, A Ď C, Γ Ď ∆, Σ Ď Λ, and B Ď D. A
chain of a position S in a branch ChpSq is defined inductively
Definition 36 (Chain of S). If S is a position in an open branch, then S 1 P ChpSq
if either S 1 “ #S or there is an S˚ P ChpSq such that S 1 “ #S˚.
Let UChpSq be a potentially infinite position identified by the union of all the
elements of positions occurring in the chain of S.
Definition 37 (Union of a Chain). Let ChpSq “ pA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : B1q, . . . , pAn :
Γn ñ Σn : Bnq, . . .
UChpSq “ p
ď
i
Ai :
ď
i
Γi ñ
ď
i
Σi :
ď
i
Biq
For any pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq, if pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq P ChpA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq, A Ď C,
Γ Ď ∆, Σ Ď Λ, and B Ď D. It follows that for any positions S, S 1 and S˚, if
UChpSq “ S 1 and S˚ P ChpSq, UChpS˚q “ S 1.
Let G be an unprovable hyper-position and β “ G1, . . . , Gn, . . . an open branch
in a tree constructed in the manner of section 7.6.1 from G.
Epβq “
ď
tUChpSq : DGipGi P β&S P Giu
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Epβq is a hyper-position. Suppose that there is a position in Epβq, pA : Γ ñ
Σ : Bq, such that ϕ P Γ Y Σ. If that were the case, then there is a step, n, with
position, pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq with ϕ in either ∆ or Λ. At some later stage, n`m with
position, pC 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q P ChpSq, ϕ would have to have been added to Λ or ∆
respectively. But then β would have closed at m ` n, contradicting the hypothesis
that β is an open branch. Similar considerations rule out that there is any sequent
pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq, such that there is a t P AXB.
There are several other important features of Epβq. These features are summed
up in lemmas 7.9 to 7.15.
Lemma 7.9. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If Fc1, . . . , cn P Γ, then for each ci,
1 ď i ď n, ci P A.
Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Since Fc1, . . . , cn P Γ, there is a stage j with
position pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq such that Fc1, . . . , cn P ∆. At stage j ` 1, by (1) of
the procedure in section 7.6.1, c1, . . . , cn would be added to C. Since for each such
pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, C Ď A, c1, . . . , cn P A.
Lemma 7.10. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If  ϕ P Γ, then ϕ P Σ, and if  ϕ P Σ,
then ϕ P Γ.
Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Only the first conjunct will be proved since
the proof of th second conjunct is similar. Let  ϕ P Γ. So there is a stage, n, with
a position, pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, such that  ϕ P ∆. At stage n ` 1, with sequent
pC 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q, by (2a) of the process in section 7.6.1, ϕ would have been added
to Λ1. Since Λ1 Ď Σ, ϕ P Σ.
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Lemma 7.11. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If ϕ Ñ ψ P Γ, then either ϕ P Σ or
ψ P Γ. If ϕÑ ψ P Σ then ϕ P Γ and ψ P Σ.
Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Let ϕ Ñ ψ P Γ. So there is a stage, n, with
position pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, such that ϕ Ñ ψ P ∆. At some following step or stage,
with a position pC 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q, the tree branches adding pC 1 : ∆1, ψ ñ Λ1 : D1q
to the left and pC 1 : ∆1 ñ ψ,∆1 : D1q, to the right. β must be one of these branches.
In the first case, since ∆1 Y tψu Ď Γ, ψ P Γ. In the second case, since Λ1 Y tϕu Ď Σ,
ϕ P Σ.
Let ϕ Ñ ψ P Σ. There is a stage, n, with position, pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq such
that ϕ Ñ ψ P Λ. At a later stage, with position pC 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q, by (3b) the
tree would have been extended by the position pC 1 : ∆1, ϕ ñ ψ,Λ1 : D1q. Since
∆1 Y tϕu Ď Γ and Λ1 Y tψu Ď Σ, ϕ P Γ and ψ P Σ.
Lemma 7.12. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If ♦ϕ P Γ, then there is a pC : ∆ ñ Λ :
Dq P Epβq such that ϕ P ∆, and if ♦ϕ P Σ, then for any pC : ∆ ñ Λ P Epβq, ϕ P Λ.
Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Suppose that ♦ϕ P Γ. So there is a stage, n, with
position pP : Π ñ Θ : Qq. At the following stage with position, P 1 : Π1 ñ Θ1 : Q1q P
ChpP : Π ñ Θ : Qq and hyper-position J . At that stage either there is a position,
pP 2 : Π2 ñ Θ2 : Q2q such that ϕ P Π2 or not. If it is, the result is given. If not,
then by (4a) the tree would be expanded by p: ϕ ñ :q; J . Since p: ϕ ñ :q; J P β
and p: ϕ ñ :q P p: ϕ ñ :q; J , UChp: ϕ ñ :q P Epβq. Let UChp: ϕ ñ :q be
pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq. Since tϕu Ď ∆, ϕ P ∆ for some pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq P Epβq.
Suppose that ♦ϕ P Σ. Let pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq P Epβq, but ϕ R Λ. There must be
some stage, n, with position, C 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1 such that UChpC 1∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q “
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pC 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q. At a later stage,n `m, there is a position pA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : B1q
such that UChpA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : B1q “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq. At stage n ` m ` 1, let
pP : Π ñ Θ : Qq P ChpC 1 : ∆1 ñ Λ1 : D1q. There is a position, pA2 : Γ2 ñ Σ2 :
B2q P ChpA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : B1q at that stage, with ♦ϕ P Σ1. Let the hyper-position at
m ` n ` 1 be pA2 : Γ2 ñ Σ2 : B2q; . . . ; pP : Π ñ Θ : Qq; . . . At stage m ` n ` 1.j,
by (4b), the tree is extended by pA2 : Γ2 ñ ϕ,Σ2 : B2q; . . . ; pP : Π ñ ϕ,Θ : Qq; . . ..
Since UChpP : Π ñ ϕ,Θ : Qq “ pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, ϕ P Λ. Thus, for all positions,
pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq P Epβq, ϕ P Λ.
Lemma 7.13. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If xλx1, . . . , xnϕyc1, . . . , cn P Γ then
c1, . . . , cn P A and ϕrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns P Γ and if xλxϕyc P Σ then either one of ci P B
or ϕrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns P Σ.
Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Suppose that xλx1, . . . xnϕyc1, . . . , cn P Γ. Then
there is a stage, n, with position pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq such that UChpC : ∆ ñ Λ :
Dq “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq and xλx1, . . . , xn P ∆. At some later stage, n` 1 let position
pP : Π ñ Θ : Qq P ChpC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq. At that point ϕrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns would
have been added to Π and c1, . . . , cn added to P . Thus, ϕrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns P Γ and
c1, . . . , cn P A.
Let xλx1, . . . , xnϕyc1, . . . , cn P Σ. There is a stage, n with hyper-position J and
position pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq P J such that UChpC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq
where xλx1, . . . , xnϕyc1, . . . , cn P Λ. By (5b) at stage n ` 1 the tree expands by
branching. The left-most branch has J with pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq replaced by pC :
∆, ϕrc1, x1s . . . rcn{xns ñ Λ : Dq as its leaf. The i` 1th branch has J with pC : ∆ ñ
Λ : Dq replaced by pC : ∆ ñ Λ : D, ciq as a leaf. β must pass through one of these
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branches. If it passes through the left-most branch then ϕrc1, x1s . . . rcn{xns P Σ. If
it passes through the i` 1th branch then ci P B.
Lemma 7.14. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If Dxϕ P Γ, then there is a witness, w,
such that w P A and ϕrw{xs P Γ and if Dxϕ P Σ, then for any name or witness, t,
appearing in Epβq, either t P B or ϕrt{xs P Σ.
Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Suppose that Dxϕ P Γ. There is a stage,
n, such that the hyper-position under consideration is J ; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, where
UChpC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq. Either there is a term, w, such that w P C
and ϕrw{xs P ∆ or not. If so, the result is given. If not, at stage the tree would have
been expanded by J ; pC,w : ∆, ϕrw{xs ñ Λ : Dq where w is the least element of W1
not occurring in J ; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq. Since pC,w : ∆, ϕrw{xs ñ Λ : Dq P ChpC :
∆ ñ Λ : Dq, UChpC,w : ∆, ϕrw{xs ñ Λ : Dq “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq. So w P A and
ϕrw{xs P Γ.
Suppose that Dxϕ P Σ. Suppose that there is a term, t, such that t R B, and
ϕrt{xs R Σ. Let t be the ith term in the ordering of T1 YW1. There is a stage, n,
such with hyper-position, J ; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq such that Dxϕ P Λ and UChpC : ∆ ñ
Λ : Dq “ A : Γ ñ Σ : B. Let K; pP : Π ñ Θ : Qq be the hyper-position under
consideration at stage n ` i and UChpP : Π ñ Θ : Qq “ A : Γ ñ Σ : B. By (6b)
the tree branches. On one branch ϕrt{xs is added to Π, on the other t is added to
Q. Since Epβq passes through one of these branches, either ϕrt{xs P Γ or t P B.
Lemma 7.15. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. If Dfϕ P Γ then there is a witness W of
the same arity of f , such that ϕrW {f s P Γ and if Dfϕ P Σ, then for all predicates or
λ-expressions, ξ, of the same arity as f , ϕrξ{f s P Σ.
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Proof. Let pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq P Epβq. Suppose that Dfϕ P Γ. There is a stage, n, such
that the hyper-position under consideration is J ; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq, where UChpC :
∆ ñ Λ : Dq “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq. Either there is a term, W , such that ϕrW {f s P ∆
or not. If so, the result is given. If not, at stage the tree would have been expanded
by J ; pC : ∆, ϕrW {f s ñ Λ : Dq where W is the least element of W2 not occurring
in J ; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq. Since pC : ∆, ϕrW {f s ñ Λ : Dq P ChpC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq,
UChpC : ∆, ϕrW {f s ñ Λ : Dq “ pA : Γ ñ Σ : Bq. So ϕrW {f s P Γ.
Suppose that Dfϕ P Σ. Suppose that there is a predicate expression, ε, such that
ϕrε{f s R Σ. Let ε be the ith term in the ordering of P . There is a stage, n, such with
hyper-position, J ; pC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq such that Dfϕ P Λ and UChpC : ∆ ñ Λ : Dq “
A : Γ ñ Σ : B. Let K; pP : Π ñ Θ : Qq be the hyper-position under consideration
at stage n ` i and UChpP : Π ñ Θ : Qq “ A : Γ ñ Σ : B. By (7b) ϕrt{xs is added
to Π.
Lemma 7.16. δMσ pw,F q “ δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnFx1, . . . , xnq, for all σ and n-ary pred-
icate F .
Proof. Let xo1, . . . , 0ny P δMσ pw,F q.
Since IMpw,F q Ď δMw p0qn, oi P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n. Let σ1 be such that
σpw, xiq “ oi for 1 ď i ď n and σ1 „x1,...,xn σ. It follows that M,w, σ1 |ù Fx1, . . . , xn.
So xσ1pw, x1q, . . . , σ1pw, xnqy P txσˆpw, x1q, . . . , σˆpw, xnqy : σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pw, xiq P
dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù Fx1, . . . , xnu, i.e. xσ1pw, x1q, . . . , σ1pw, xnqy P
δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnFx1, . . . , xnq. Since δMσ1 pw, xiq “ σ1pw, xiq “ oi for 1 ď i ď n,
xo1, . . . , ony P δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnFx1, . . . , xnq.
Let xo1, . . . on P δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnFx1, . . . xnq. So xo1, . . . ony P txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy :
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σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù Fx1, . . . , xnu. Let
σ1 „x1,...,xn σ and be such that σpw, xiq “ oi for 1 ď i ď n. So xδMσ1 pw, x1q, . . . δMσ1 pw, xnqy P
txδMσˆ pw, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pw, xnqy : σ „x1,...,xn σˆ&δMσˆ pw, xiq P dMw p0q for 1 ď i ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù
Fx1, . . . , xnu. Fromm this it follows thatM,w, σ1 |ù Fx1, . . . , xn. So xδMσ1 pw, x1q, . . . , δMσ1 pw, xnqy P
IMpw,F q. Thus, xo1, . . . , ony P IMpw,F q.
Lemma 7.17. In models where DM is countable, if X P dMw pnq then there is a closed
λ-expression, λx1, . . . , xnϕ, in an expanded language such that δ
M
σ pw, xλx1, . . . , xnq “
X.
Proof. If X P dMw then there is a stage in the construction of the model at which
it was added. If it was added at a base case, then there is an n-ary predicate, F ,
such that IMpw,F q “ X. By lemma 7.16, there is a closed lambda expression,
λx1, . . . , λxnFx1, . . . , xn, such that δ
M
σ pw, λx1, . . . , xnFx1, . . . , xnq “ X for all σ.
Let S be a countable set of witnesses. If X was added to dMw p0q at a later
stage, then either there already is a closed λ-expression, λx1, . . . , xnϕ such that
δMσ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕq “ X or there is a λ-expression, λx1, . . . , xnϕ with several free
variables, y1, . . . , ym, and a sequence, σ, such that δ
M
σ pw, λx1, . . . , xnϕq “ X. Since
the domain is countable, only countably many such sets will be added at any stage.
Since sentences are finite and the set of witnesses is countable for any such λ-
expression it is possible to do the following. Let si1 , . . . , sim be unassigned witnesses
and assign IMpv, sij “ σMσ pv, yjq for all v P WM .
A model, M , of G is constructed from Epβq. For each position pAi : Γi ñ Σi :
Biq P Epβq, let there be a world wi P WM , dwmp0q “ A, and for each n-ary atomic
predicate, F , if Ft1, . . . , tn P Γi, then xt1, . . . , tny P IMpw,F q and xt1, . . . , tny P dMw pnq.
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Lemma 7.18. Let pA1 : Γ1 ñ Σ1 : B1q; . . . ; pAn : Γn ñ Σn : Bnq; . . . be Epβq. for
each pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq P Epβq there is a world, w P WM , such that for each c P Ai,
c P dMw p0q, for each c P Bi, c R dMw p0q, for each ϕ P Γi, M,w |ù ϕ and for each
ϕ P Σi, M,w ­|ù ϕ.
Proof. It must be that for each pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq P Epβq, if c P Ai, then c P dMi p0q
where i is the world introduced to correspond to pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq. This is because
dMi p0q “ Ai. Similarly, suppose that c P Bi and c P dMi p0q. Since dMi p0q “ Ai, c P Ai.
But if c P Ai X Bi, the branch β would not be open, contradicting the assumption
that it was.
The second claim is proved by induction on ϕ.
Case 1 (ϕ is atomic). Let ϕ be Ft1, . . . , tn. Let ϕ P Γi for some pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq.
Let wi P WM , be the world added to correspond to that position. By lemma 7.9 for
each ti, 1 ď i ď n, ti P A, and so ti P dMi for 1 ď i ď n. By the construction of
M , xt1, . . . , tny P IMpi, F q iff Ft1, . . . , tn P Γi. Since Ft1, . . . , tn P Γi by hypothesis,
IMpϕq “ 1.
Let ϕ P Σi. By the construction of, M , xt1, . . . , tny P IMpi, F q iff Ft1, . . . , tn P Γi.
If ϕ P Γi, then the branch β would have closed, so ϕ R Γi. It follows that xt1, . . . , tny R
IMpi, F q, so M, i ­|ù ϕ.
Case 2 (ϕ is  ψ). Let ϕ P Γi. By lemma 7.10, ψ P Σi. By IH, M, i ­|ù ψ, so
M, i |ù  ψ.
Let ϕ P Σi. By lemma 7.10, ψ P Γi. By IH, M, i |ù ψ, so M, i ­|ù  ψ.
Case 3 (ϕ is ψ Ñ θ). Let ϕ P Γi. By lemma 7.11 either ψ P Σi or θ P Γi. In the
first case, by IH, M, i ­|ù ψ, so M, i |ù ψ Ñ θ. In the second, by IH, M, i |ù θ, so
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M, i |ù ψ Ñ θ.
Let ϕ P Σi. By lemma 7.11, ψ P Γi and θ P Σi. By IH, M, i |ù ψ and M, i ­|ù θ.
So M, i ­|ù ψ Ñ θ.
Case 4 (ϕ is ♦ψ). Let ϕ P Γi. By lemma 7.12, there is a position, pAj : Γj ñ Σj : Bjq,
such that ψ P Γj. Let j P WM be the world that corresponds to that position. By
IH, M, j |ù ψ. There is a world, j P WM , such that M, j |ù ψ, so M, i |ù ♦ψ.
Let ϕ P Γi. By lemma 7.12 for any pAj : Γj ñ Σj : Bjq P Epβq, ψ P Σj. So for
any world, j, corresponding to a position, pAj : Γj ñ Σj : Bjq P Epβq, M, j ­|ù ψ.
But for any world, w P WM , there is a corresponding position. So for any world, w,
M,w ­|ù ψ. From that it follows that, M, i ­|ù ♦ψ.
Case 5 (ϕ is xλx1, . . . , xnϕyc1, . . . , cn). Suppose that ϕ P Γi for pAi : Γi ñ Σi :
Biq. By lemma 7.13, c1, . . . , cn P Ai and ψrc1{xis, . . . , rcn{xns P Γi. Let σ be
a sequence and σ1 „x1,...,xn σ such that σpxjq “ IMpcjq for 1 ď j ď n. It fol-
lows that σpxjq P dMj p0q for 1 ď j ď n. By lemma 7.7, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. So
xσ1px1q, . . . , σ1pxnqy P txδMσˆ pi, x1q, . . . , δMσˆ pi, xnqy : σˆ „x1,...,xn σ&δMσˆ pi, xjq P dMi p0q
for 1 ď j ď n&M,w, σˆ |ù ψu, that is xσpx1q, . . . , σpxnqy P IMpi, λx1, . . . , xnψq. Since
σpxjq “ IMpcjq for 1 ď j ď n, xIMpc1q, . . . , IMpcnqy P IMpi, λx1, . . . , xnψq. Since σ
was arbitrary, this can be done for any sequence. So M,w |ù xλx1, . . . , xnϕyc1, . . . , cn.
Suppose that ϕ P Σi. By lemma 7.13 either ψrc1{x1s, . . . , rcn{xns P Σi or for
some cj, cj P Bi. Suppose that xδMσ pc1q, . . . , δMσ pcnqy P δMσ1 pi, xλx1, . . . , xnψq for some
σ „x1,...,xn σ1. So IMpcjq P dMw p0q for 1 ď j ď n and M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since Ai “ dMw p0q
and cj “ IMpcj for 1 ď j ď n, c1, . . . , cn P Ai. Since Epβq is open, there is no cj such
that cj P Bi. Thus, ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns P Σi. By IH, M,w |ù ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns.
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So M,w, σ1 |ù ψrc1{x1s . . . rcn{xns. But by lemma 7.7, this contradicts the fact that
M,w, σ1 |ù ψ.
Case 6 (ϕ is Dxψ). Suppose that ϕ P Γi. By lemma 7.14, there is a witness, wj P Ai
such that ψrwj{xs P Γi. By IH, M,w |ù ψrwj{xs. Let σ be a sequence. Let σ1 „x σ
be such that σ1pxq “ IMpwjq. By lemma 7.7, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since σ1 „x σ and
δMσ pi, xq P dMi p0q, M,w, σ |ù Dxψ. Since σ was arbitrary, this holds for any sequence.
Suppose that ϕ P Σi. Suppose that there is a sequence, σ such that M, i, σ |ù Dxψ.
So there is a sequence, σ1 such that σ „x σ1, δMσ1 pi, xq P dMi p0q and M, iσ1 |ù ψ. Since
Ai “ dMi p0q, there is a term or witness, t, such that t P Ai. By lemma 7.14,
ψrt{xs P Σi. IH entails that M,w ­|ù ψrt{xs. But by lemma 7.7, this contradicts that
M,w, σ1 |ù ψ.
Case 7 (ϕ is Dfψ). Suppose that ϕ P Γi. By lemma 7.15, there is a witness, W ,
such that ψrW {f s P Γi. By IH, M,w |ù ψrW {f s. Let σ1 „W σ be such that
σ1pj, fq “ IMpj,W q for all j P WM . By lemma 7.7, M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. So there is a
sequence, σ1 such that σ1 „f σ and M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. So M,w, σ |ù Dfψ. Since σ was
arbitrary, this holds for all sequences.
Let ϕ P Σi. Let M,w, σ |ù Dfψ. So there is a sequence, σ1 such that σ1 „f σ
and M,w, σ1 |ù ψ. Since DM is countable and contains witnesses for each el-
ement of DM , by lemma 7.17, there is a closed λ-expression, λx1, . . . , xnθ such
that IMpj, λx1, . . . , xnθq “ σMσ1 pj, fq , for all j P WM . By lemma 7.7, M,w, σ1 |ù
ψrλx1, . . . , xnθ{f s. However, by lemma 7.15, ψrλx1, . . . , xnθ{f s P Σi. But applying
IH contradicts the fact that M,w, σ1 |ù ψrλx1, . . . , xnθ{f s.
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Theorem 7.6.2. M is a counter-example to G.
Proof. Lemma 7.18 establishes that M is a counter-example to Epβq. For any posi-
tion, pCi : ∆i ñ Λi : Diq P G, there is a position, pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq P Epβq, such
that Ci Ď Ai, ∆i Ď Γi, Λi Ď Σi, and Di Ď Bi. Lemma 7.18 shows that for any posi-
tion, pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq P Epβq, there is a world, i P WM that is a counter-example
to pAi : Γi ñ Σi : Biq. It follows that for position, pCi : ∆i ñ Λi : Diq, there is a
world, i P WM , such that i is a counter-example to pCi : ∆i ñ Λi : Diq. Thus, M is
a counter-example to G.
It follows from theorem 7.6.2 that for any unprovable hyper-position, there is a
model that counter-examples it.
Theorem 7.6.3. If there is a deduction of G, then there is a deduction of G without
use of the cut-rule.
Proof. Theorem 7.6.2 did not depend on the cut rule. Thus, if a hyper-position is
not provable using the cut rule, there is a model, M , such that M ­|ù G. Let there
be a deduction of G using Cut, but no deduction of G without Cut. Since there is
no deduction of G without Cut, there is a model, M , such that M ­|ù G. But since
G is provable with Cut, by theorem 7.5.1 there is no model, M , such that M ­|ù G.
Since there is a contradiction, if there is a derivation of a hpyersequent that makes
use of Cut, there is a derivation that does not.
Theorem 7.6.4. If there is a deduction of G, then there is a deduction of G without
the use of the Cutt rule.
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Proof. As with theorem 7.6.3 this follows from the fact that the proof of theorem 7.6.2
did not rely on Cutt although that rule is sound.
7.7 Discussion
Prior [43] and Williamson [74] propose problems for a logic that can capture con-
tingentism. Prior argues that if the existence of a being named by ‘a’ is expressed
by the sentence ‘Dffa’ then necessitation is not valid and the modal operators ˝
and ♦ are not inter-definable. Williamson argues that a contingentist logic requires
free first-order quantification and therefore also requires free second-order quantifi-
cation. However, he claims, if a logic with free second-order quantifiers is not strong
enough to prove important instances of the modal comprehension schemas. Sec-
tion 7.2 showed that PHIL addresses both of these concerns. Prior’s arguments are
shown to be fail because of his assumption that all judgments can be converted into
acts of predication. Williamson’s arguments are addressed directly. The second-
order quantifiers of PHIL are free but the free and classical accounts of second-order
quantification collapse because PHIL is bivalent.
In order for a calculus to be adequate it must meet two standards. It must
uniquely characterize the expressions for which it has operational rules and it must
be cut admissible. Uniqueness guarantees that the meaning of those expressions is
fully specified, i.e. introducing another expression by the same rules will always
result in the one being substitutable for the other while preserving validity. The cut-
admissibility of PHIL entails that it has some other useful properties. For instance,
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each of the fragments of the language of PHIL conservatively extends the rest of the
language. A version of the generalized sub-formula property is also true of PHIL.
From this it follows that proof-search in PHIL is somewhat constrained. These
properties suggest that independently of the solutions to the above difficulties that
PHIL offers, it is well-motivated and natural.
7.7.1 Existence
This chapter assumes that the existence of a being named by ‘a’ is captured by
the sentence ‘Dffa’. This leaves open the question whether the sentence ‘Dffa’ is,
according to PHIL, an adequate account of existence. As discussed in section 7.1 the
reading of A : Γ ñ Σ : B is that one takes that position up by taking all of A to
denote, asserting all of Γ, denying all of Σ, and taking all of B to be non-denoting.
If it is coherent to assert that a being named by ‘a’ exists then it is coherent to take
the term ‘a’ to denote. Conversely, if it is coherent to deny that a being named by ‘a’
exists then it is coherent to take ‘a’ not to denote. These claims can be interpreted,
in another mode of speaking, as the sentence ‘a exists’ is true iff a exists where
A : Γ ñ Σ : B is read as saying that all of A exists, all of Γ is true, all of Σ is
false, and all of B fails to exist. Theorem 7.5.1 and theorem 7.6.2 suggest that such
a reading of positions may be appropriate for PHIL. Let L 1 be L expanded by a
unary predicate E!, the existence predicate. The above remarks suggest that the
rules governing E! in PHIL are the following12
12As in section 7.1 only position as opposed to hyper-positions are considered in the discussion
of the existence predicate. Any remarks made here can also be made about the full logic of hyper-
positions as a result of theorem 7.6.4 and theorem 7.6.3.
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A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B
LE!
A : Γ, E!tñ Σ : B
A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t
RE!
A : Γ ñ E!t,Σ : B
The question of whether the sentence ‘Dffa’ adequately expresses that the being
denoted by ‘a1 exists can now be reduced to the question of whether or not Dffa
is everywhere substitutable for E!a. The following two deductions show that this is
the case
A, t : Γ ñ Σ : B
AL
A : Γ, F tñ Σ : B
LD2 A : Γ, Dfftñ Σ : B
Id(s)
A : Γ, F tñ Ft,Σ : B
R 
A : Γ ñ Ft, Ft,Σ : B
R_
A : Γ ñ Ft_ Ft,Σ : B A : Γ ñ Σ : B, t
Rλ
A : Γ ñ xλxFx_ Fxyt,Σ : B
RD2 A : Γ ñ Dfft,Σ : B
The open branch of each deduction is a valid place to apply RE! or LE!. All the
other branches of the deductions are closed. Therefore, in any deduction where an
application of RE! or LE! occurs the right or left deduction respectively can replace
the rule governing the existence predicate. The sentence ‘Dffa’ adequately expresses
the existence of a being denoted by ‘a’ in PHIL.
7.7.2 Truth and Being
This chapter has been primarily concerned with the logic of assertions, denials, judg-
ments and acts of predication in a higher-order modal language. Alternatively, it
could be interpreted as being about the coherence relations between existing beings,
true sentences, false sentences, and non-existent beings. This is only an account of
what combinations of such things are logically possible. This focus can address some
issues for contingentism, in particular those raised by Prior [43] and Williamson [74]
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The logical investigation leaves unanswered questions about the nature of truth
and being with respect to modal discourse. Suppose that A : Γ ñ Σ : B is a
coherent position and, in fact, the true position. An investigation of logic alone
does not answer the question of what makes it the case that A : Γ ñ Σ : B has
this privileged status amongst other coherent positions. This chapter leaves out the
relation between the coherence of a position and a true position. This, in turn, leaves
open the question of in virtue of what a sentence of the form ♦pDffaq ^  Dffa is
true.
The modest aim of this chapter was to introduce PHIL and show that it could
overcome several difficult problems facing contingentism and was well-behaved proof-
theoretically. These features of PHIL suggest that it is a candidate for the right logic
in which discourse about possibilities is to be conducted.
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